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CULTURE AND FREEDOM IN TRANSCENDENTAL AND SPECULATIVE IDEALISM

ABSTRACT

The founding fathers of modern philosophy of culture, the neo-Kantians, and especially the Southwest school, brought the concept of culture into play as a counter concept to that of nature. Taking Heinrich Rickert's conception of culture as a starting point, the article shows how culture is conceived of as a self-formation of the (concrete) subject (agent). It leads to transcendental idealism of freedom, typical of a Kantian type of transcendental philosophy. However, in this self and world formation of the subject it is presupposed that nature is to any extent formable by values and thus by freedom. This presupposition cannot be accounted for properly within transcendental idealism. Hegel, by contrast, conceives of culture as a manifestation of the idea, leading to speculative idealism of freedom. The origin of culture, i.e., its original determinacy, should not be conceived of in terms of an opposition to nature, and consequently in the fashion of a subject (agent) of thought and action that forms itself by forming its world, culture. Rather, it should be conceived of in terms of a manifestation of the idea as the truly transcendental subject qua absolute ground of validity and thus the ground of being too. Nature and culture are both primarily determined by their ideal character and the relationships emerging therefrom.

KEYWORDS

nature, culture, value, freedom, transcendental idealism, speculative idealism, Rickert, Bauch, Kant, Hegel

Our so-called 'postmodern' world is characterized by a plurality that seems to call rather for 'cultural' philosophy than a philosophy of One Reason. Indeed, conceptualizing philosophy as a philosophy of culture has proved particularly promising. In the wake of local and global social developments, 'intercultural philosophy' has even become one of the usual suspects of contemporary philosophy, and the topic of 'multiculturalism' is not less widely discussed (Taylor, Gutmann 1992; Kimmerle 2002; Wimmer 2004; Yousefi, Braun 2011). For some, multiculturalism and interculturalism are even still too much connected with the stigma of homogeneity and closedness, advocating the concept of

“transculturality” (Welsch 2017; Darowska 2010; Langenohl, Poole, Weinberg 2015). However, it is important to note that any talk of transculturality, multiculturalism, or interculturality presupposes a concept of culture. What is culture?

Historically and systematically, two dimensions specify this question philosophically: a) the scientific character of scientific cognition of cultural facts, i. e. the methodology of the cultural sciences, taking into account that cultural cognition concerns phenomena of meaning, value, or validity in contrast to the cognition of mere natural phenomena.¹ With this, b), the dimension I shall address in the following comes into view: the subject matter of cultural cognition: culture. As indicated, the original determinacy of culture is presupposed in any cognition of cultural facts. Insofar, the original determinacy of culture is transcultural. The transculturality of the original determinacy of culture is virtually an index of its transcendental, since it consists of a whole of principles that determine culture *as* culture. It constitutes the objectivity or culturality of culture.

Nature and Culture

Not only the founding fathers of modern philosophy of culture, the neo-Kantians,² above all the Southwest school, brought the concept of culture into play as a *counter concept* to the concept of nature. Heinrich Rickert, for example, defines both terms epistemologically and ontologically against each other: From the perspective of logic, more precisely that of a philosophy of science, reality becomes “nature” if conceived of with regard to the “general” and “culture” if conceived of with regard to the “particular and individual” (Rickert 1926: 55; 1929: 227).

Hence, a certain material qualification – i. e. a qualification of the objects of cognition—results from the cognitive purpose of the respective cognitive attitude and thus from the logical or formal goal of ‘generalizing’ or ‘individualizing’ concept formation. Logically, natural objects are *value-free*, whereas cultural objects are *value-laden*. Ontologically, this logical opposition not only implies value-free and value-laden objects, nature and culture. Rickert also hints at their well-known and often quoted etymology:³ Nature is the whole

1 The (only partly valid) conviction that Kant lacked a philosophy of culture, led to all kinds of attempts in the late 19th century to supply the alleged desideratum one way or another. Paradigmatically, one can think of Dilthey’s “Critique of Historical Reason”, which is not very Kantian, as well as of the philosophies of the neo-Kantians, which, in comparison to Dilthey’s proposal, are more Kant-oriented. With regard to a philosophy of science of the cultural sciences, within transcendental philosophy, see the seminal writings of Rickert (1926, 1929). For a thematization of Kant’s philosophy of culture and history in its transcendental content see Flach (2015). Flach’s transcendental philosophy of cognition and science (Flach 1994) is also co-determining for Göller (2000). See for the attempt of a Kant-oriented philosophy of cultural studies also Grünewald (2009) as well as my remarks on this attempt (Krijnen 2013).

