2,868 research outputs found
Concentrations and snow-atmosphere fluxes of reactive nitrogen at Summit, Greenland
Concentrations and fluxes of NOy (total reactive nitrogen), ozone concentrations and fluxes of sensible heat, water vapor, and momentum were measured from May 1 to July 20, 1995 at Summit, Greenland. Median NOy concentrations declined from 947 ppt in May to 444 ppt by July. NOy fluxes were observed into and out of the snow, but the magnitudes were usually below 1 μmol m−2 h−1 because of the low HNO3 concentration and weak turbulence over the snow surface. Some of the highest observed fluxes may be due to temporary storage by equilibrium sorption of peroxyacetylnitrate (PAN) or other organic nitrogen species on ice surfaces in the upper snowpack. Sublimation of snow at the surface or during blowing snow events is associated with efflux of NOy from the snowpack. Because the NOy fluxes during summer at Summit are bidirectional and small in magnitude, the net result of turbulent NOyexchange is insignificant compared to the 2 μmol m−2 d−1 mean input from fresh snow during the summer months. If the arctic NOy reservoir is predominantly PAN (or compounds with similar properties), thermal dissociation of this NOy is sufficient to support the observed flux of nitrate in fresh snow. Very low HNO3 concentrations in the surface layer (1% of total NOy) reflect the poor ventilation of the surface layer over the snowpack combined with the relatively rapid uptake of HNO3 by fog, falling snow, and direct deposition to the snowpack
Your money or your life: Comparing judgements in trolley problems involving economic and emotional Harms, injury and death: Natalie gold et al
There is a long-standing debate in philosophy about whether it is morally permissible to harm one person in order to prevent a greater harm to others and, if not, what is the moral principle underlying the prohibition. Hypothetical moral dilemmas are used in order to probe moral intuitions. Philosophers use them to achieve a reflective equilibrium between intuitions and principles, psychologists to investigate moral decision-making processes. In the dilemmas, the harms that are traded off are almost always deaths. However, the moral principles and psychological processes are supposed to be broader than this, encompassing harms other than death. Further, if the standard pattern of intuitions is preserved in the domain of economic harm, then that would open up the possibility of studying behaviour in trolley problems using the tools of experimental economics. We report the results of two studies designed to test whether the standard patterns of intuitions are preserved when the domain and severity of harm are varied. Our findings show that the difference in moral intuitions between bystander and footbridge scenarios is replicated across different domains and levels of physical and non-physical harm, including economic harms
The resistance of randomly grown trees
Copyright @ 2011 IOP Publishing Ltd. This is a preprint version of the published article which can be accessed from the link below.An electrical network with the structure of a random tree is considered: starting from a root vertex, in one iteration each leaf (a vertex with zero or one adjacent edges) of the tree is extended by either a single edge with probability p or two edges with probability 1 − p. With each edge having a resistance equal to 1 omega, the total resistance Rn between the root vertex and a busbar connecting all the vertices at the nth level is considered. A dynamical system is presented which approximates Rn, it is shown that the mean value (Rn) for this system approaches (1 + p)/(1 − p) as n → ∞, the distribution of Rn at large n is also examined. Additionally, a random sequence construction akin to a random Fibonacci sequence is used to approximate Rn; this sequence is shown to be related to the Legendre polynomials and its mean is shown to converge with |(Rn) − (1 + p)/(1 − p)| ∼ n−1/2.Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC
Memory-Based Snowdrift Game on Networks
We present a memory-based snowdrift game (MBSG) taking place on networks. We
found that, when a lattice is taken to be the underlying structure, the
transition of spatial patterns at some critical values of the payoff parameter
is observable for both 4 and 8-neighbor lattices. The transition points as well
as the styles of spatial patterns can be explained by local stability analysis.
In sharp contrast to previously reported results, cooperation is promoted by
the spatial structure in the MBSG. Interestingly, we found that the frequency
of cooperation of the MBSG on a scale-free network peaks at a specific value of
the payoff parameter. This phenomenon indicates that properly encouraging
selfish behaviors can optimally enhance the cooperation. The memory effects of
individuals are discussed in detail and some non-monotonous phenomena are
observed on both lattices and scale-free networks. Our work may shed some new
light on the study of evolutionary games over networks.Comment: 6 pages, 6 figures, to be published in Phys. Rev.
Ras-mediated phosphorylation of a conserved threonine residue enhances the transactivation activities of c-Ets1 and c-Ets2
The Ras oncogene products regulate the expression of genes in transformed cells, and members of the Ets family of transcription factors have been implicated in this process. To determine which Ets factors are the targets of Ras signaling pathways, the abilities of several Ets factors to activate Ras-responsive enhancer (RRE) reporters in the presence of oncogenic Ras were examined. In transient transfection assay, reporters containing RREs composed of Ets-AP-1 binding sites could be activated 30-fold in NIH 3T3 fibroblasts and 80-fold in the macrophage-like line RAW264 by the combination of Ets1 or Ets2 and Ras but not by several other Ets factors that were tested in the assay. Ets2 and Ras also superactivated an RRE composed of Ets-Ets binding sites, but the Ets-responsive promoter of the c-fms gene was not superactivated. Mutation of a threonine residue to alanine in the conserved amino-terminal regions of Ets1 and Ets2 (threonine 38 and threonine 72, respectively) abrogated the ability of each of these proteins to superactivate reporter gene expression. Phosphoamino acid analysis of radiolabeled Ets2 revealed that Ras induced normally absent threonine-specific phosphorylation of the protein. The Ras-dependent increase in threonine phosphorylation was not observed in Ets2 proteins that had the conserved threonine 72 residue mutated to alanine or serine. These data indicate that Ets1 and Ets2 are specific nuclear targets of Ras signaling events and that phosphorylation of a conserved threonine residue is a necessary molecular component of Ras-mediated activation of these transcription factors
Introductions to the Community: Early-Career Researchers in the Time of COVID-19
COVID-19 has unfortunately halted lab work, conferences, and in-person networking, which is especially detrimental to researchers just starting their labs. Through social media and our reviewer networks, we met some early-career stem cell investigators impacted by the closures. Here, they introduce themselves and their research to our readers
A tale of two tables
PostprintPeer reviewe
Explaining Strategic Coordination: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory, Strong Stackelberg Reasoning, and Team Reasoning Author Note
Abstract In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually optimal outcomes, but orthodox game theory provides no reason for them to play their individual parts in these seemingly obvious solutions and no justification for choosing the corresponding strategies. A number of theories have been suggested to explain coordination, among the most prominent being versions of cognitive hierarchy theory, theories of team reasoning, and social projection theory (in symmetric games). Each of these theories provides a plausible explanation but is theoretically problematic. An improved theory of strong Stackelberg reasoning avoids these problems and explains coordination among players who care about their co-players' payoffs and who act as though their co-players can anticipate their choices. Two experiments designed to test cognitive hierarchy, team reasoning, and strong Stackelberg theories against one another in games without obvious, payoff-dominant solutions suggest that each of the theories provides part of the explanation. Cognitive hierarchy Level-1 reasoning, facilitated by a heuristic of avoiding the worst payoff, tended to predominate, especially in more complicated games, but strong Stackelberg reasoning occurred quite frequently in the simpler games and team reasoning in both the simpler and the more complicated games. Most players considered two or more of these reasoning processes before choosing their strategies
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