161 research outputs found
Umicore Building for Umicore Precious Metals Refining in Hoboken, Belgium
Material of interest: Hybrid or composite materials
Material used: Zinc panels
Properties of material: Zinc Panels are used to clad both the wall and roof systems. This material is naturally occurring and very abundant. In addition, this material can be reused, in the case that the panels are removed or once they are replaced.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/bcs/1127/thumbnail.jp
Radical Pluralism, Classificatory Norms and the Legitimacy of Species Classifications
Moderate pluralism is a popular position in contemporary philosophy of biology. Despite its popularity, various authors have argued that it tends to slide off into a radical form of pluralism that is both normatively and descriptively unacceptable. This paper looks at the case of biological species classification, and evaluates a popular way of avoiding radical pluralism by relying on the shared aims and norms of a discipline. The main contention is that while these aims and norms may play an important role in the legitimacy of species classifications, they fail to fend off radical pluralism. It follows from this that the legitimacy of species classifications is also determined by local decisions about the aims of research and how to operationalize and balance these. This is important, I argue, because it means that any acceptable view on the legitimacy of classification should be able to account for these local decisions.This work was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/14/Pool/5) and by the Research Foundation - Flanders (FWO; research project 3H160214)
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Values, regulation, and species delimitation
Garnett and Christidis (2017) [hereafter GC] recently proposed that the International Union of the Biological Sciences
should centrally regulate the taxonomy of complex organisms. Their proposal was met with much criticism (e.g.
HoĆyĆski 2017; Thomson et al., 2018), and perhaps most extensively from Raposo et al. (2017) in this journal. The main
target of this criticism was GCâs call to, first, ârestrict the freedom of taxonomic actionâ, and, second, to let social,
political and conservation values weigh in on species classification. Some commentators even went as far as to draw a
comparison with the infamous Lysenko-case of state-controlled and heavily restricted science (Raposo et al. 2017, 181;
HoĆyĆski 2017, 12). This comment will argue, without thereby endorsing GCâs position, that these two aspects of their
views need not be as threatening as this comparison suggests, and indeed are very reasonable
Measuring evolutionary independence: A pragmatic approach to species classification
After decades of debates about species concepts, there is broad agreement that species are evolving lineages. However, species classification is still in a state of disorder: different methods of delimitation lead to competing outcomes for the same organisms, and the groups recognised as species are of widely different kinds. This paper considers whether this problem can be resolved by developing a unitary scale for evolutionary independence. Such a scale would show clearly when groups are comparable and allow taxonomists to choose a conventional threshold of independence for species status. Existing measurement approaches to species delimitation are typically shot down by what I call the heterogeneity objection, according to which independently evolving groups are too heterogeneous to be captured by a single scale. I draw a parallel with the measurement of temperature to argue that this objection does not provide sufficient reasons to abandon the measurement approach, and that such an approach may even help to make the vague notion of evolutionary independence more precise
Integrative Taxonomy and the Operationalization of Evolutionary Independence
There is growing agreement among taxonomists that species are independently evolving lineages. The central notion of this conception, evolutionary independence, is commonly operationalized by taxonomists in multiple, diverging ways. This leads to a problem of operationalization-dependency in species classification, as species delimitation is not only dependent on the properties of the investigated groups, but also on how taxonomists choose to operationalize evolutionary independence. The question then is how the operationalization-dependency of species delimitation is compatible with its objectivity and reliability. In response to this problem, various taxonomists have proposed to integrate multiple operationalizations of evolutionary independence for delimiting species. This paper first distinguishes between a standard and a sophisticated integrative approach to taxonomy, and argues that it is unclear how either of these can support the reliability and objectivity of species delimitation. It then draws a parallel between the measurement of physical quantities and species delimitation to argue that species delimitation can be considered objective and reliable if we understand the sophisticated integrative approach as assessing the coherence between the idealized models of multiple operationalizations of evolutionary independence
Against Natural Kind Eliminativism
It has recently been argued that the concept of natural kinds should be eliminated because it does not play a productive theoretical role and even harms philosophical research on scientific classification. We argue that this justification for eliminativism fails because the notion of ânatural kindsâ plays another epistemic role in philosophical research, namely, it enables fruitful investigation into non-arbitrary classification. It does this in two ways: first, by providing a fruitful investigative entry into scientific classification; and second â as is supported by bibliometric evidence â by tying together a research community devoted to non-arbitrary classification. The question of eliminativism then requires weighing off the benefits of retaining the concept against its harms. We argue that the progressive state of philosophical work on natural kinds tips this balance in favour of retaining the concept