2 For the neo-Kantian philosophy of culture see e. g. Ferrari (2003: ch. 10), Krijnen (2001: ch. 2; 2015a), and Krijnen and Orth (1998).

3 See for this etymology Perpeet (1997: ch. 1).

of that which is and grows by itself (*nasci*), culture (*cultura*) is that which has been created by people acting according to purposes, i. e. that which has been cultivated for the sake of the values attached to it (*colere*). Moreover, regardless whether we apply etymology or turn towards the conceptual history of culture, we continuously see that culture refers both to the activity of cultivating as well as to the result, the cultivated. Culture is understood as resulting from human behavior, consequently as a counter concept to nature. Nature and culture are reciprocal terms, terms determining each other. Insofar they are opposed to each other. Culture is self-formation of humans, whereas nature is determinacy by heteronomous forces.

This opposition of nature and culture is accompanied by that of nature and freedom. Since antiquity, these terms are dominantly conceived of as an opposition too. Culture as the realm of freedom is opposed to nature as the realm of necessity (natural laws). Opposites such as nature and freedom, nature and culture, culture and freedom indicate the conceptual constellations that form the background of the thesis to be defended in the coming deliberations: The origin of culture, i. e. its original determinacy, should not be conceived in the way of an opposition to nature, and consequently in the fashion of a subject (agent) of thought and action that forms itself by forming its world, culture. Rather, it should be conceived in the way of a manifestation of the idea as the truly transcendental subject qua absolute ground of validity and thus the ground of being too. Culture is primarily a manifestation of the idea, not a self-formation of the subject. As a manifestation of the idea, the concept of culture is not primarily a counter concept to that of nature. Rather, nature and culture are both primarily determined by their ideal character and the relationships emerging thereby.

Culture as Self-Formation of the Subject: Transcendental Idealism of Freedom

[i] Culture as self-formation of the (concrete) subject (agent) is the paradigm of a Kantian type of transcendental philosophy,⁴ leading to transcendental ideal-

4 In the sense of rejecting Hegel's speculative conceptual development in its core and orienting itself to Kant's approach of correlations. The label 'Kantian type of transcendental philosophy' suggests that Hegel's philosophy can also be interpreted as transcendental philosophy. This is insofar true as Kant's transcendental revolution of philosophy, to think objectivity as grounded in subjectivity, is inescapable for Hegel, who's philosophy is directed from the start to the perfection of what Kant achieved in his project of 'self-knowledge of reason'. However, for Hegel "critical philosophy" is not only one of the (insufficient) 'Positions of Thought toward Objectivity' (Hegel 1991: §§ 40 ff.) and Hegel already in the 'Introduction' to his *Logic* criticizes harshly "critical philosophy" and "transcendental idealism" [= Fichte, ck] (Hegel 1951: I, 28, cf. 26–28, 32), but precisely his radicalization of the critical method of philosophy as well as of the architectonic of reason mark decisive differences to Kant's philosophy, making it problematic to determine Hegel's philosophy as a transcendental philosophy. Yet both types of philosophy agree in being validity-reflective idealism (and insofar not metaphysics or ontology). The adjective validity-reflective thus involves Hegel's speculative

ism of freedom. The basic doctrine of the structure of self-formation is that of the so-called *fundamental axiomatic relation* (gr. ἀξιοσ = value). It is supposed to be a solution for Kant's architectonic of reason, assessed as very problematic already in early post-Kantian German idealism and also in neo-Kantianism (see e. g. Rickert's philosophy of values (Rickert 1921; 1928; 1934) or Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms (Cassirer 2001 f.)), just as in the contemporary transcendental philosophy of Hans Wagner (1980) or Werner Flach (1997).

