Knowledge and Sensory Knowledge in Hume's _Treatise_

I argue that the Hume of the Treatise maintains an account of knowledge according to which (i) every instance of knowledge must be an immediately present perception (i.e., an impression or an idea); (ii) an object of this perception must be a token of a knowable relation; (iii) this token knowable relation must have parts of the instance of knowledge as relata (i.e., the same perception that has it as an object); and any perception that satisfies (i)-(iii) is an instance of knowledge. I then apply this account to the case of sense perception. I argue that Hume holds that relations of impressions can be intuited, are knowable, and are necessary. For Hume, these relations constitute sensory knowledge. While Hume is rightly labeled an empiricist for many reasons, a close inspection of his account of knowledge reveals yet another way in which he deserves the label

Aristotle’s Argument from Truth in Metaphysics Γ 4

Some of Aristotle’s statements about the indemonstrability of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in Metaphysics Γ 4 merit more attention. The consensus seems to be that Aristotle provides two arguments against the demonstrability of the PNC, with one located in Γ 3 and the other found in the first paragraph of Γ 4. In this article, I argue that Aristotle also relies upon a third argument for the same conclusion: the argument from truth. Although Aristotle does not explicitly state this argument, it is the best argument that he could use to defend some of his statements in the second paragraph of Γ 4. Since the argument relies on only a few of Aristotle’s core views about truth, I propose that it is faithful to his considered position throughout his corpus, and it may be the strongest argument he could offer for the indemonstrability of the PNC

Can the Berkeleyan Idealist Resist Spinozist Panpsychism?

We argue that prevailing definitions of Berkeley’s idealism fail to rule out a nearby Spinozist rival view that we call ‘mind-body identity panpsychism.’ Since Berkeley certainly does not agree with Spinoza on this issue, we call for more care in defining Berkeley’s view. After we propose our own definition of Berkeley’s idealism, we survey two Berkeleyan strategies to block the mind-body identity panpsychist and establish his idealism. We argue that Berkeley should follow Leibniz and further develop his account of the mind’s unity. Unity—not activity—is the best way for Berkeley to establish his view at the expense of his panpsychist competitors

Spinoza\u27s Methodology: A Genetic Account of Fundamental Concepts in His Early Writings

Spinoza’s magnum opus, the Ethics, is written in a very peculiar, “geometrical” style, one that builds metaphysical and ethical doctrines out of mathematical, deductive proofs. These proofs rely on a series of definitions, axioms, propositions, and demonstrations. Nowhere in the Ethics does Spinoza explain his fundamental definitions and axioms, nor does he proffer a defense of his manner of presentation. I claim that by a thorough and systematic investigation of his earliest writings we can peel back the mystery of this geometrical garb and grasp why Spinoza presents his philosophy with formal, mathematical structure. I argue for the view that his methodology is more extensive and diverse than the geometrical presentation of the Ethics with which he is most closely associated. This essay pays special attention to Spinoza\u27s earliest unpublished works with particular emphasis paid to Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. Therein, Spinoza provides his only extant attempt at explicitly and systematically developing his method. By focusing on the genetic development of key epistemological concepts in this text, the origins of Spinoza\u27s system comes into stark relief. I argue that the Treatise can function like a prolegomena for the Ethics. Though there are important doctrinal disagreements between the texts, the Treatise, when conceived as a proper propaedeutic to the Ethics, can make the experience of the latter more powerful and comprehensible, filling in gaps in meaning left open by the geometrical presentation. One route for accomplishing this task requires a sustained conceptual analysis of scientia intuitiva, Spinoza\u27s term for intuitive knowledge, the greatest form of knowledge in his epistemology. I offer a developmental account of intuitive knowledge and explore a unique interpretation of its nature that elucidates and organizes the creative momentum of Spinoza\u27s method from the Treatise on the Emendation to the Ethics and beyond

What makes Hume an External World Skeptic?

