Sama ideja organizacije: ka hegelijanskom izlaganju

The contemporary debate on the social ontological foundations of organization does not, for methodological reasons, sufficiently get a grip on the phenomenon of organization. The original determinacy of organization remains presupposed. To render this implicit meaning of organization explicit, another, more embracing and in-depth methodology is needed. German idealist types of philosophy provide an extremely powerful methodology. In the philosophy of German idealism from Kant to Hegel, along with neo-Kantianism and up to contemporary transcendental philosophy, however, the idea of organization is not addressed. Indeed, it is a challenge to construct the idea of organization from the perspective of German idealism: the perspective of reason, and with that, of freedom. It results in a new framework for dealing with organization in theory and practice. The article constructs the idea of organization (and claims that it still makes sense to do so) within the framework of G.W.F. Hegel. It shows where the issue of organization should be addressed topologically in Hegel’s system of philosophy and what, then, organization shows to be here speculatively.Savremena debata o socijalno ontološkim osnovama organizacije, iz metodoloških razloga, nedovoljno zahvata fenomen organizacije. Početno određenje organizacije ostaje pretpostavljeno. Da bi se ovo implicitno značenje – toga šta organizacija jeste – učinilo eksplicitnim, potrebna je drugačija, obuhvatnija i temeljnija metodologija. Filozofija nemačkog idealizma pruža veoma moćnu metodologiju. Međutim, u filozofiji nemačkog idealizma od Kanta do Hegela, neo-kantijanizma, pa sve do savremene transcendentalne filozofije, ideja organizacije nije obrađivana. Odista, izazov je konstruisati ideju organizacije iz tako idealističke perspektive: perspektive razuma i, uz to, slobode. Ovo nam pruža novi okvir za bavljenje organizacijom u teoriji i praksi. Članak konstruiše ideju organizacije (i drži se toga da i dalje ima smisla to raditi) unutar okvira G. V. F. Hegela. Pokazuje gde bi, topološki gledano, problemi organizacije trebalo da se obrađuju u Hegelovom filozofskom sistemu i, stoga, šta se ovde pokazuje da organizacija jeste spekulativno

Rickert’s Heterology in the Mirror of Hegel’s Logic: External Reflection

With his heterology, the southwest German neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert developed a doctrine that proved to be groundbreaking not only for neo-Kantianism, but also for the theory of subjectivity in postwar transcendental philosophy in the broad sense. Rickert’s heterology is primarily concerned with the original structure of thought. Since the discussion of Hegel plays an important role for Rickert, heterology simultaneously concerns the relationship between Hegel’s speculative idealism and (advanced) Kantian transcendental philosophy. However, on the whole, the debate has until now been far from unanimous with regard to the validity of Rickert’s critique of Hegel. This study develops a new interpretative perspective, focusing on the issue of formalism as a methodological problem. It turns out that Rickert’s heterology is a case of, in Hegel’s words, mere external reflection. Rickert hastily moves from the beginning of philosophy to the origin of thinking. Thus, unlike Hegel, Rickert provides an insufficient account of the very concepts with which he determines the origin of thought—the Achilles’ heel of transcendental philosophy

Kultura i sloboda u transcendentalnom i spekulativnom idealizmu

The founding fathers of modern philosophy of culture, the neo-Kantians, and especially the Southwest school, brought the concept of culture into play as a counter concept to that of nature. Taking Heinrich Rickert’s conception of culture as a starting point, the article shows how culture is conceived of as a self-formation of the (concrete) subject (agent). It leads to transcendental idealism of freedom, typical of a Kantian type of transcendental philosophy. However, in this self and world formation of the subject it is presupposed that nature is to any extent formable by values and thus by freedom. This presupposition cannot be accounted for properly within transcendental idealism. Hegel, by contrast, conceives of culture as a manifestation of the idea, leading to speculative idealism of freedom. The origin of culture, i.e., its original determinacy, should not be conceived of in terms of an opposition to nature, and consequently in the fashion of a subject (agent) of thought and action that forms itself by forming its world, culture. Rather, it should be conceived of in terms of a manifestation of the idea as the truly transcendental subject qua absolute ground of validity and thus the ground of being too. Nature and culture are both primarily determined by their ideal character and the relationships emerging therefrom.Osnivači moderne filozofije kulture, neo-kantovci, a posebno jugozapadna škola, uveli su koncept kulture u rasprave kao kontra-koncept konceptu prirode. Uzimajući kao polaznu tačku koncepciju kulture Hajnriha Rikerta, pokazuje se kako se kultura shvata kao samoformiranje (konkretnog) subjekta (delatnika). Ona vodi ka transcendentalnom idealizmu slobode, tipičnom za kantovsku vrstu transcendentalne filozofije. Međutim, u ovakvom formiranju sebe i sveta subjekta pretpostavlja se da je priroda u nekoj meri uobličena vrednostima, a time i slobodom. U okviru transcendentalnog idealizma, ova pretpostavka se ne može uverljivo objasniti. Hegel, nasuprot ovome, shvata kulturu kao manifestaciju ideje koja vodi ka spekulativnom idealizmu slobode. Poreklo kulture, odnosno njenu prvobitnu determinisanost, ne treba shvatati u smislu suprotstavljanja prirodi, a shodno tome, ni u smislu suprotstavljanja subjektu (delatniku) mišljenja i delanja koji se formira tako što formira svoj svet, odnosno kulturu. Umesto toga, poreklo kulture trebalo bi da se shvati u smislu manifestacije ideje kao istinski transcendentalnog subjekta kao apsolutnog osnova valjanosti, a time i kao osnova samog bića. Priroda i kultura su prvenstveno određene njihovim idealnim karakterom i odnosima koji iz toga proizlaze

Metaphysical Foundations of Knowledge and Ethics in Chinese and European Philosophy

In the history of Chinese and European philosophy, metaphysics has played an outstanding role: it is a theoretical framework which provides the basis for a philosophical understanding of the world and the self. A theory of the self is well integrated in a metaphysical understanding of the totality of nature as a dynamic process of continuous changes. According to this view, the purpose of existence can be conceived of as the development and realization of the full potential given to the individual by its nature. In regard to human nature specifically, this idea of self-realization includes the development of all cognitive faculties as well as of the moral character. Metaphysics has, however, suffered a loss of importance in current debates, especially in ethics. As a result, we observe the emergence of such philosophical views as moral skepticism and even nihilism. The consequence of this tendency has been the renunciation of a claim to understanding and to providing a solid ground for ethics. Yet an intercultural dialogue can provide us with some hope as the consolidation of debates on crucial topics of our traditions might indeed serve as the basis for a more powerful philosophy in the future