Kant's architectonic of reason in terms of theoretical and practical philosophy or nature and freedom respectively does not only lack a transcendental justification, it also has been reproached for lacking a founding unity from which the dualism of the theoretical and the practical realm emerges. Already, e. g., Fichte (1845/46: I, 264; III: 20 f.) tried to work out practical reason as the basis of theoretical and practical reason, of thinking and willing in the way of a primacy of willing. Hegel (1951: II, 429 ff.; 1991: §§ 445 ff.), then, attempted to sublimate the limitations of theoretical cognition under the idea of the true and of practical cognition under the idea of the good by a doctrine of the absolute idea, just as in his elaborations on the free spirit the dualism of theoretical and practical action of the spirit is sublated. This urge for unity determines the efforts of the neo-Kantians too. Rickert's transformation of Kant's primacy of practical reason into a primacy of self-formation, shaking of its particular practical nature, is conceived of as an encompassing idealism of freedom (Krijnen 2001: ch. 2.3, 6.3, 7.2 f.). It leads Rickert to a fundamental axiomatic relation as the unity of reason itself. With regard to the subject (agent) we could also say that it constitutes a continuous relation of subjectivity. Rickert's model has proved to be very important also for later transcendental philosophers. In the following, I therefore address it as a paradigm.

Rickert (1928: 438) qualified the fundamental axiomatic relation as the "starting point" and "communal root" of all philosophy; it concerns the "the correlation between valid values and the valuing subject". This correlation is a relation between *values* in which validity is absolute, although related to subjects, and *subjects* who, as subjects, are related to absolute values guiding their activity. According to the doctrine of the fundamental axiomatic relation, already the realm of cognition is characterized by a(n) (objective) normative constraint. This normative constraint guides our theoretical (epistemic) endeavors. Cognizing has the structure of taking an alternative position towards values. Values are, from the perspective of the subject, the point of orientation for its theoretical endeavors. A cognizing subject is a subject that recognizes values; more precisely, it makes the value of 'truth' the determining factor of its behavior. Hence, the cognizing subject subjects itself to an 'ought' and therefore amends its criteria for determination from factors of reality to factors of validity or ideality.

method. This method is a radicalization of Kantian transcendental reflection, but either way it concerns 'immanent deduction' and thus cognition that makes explicit the principles of sense or meaning. While the term 'speculative' creates no less confusion than 'idealism', the distinction between transcendental idealism and speculative idealism is probably the most accurate with respect to the issue at stake.

Consequently, normative constraints are in no way constitutive only for the 'practical' realm.⁵ They make up the foundation of the whole human world.

The distinguished realms of culture, whichever, all are specifications of the fundamental axiotic relation. It is this relation which is thematic in the often misunderstood neo-Kantian doctrine of the 'primacy of practical reason'. This doctrine does not intend to narrow all foundations to ethics but to determine the fundamental axiotic relation. Rickert develops it by, so to speak, axiotizing the theoretical realm, giving it a paradigmatic meaning for all realms of culture.

From the perspective of the subject, that is, the validity noetic point of view, the subject obtains its fundamental determination by the concept of *self-formation*: the subject knows itself as related to values and with that subjected to a task, finally an infinite task. The fundamental axiotic relation is this relation between absolute *values* determining the subject concerning the validity of its endeavors and the *subject* which fulfils this infinite, unconditional task only in a finite, conditional way. As this infinity is a defining part of the validity claims of the validity function called 'subject', value-laden self-formation of the subject is self-formation according to values intrinsically or immanently part of its own subjectivity. Apparently, on the level of the fundamental axiotic relation the moment of self-formation, the basic characteristic of the subject, does not lead to a primacy of practical reason in the sense of a primacy of specific ethical, moral moments making up the foundation of all human self-formation. The concept of self-formation concerns the value relatedness or value ladenness, hence, the value determinacy *as such* of the subject (Rickert 1928: 189 f., 292 f., etc.). The subject *is* the validity function of self-formation. From a validity noetic perspective, both theory and praxis are conceptualized as 'taking a position towards values' (*Stellungnehmen zu Werten*). Thus for Rickert, the former "primacy of the practical" turns out to be a "primacy of values", a primacy of self-formation Rickert also qualifies as an "idealism of activity". (Rickert 1909, 216) Not only neo-Kantians but also more recent doctrines of the fundamental axiotic relation, such as Wagner's (1980: §§ 9, 25) or Flach's (1997: ch. 2 f.), are concerned with such a doctrine of self-formation, axiotizing the sphere of knowledge and conceiving of it as a specification of the fundamental axiotic relation.