What would it take for Hume to be an external world skeptic? Is Hume\u27s position on knowledge sufficient to force him to deny that we can acquire knowledge of (non-logical) propositions about the external world? After all, Hume is extremely restrictive about what can be known because he requires knowledge to be immune to error. In this paper, I will argue that if Hume were a skeptic, then he must also deny a particular kind of view about what is immediately present to the mind. I will argue that direct realisms—views that maintain that mind-independent (i.e. ontologically distinct) things are immediately present to the mind—combine with Hume\u27s position on knowledge to entail the negation of skepticism. So, despite his position on knowledge, Hume could still consistently reject skepticism, if he were to endorse direct realism

Truth, Subjectivity, and the Aesthetic Experience: A Study of Michel Foucault\u27s History of Madness

One of the fundamental issues in 20th century philosophy is of the nature of individual subjective experience. I seek to show how this “nature” is revealed and hidden by a historical process outlined in History of Madness by Michel Foucault. Foucault’s philosophical and anthropological engagement with the experience of madness in The Modern Age functions as a useful tool towards this end. The psychologisation and medicalization of madness in the 19th century allowed for an endless discourse on madness. This in turn permitted the language of the mad to burst open from its silence, historically present since the Great Confinement. This language of madness expressed itself poetically and artistically, thus revealing the paradoxical essence of the nature of human subjectivity as well as the particularity of its expression in the Modern Period. This particularity is elucidated from a genealogical account of the births of subjectivity and objectivity. I proceed to use this genealogy in conjunction with the language of madness to posit a prescriptive theory for aesthetic engagement. The essay seeks to show how the aesthetic experience can aid in the affirmation of the individual’s modern subjective reality. Thusly, the “goal” of the essay is to reveal affirmation, i.e., amor fati, the love of fate

The Contours of Locke’s General Substance Dualism

In this paper, I will argue that Locke is a substance dualist in the general sense, in that he holds that there are, independent of our classificatory schema, two distinct kinds of substances: wholly material ones and wholly immaterial ones. On Locke’s view, the difference between the two lies in whether they are solid or not, thereby differentiating him from Descartes. My way of establishing Locke as a general substance dualist is to be as minimally committal as possible at the outset, especially with respect to the classic debates on Locke’s positions in this domain, including those concerning substrata, real essences, and the like. Nonetheless, I show that minimal commitments about Locke’s primary/secondary quality distinction are sufficient to derive some substantive conclusions about his positions on these issues, as well as that he is a general substance dualist

Hume's Incredible Demonstrations

Commentators have rightly focused on the reasons why Hume maintains that the conclusions of skeptical arguments cannot be believed, as well as on the role these arguments play in Hume’s justification of his account of the mind. Nevertheless, Hume’s interpreters should take more seriously the question of whether Hume holds that these arguments are demonstrations. Only if the arguments are demonstrations do they have the requisite status to prove Hume’s point—and justify his confidence—about the nature of the mind’s belief-generating faculties. In this paper, I treat Hume’s argument against the primary/secondary quality distinction as my case study, and I argue that it is intended by Hume to be a demonstration of a special variety

A New Scene of Thought: On Waldow's _Experience Embodied_

In her book Experience Embodied, Anik Waldow challenges and reimagines the traditional interpretative approach to the concept of experience in the early modern period. Traditionally, commentators have emphasized early moderns' views on the first-person perspective and eschewed the relevance of our embodiment to their epistemological outlooks. My focus here is on Waldow's chapter on Hume, wherein she analyzes Hume's account of our capacity for reflective moral judgment, arguing that he understands it as natural despite the countless ways in which our embodied social experiences impinge on it. After detailing Waldow's contributions, I clarify, corroborate, and criticize them. Since I contend that Waldow is broadly successful in her interpretative efforts, I suggest that she undermines the traditional interpretative approach to experience in the early modern period, but not in the sense that she moves us away from the epistemological towards other lenses. Rather, Waldow should be understood as showing that, at least in the case of Hume's metaethics, the epistemological is embodied, is social, and is both cognitive and sentimental