Relativismo e differenza chez Wittgenstein

Il saggio affronta il tema del presunto relativismo sia concettuale sia epistemico nel pensiero del secondo Wittgenstein. Sostiene che la posizione di Wittgenstein non sia genuinamente relativista e che sia più corretto interpretarla come una forma di antirealismo

Critical notice of Origins of Objectivity, Oxford, by Tyler Burge

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Self-knowledge (but not : "know thyself")

"If I ask you right now “What are you thinking?”, or “What are you feeling?” you really don’t seem to have a lot of work to do in order to be able to answer my question. Be sincere—nobody is going to hear you—and voice it out loud “What a bore, I have this paper to read for the Fellows’ luncheon. It’s in philosophy of mind—mmh, what is it?—; I can’t wait to go back to my own stuff. Well, after all, life is almost perfect at the Italian Academy, I guess I can put up with this little chore”. So easy: to know your own mind takes just one moment reflection and you can immediately pour out a whole series of thoughts, beliefs, desires, feelings, emotions and sensations.

Critical notice of Tyler Burge's Origins of Objectivity

The paper provides a presentation and critical assessment of Tyler Burge's monumental *Origins of Objectivity

Stopping points: ‘I’, immunity and the real guarantee

The aim of the paper is to bring out exactly what makes first-personal (and more generally indexical and demonstrative) contents special, by showing that they perform a distinctive cognitive function. Namely, they are stopping points of inquiry. First, I articulate this idea and then I use it to clear the ground from a troublesome conflation. That is, the conflation of this particular function all first-person thoughts have with the property of immunity to error through misidentification, which only some I-thoughts enjoy. Afterward, I show the implications of this idea for a theory of first-person content and of immunity to error though misidentification. I then make some comparisons with Pryor’s notion of wh-misidentification and immunity thereof and with Cappelen and Dever’s position on immunity to error through misidentification and show why they are defective

In Quest of a Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology

Hinge epistemology is a family of theories about justification (and knowledge) which give centre-stage to Wittgenstein’s notion of a “hinge”. In the following, I will first put forward some basic methodological considerations regarding the relationship between merely exegetical work on, in particular, Wittgenstein’s texts, and more theoretically committed work, which aims at developing suggestions that can be found in the texts, even though they are not clearly attributable as such to their author (§1). I will then summarize the main tenets of what, to date, is still the most widespread reading of On Certainty (§2) – the so-called “framework reading”. In light of the initial methodological considerations and of this exegesis of On Certainty, I will then review some contemporary attempts at developing Wittgenstein’s ideas in an anti-skeptical direction, such as Crispin Wright’s, Michael Williams’ and Duncan Pritchard’s (§3). I will argue that, their intrinsic merits notwithstanding, they fail to take proper measure of Wittgenstein’s own position. I will then close by sketching my own version of hinge epistemology and by highlighting points of contact and disagreement with Wittgenstein’s own views as portrayed by the framework reading (§4)

Immunity to error through misidentification and the trilemma about the self

The thesis addresses the issues of error through misidentification and immunity to error through misidentification in relation to the problem of the first person. First, it provides an explanation of error through misidentification. Secondly, it shows that there are two possible ways of understanding immunity to error through misidentification. It is then argued that the first understanding of immunity to error through misidentification leads to what is labelled "the trilemma about the self". That is to say, either we provide an explanation of immunity to error through misidentification, but we subscribe to two contentious metaphysical views about the self-the Cartesian and the Idealist; or else we hold the view that the self is identical with a human being, but we have no explanation of immunity to error through misidentification. It is then shown that in order to solve the trilemma, a different understanding of immunity to error through misidentification must be offered. After discussing various possible understandings of immunity to error through misidentification, a sound account of it is finally provided. Moreover, it is shown how non-inferential, introspection-based mental self-ascriptions can comply with it, in such a way that they turn out to be logically immune to error through misidentification. Finally, by drawing on Evans' and Peacocke's accounts of the possession conditions of the first person concept-in which IEM I-judgements play a central role-, it is shown that it is a concept of a human being who thinks of herself as such. Hence, our first person concept is firmly anti-Cartesian and anti-Idealist. As a consequence, it is maintained that not only is there no need to hold the Cartesian and the Idealist metaphysics of the self in order to explain why some I-judgements can be immune to error through misidentification, but it is also argued that one can no longer be either Cartesian or Idealist. For that would expose one to conceptual incoherence

What philosophical disagreement and philosophical skepticism hinge on

Philosophers disagree. A lot. Pervasive disagreement is part of the territory; consensus is hard to find. Some think this should lead us to embrace philosophical skepticism: skepticism about the extent to which we can know, or justifiably believe, the philosophical views we defend and advance. Most philosophers in the literature fall into one camp or the other: philosophical skepticism or philosophical anti-skepticism. Drawing on the insights of hinge epistemology, this paper proposes another way forward, an intermediate position that appeals both to skeptical and anti-skeptical intuitions concerning the possibility and scope of philosophical knowledge. The main advantage of our account is that it’s able to recover some philosophical knowledge while also being compatible with philosophical skepticism

Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement

This chapter serves as an opinionated introduction to the problem of convergence (that there is no clear convergence to the truth in philosophy) and the problem of peer disagreement (that disagreement with a peer rationally demands suspending one’s beliefs), and some of the issues they give rise to, namely, philosophical skepticism and progress in philosophy. After introducing both topics and surveying the various positions in the literature we explore the prospects of an alternative, hinge-theoretic account