As said, culture is first conceived as a counter concept to nature, as a value-laden reality versus a value-free reality. Culture, then, proves to be the result of a value-determined self-formation of the subject. Yet culture is not only opposed to nature. Rather, nature is integrated into the fundamental axiotic relation too. On the one hand, it is the object of the cultural activity we call the natural sciences. On the other hand, nature itself is founded in values; nature is a value phenomenon. How is that to be understood?

From the perspective of the natural sciences, humans are (methodologically) determined as a value-free reality, as a natural *object* of scientific determination.

5 In contemporary philosophy, this insight is emphasized in theories of inferential semantics (cf. e. g. Brandom 1994) and philosophies of science dealing with 'epistemic values' (cf. e. g. Haddock, Millar, Pritchard 2009).

Taken as a *subject*, however, humans at the same time are the principle of realizing validity, i. e. shaping reality according to values. Culture is always a world created by humans, not a mere product of nature. For being able to act as a value-determined being, humans must *live* in the natural scientific sense of the word. Hence, the problem of realizing validity or values leads to a whole of necessary natural conditions that make value realization *factually* possible. Therefore, nature is not only the whole of value-free objects. It is philosophy that understands nature in terms of validity, i. e. in its *value-determinacy*. Nature turns out to be a *condition* for realizing values. Accordingly, Rickert qualifies nature as the *medium* of value realization; as a result, nature is embedded in the structure of values. This structure is determined by the differentiation of “*conditional values*” and “*intrinsic values*” (Rickert 1934: 167 f.; 1911: 153 f., 165) or of “life and civilization values” versus “cultural values” (Rickert 1934: 170 ff.; 1911). Such differentiations aim at bringing order into the world of humans and, at the same time, at bringing about an all-round estimation of constituents of this world. Seen systematically, they are, despite all differences in detail, prefigured by Kant and have been preserved beyond neo-Kantianism up to contemporary transcendental philosophy.

[ii] Obviously, transcendental idealism thinks the unity of realizing validity from the perspective of the subject and insofar ‘subjectively’: The self-formation model of culture conceives the unity of value and reality, nature and freedom in terms of a subject shaping itself and thereby creating culture. As a real subject, the subject is itself a unity of nature- and value-determinacy, of nature and freedom. Through its self-formation it brings about a world that is culture, a value-laden reality, a world that is a unity of nature and freedom.

In this self and world formation of the subject, it is *presupposed* that nature is at all formable by values and thus by freedom. According to its original determinacy, nature has to allow for a value- or freedom-based formation. “Realization of values” as “embodying” values into reality, “bringing reason into sensibility” presupposes that reason and sensibility, value and reality do not stand opposite to each other as “two separate worlds”. Rather, what is sensibly real must have its transcendental condition in an “objective”, admittedly not metaphysical, but “functionally lawful” order of reason.⁶

The substantiation of this precondition of subjective activity requires an objective order of reason, consequently an objective-logical transcendental basis. Hence, an approach beyond a subjective unity is necessary. This approach can be exposed, again, by taking Kant as a starting point. The fundamental axiomatic relation also started with Kant’s idea of transcendental philosophy, namely that the subject is subject to laws of validity founded in reason. To the neo-Kantians, Kant had to appear as the “philosopher of modern culture”, to use the title of

⁶ The quotes stem from Bauch (1935: 94 incl. note 3, and 141 ff.). Bauch, in particular, tried to clarify the presupposition mentioned. His attempt fails in a manner typical of transcendental idealism and its axiomatic fundamental relation.

