Market and Non-Market Mechanisms for the Optimal Allocation of Scarce Resources

Both market (e.g. auctions) and non-market mechanisms (e.g. lotteries and priority lists) are used to allocate a large amount of scarce public resources that produce large private benefits and small consumption externalities. I study a model in which the use of both market and non-market mechanisms can be rationalized. Agents are risk neutral and heterogeneous in terms of their monetary value for a good and their opportunity cost of money, which are both private information. The designer wants to allocate a set of identical goods to the agents with the highest values. To achieve her goal, she can screen agents on the basis of their observable characteristics, and on the basis of information on their willingness to pay that she can extract using market mechanisms. In contrast to models where willingness to pay and value coincide, a first best cannot be achieved. My main result is that both market and non-market mechanisms, or hybrid mechanisms, can be optimal depending on the prior information available to the designer. In particular, non-market mechanisms may be optimal if the value is positively correlated with the opportunity cost of money.

Endogenous Trading Networks

We investigate the effects of a class of trading protocols on the architecture and efficiency properties of endogenously formed trading networks. In our model, the opportunity to sell valuable objects occurs randomly to different individuals. A sale can only be realized if two individuals are connected, directly or indirectly, but forming and maintaining a trading relation is a costly investment. When the outcome of trading is efficient and provides no intermediation rents, a tension between equilibrium and efficient networks emerges when the cost of forming a link is at an intermediate level. There are two types of inefficiencies. Either all equilibrium networks are under- connected when compared to efficient networks, or a multiplicity of equilibriam may exist and agents may fail to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium network

Peripherality and proximity. Do business support services matter?

This essay is based on empirical evidence from the case of Tuscany (Italy) and follows previous work on the role and meaning of image in regional development and innovation policies (Bellini, 2004). Discussions about image and branding policies is usually placed in the framework of "place marketing" and marketing literature helps in defining the features, components and main characters of image and of its relationship with local identity. We suggest, however, that managing images is also a political process with significant impact in supporting and shaping the scenario (perceptions and expectations) for innovation policies. In fact this process implies a competition between images in order to "control" the representation of the past, present and future of an area. This competition aims at influencing the policy agenda by manipulating the gap between image and identity. In other words, we suggest that image-related policies should be considered part of the toolbox of a modern innovation policy.

Networks of motifs from sequences of symbols

We introduce a method to convert an ensemble of sequences of symbols into a weighted directed network whose nodes are motifs, while the directed links and their weights are defined from statistically significant co-occurences of two motifs in the same sequence. The analysis of communities of networks of motifs is shown to be able to correlate sequences with functions in the human proteome database, to detect hot topics from online social dialogs, to characterize trajectories of dynamical systems, and might find other useful applications to process large amount of data in various fields.Comment: Accepted for publication in Phys. Rev. Lett. Main article 4 pages, 2 figure; supplementary material 4 pages, 1 figur

Efficient and Equitable Airport Slot Allocation

This paper studies slot allocation at congested airports in Europe. First, I discuss the inefficiencies of the current regulation, introduced as part of the liberalisation process of the air transport market. Then, I consider three marked based methods which are suitable to achieve a more efficient allocation of slots to airlines: congestion pricing, auctions and secondary trading. These methods are examined in terms of their ability to improve efficiency and in terms of their implications on the distribution of slots’ scarcity rents. Special attention is drawn to complementarities between slots. Finally, I propose to auction slots periodically, allowing secondary trading well before the first auction takes place. By selling slots before the first auction incumbents can be partially compensated for the subsequent withdrawal of their slots.

What money can't buy: allocations with priority lists, lotteries and queues

I study the welfare optimal allocation of a number of identical and indivisible objects to a set of heterogeneous risk-neutral agents under the hypothesis that money is not available. Agents have independent private values, which represent the maximum time that they are will- ing to wait in line to obtain a good. A priority list, which ranks agents according to their expected values, is optimal when hazard rates of the distributions of values are increasing. Queues, which allocates the ob- ject to those who wait in line the longest, are optimal in a symmetric setting with decreasing hazard rates.rationing; queues; priority lists; lotteries.

Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources

Both market (e.g. auctions) and non-market mechanisms (e.g. lotteries and priority lists) are used to allocate a large amount of scarce public resources that produce large private benefits and small consumption externalities. I study a model in which the use of both market and non-market mechanisms can be rationalized. Agents are risk neutral and heterogeneous in terms of their monetary value for a good and their opportunity cost of money, which are both private information. The designer wants to allocate a set of identical goods to the agents with the highest values. To achieve her goal, she can screen agents on the basis of their observable characteristics, and on the basis of information on their willingness to pay that she can extract using market mechanisms. In contrast to models where willingness to pay and value coincide, a first best cannot be achieved. My main result is that both market and non-market mechanisms, or hybrid mechanisms, can be optimal depending on the prior information available to the designer. In particular, non-market mechanisms may be optimal if the value is positively correlated with the opportunity cost of money

El cardenal Rodrigo de Borja mecenas de Francesco Pagano y Paolo da San Leocadio

Català: Notícies sobre els pintors Francesco Pagano i Paolo da San Leocadio, relacionades amb la seva formació professional i, sobretot, amb els àngels de l'absis de la capella major de la seu de València, encarregats pel bisbe Roderic de Borja el 1472. Possible influència en aquesta obra dels frescos d'Antoniozzo Romano per a la capella del cardenal Bessarió de la basílica dels Dotze apòstols a Roma. No s'accepta la identificació de Pagano amb Francesco, "cartaro di Napoli". English: Information about the painters Francesco Pagano and Paolo da San Leocadio concerning both their training and their role in the work of art of the angels in the apse of the chapel of the cathedral of Valencia, commissioned by the bishop Roderic Borgia in 1472. Also analyzed is the possible influence of Antoniozzo Romano's frescoes in the chapel of Cardinal Bessarion (Basilica of the Twelve Apostles in Rome) on this artist's work. In addition, the paper demonstrates that the current identification of Francesco Pagano with Francesco, "cartaro di Napoli", can no more be accepted. Italiano: Notizie sui pittori Francesco Pagano e Paolo da San Leocadio, relazionate con la loro formazione professionale e, soprattutto, con gli angeli dell'abside della cappella maggiore della cattedrale di Valencia, commissionati dal vescovo Rodrigo Borgia nel 1472. Possibile influenza in quest'opera degli affreschi di Antoniozzo Romano per la cappella del cardinale Bessarione della basilica dei Dodici Apostoli a Roma e rifiuto dell'identificazione di Pagano con Francesco, "cartaro di Napoli"

Bilateral Trading in Networks

We study an incomplete-information model of sequential bargaining for a single object, with the novel feature that agents are located in a network. In each round of trade, the current owner of the object either consumes it or makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to some connected trader. Traders may buy in order to consume or to resale to others. We show that the equilibrium price dynamics is non-monotone and that traders that intermediate the object arise endogenously and attain a pro t. We also provide insights on how traders' equilibrium payoffs depend on their location in the network.