Against Natural Kind Eliminativism
It has recently been argued that the concept of natural kinds should be eliminated because it does not play a productive theoretical role and even harms philosophical research on scientific classification. We argue that this justification for eliminativism fails because the notion of ânatural kindsâ plays another epistemic role in philosophical research, namely, it enables fruitful investigation into non-arbitrary classification. It does this in two ways: first, by providing a fruitful investigative entry into scientific classification; and second â as is supported by bibliometric evidence â by tying together a research community devoted to non-arbitrary classification. The question of eliminativism then requires weighing off the benefits of retaining the concept against its harms. We argue that the progressive state of philosophical work on natural kinds tips this balance in favour of retaining the concept
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Radical Pluralism, Ontological Underdetermination, and the Role of Values in Species Classification
The main claim of this thesis is that value-judgments should play a profound role in the construction and evaluation of species classifications. The arguments for this claim will be presented over the course of five chapters. These are divided into two main parts; part one, which consists of the two first chapters, presents an argument for a radical form of species pluralism; part two, which comprises the remaining chapters, discusses the implications of radical species pluralism for the role of values in species classification.
The content of the five chapters is as follows. Chapter 1 starts with a discussion of the theoretical assumptions concerning species and natural kinds that form the broad framework within which the arguments of the thesis are placed. The aim of this chapter is to introduce a set of relatively uncontroversial assumptions that frame the rest of the thesis. On the basis of these assumptions, chapter 2 presents an argument for radical species pluralism. The chapter substantiates this argument with a broad range of examples, and compares this position to other forms of species pluralism. Chapter 3 returns to the main interest of the thesis, namely, the role of values in species classification. It introduces the notion of values and presents an argument for the value-ladenness of taxonomy on the basis of the considerations in the first two chapters. It then sketches three important views on values in science in the literature. Chapter 4 argues that the case presented in chapter 3 provides strong support for one of these views, called the âAims Viewâ, and against two other prominent views, called the âEpistemic Priority Viewâ and the âValue-Free Idealâ. The resulting view, in line with the Aims View, is that value-judgments should play a particularly substantial role in species classification. Chapter 5 then considers the popular assumption that these value-judgments in taxonomy commonly take the shape of generally accepted classificatory norms, and argues that this assumption is not tenable. Finally, a brief concluding chapter points at some implications of the claims and arguments in this thesis.AHRC Doctoral Training Partnership (DTP) - AHRC - Walker Studentship
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Measuring evolutionary independence: A pragmatic approach to species classification
After decades of debates about species concepts, there is broad agreement that species are evolving lineages. However, species classification is still in a state of disorder: different methods of delimitation lead to competing outcomes for the same organisms, and the groups recognised as species are of widely different kinds. This paper considers whether this problem can be resolved by developing a unitary scale for evolutionary independence. Such a scale would show clearly when groups are comparable and allow taxonomists to choose a conventional threshold of independence for species status. Existing measurement approaches to species delimitation are typically shot down by what I call the heterogeneity objection, according to which independently evolving groups are too heterogeneous to be captured by a single scale. I draw a parallel with the measurement of temperature to argue that this objection does not provide sufficient reasons to abandon the measurement approach, and that such an approach may even help to make the vague notion of evolutionary independence more precise
Measuring the Isolation of Research Topics in Philosophy
Various authors have recently argued that certain parts of academic philosophy are highly isolated from other fields of academic research. The central aim of this paper is to go beyond philosophical arguments, and empirically test whether this is indeed the case. More specifically, we investigate whether domains of Core Philosophy, like metaphysics and epistemology, are more isolated than Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Value Issues. To do this, we collected 2,369 WoS indexed papers divided into 17 Philpapers topics from these three kinds of philosophy, and used 11 indicators to measure their isolation. The results show that both Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Value Issues are less isolated than Core Philosophy. In addition, general topics in Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Value Issues tend to be more isolated than applied topics. These results suggest that the isolation of philosophy could be alleviated by shifting the priority from Core Philosophy to applied Philosophy of Science and Value Issues
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