Rickert's book about Kant (Rickert 1924). Neo-Kantian idealism was accordingly shaped as a philosophy of value, turning the Critique of Reason, as the Marburgian Cassirer (2001: I, 11) formulates it, into a "critique of culture" as a "philosophy of symbolic forms". We philosophically recognize ourselves by conceptualizing our world in terms of its principles. The clarification of the mentioned presupposition of the objective order of reason, which forms the basis for the fundamental axiotic relation, leads the issue of the formability of reality by values. With that it not only addresses the compatibility of nature and freedom, and hence the possibility of creating culture, but, as indicated, it directly leads to Kant's conception of *cosmological* freedom.

In the cosmological antinomy of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant discusses the problem of the compatibility of nature and freedom and solves it by distinguishing transcendental idealistically a sensible from an intelligible world. The latter shows to be the origin of the phenomenal world. The essence of cosmological or transcendental freedom as absolute spontaneity is that it is the first cause of a series of events. Freedom is thus brought into play as the origin of the world of appearances. Kant's transcendental concept of freedom, however, is characterized by a practical profile. His conception of cosmological freedom virtually anticipates a metaphysics of the practical reason of finite subjects. Already in his proof of the possibility to think a cosmological causality of freedom it becomes clear that Kant is primarily concerned with the possibility of moral freedom for our actions (which is logically preceded by cosmological or transcendental freedom (Kant 1910 ff.: V, B 561 f., cf. B 831)). Kant models freedom as a "power" to be the cause of effects, more precisely, as a capacity to start a series of effects "by itself", "spontaneously". This power- and causal-theoretical modeling allows, what Kant is concerned with, to understand humans as an agent of their actions: not merely as an effect of a natural causality, not as an object but as a subject.⁷

Although Kant, in the course of his transcendental turn, deontologizes the onto-theologically conceived First Cause of metaphysics in favor of a transcendental idealism of reason in humans, he sticks to the practical profile of freedom. As a consequence, the relation of cause and effect remains external, that is to say dualistically conceived of. As a consequence, the original unity of the world of appearance can no longer be thought as freedom. Freedom would concern at most the formal determinacy of the relation, not its content too. The latter is 'given', in one way or another. The causal relation is not an absolute, purely intrinsic relation. Freedom as a faculty of causality has – notwithstanding all transcendental and not 'merely formal' interpretation of principles by transcendental idealism – in this respect a formalistic basic trait. This trait also applies to the fundamental axiotic relation. It hinders it to comprehend the realization of freedom, and thus culture, in its original determinacy.

7 See on Kant's cosmological freedom and its focus on practical freedom recently Krijnen (2017b), as well as Fulda (1996), and Wagner (2008a; 2008b).

[iii] A discussion with the South-West neo-Kantian Bruno Bauch, one of the most vehement critics of a formalistic interpretation of principles, can illustrate this point not only in a paradigmatic way. Moreover, Bauch has discussed the sketched problem of the original compatibility of nature and freedom explicitly in relation to Kant. At the same time, Bauch's solution surpasses the subject-oriented orientation characteristic of a Kantian type of transcendental philosophy towards the context of a more general doctrine of the idea as the unifying ground of everything – thinking along, so to speak, with the problem of cosmological freedom contained in Kant's transcendental concept of freedom. For Bauch, the unity of value and reality is guaranteed by the transcendental conditionality of reality. This transcendental conditionality culminates in Bauch's concept of the 'idea'.⁸

In first instance, Bauch conceives of the unity of nature – causal necessity – and freedom – value-laden determinacy – as a unity of *human action*: the person actualizes values and hence unites what Bauch calls the causal and the teleological relation (1935: ch. VII, esp. 259-281).⁹ The consequence of this approach is that the unity involved is a unity of the person and hence of the concrete subject. This subject spontaneously directs itself immediately to values and in doing so mediately objectifies freedom, i. e. it produces culture. Its activity is both determined by nature and values, by causality of nature and causality from freedom. However, for Bauch, as mentioned, nature and culture have their common foundation in the idea, as, to put it in terms of one of Bauch's favorite Kant quotes, "the world must be represented as having originated from an idea" (Bauch 1935: 268, 271 f., 280; Kant 1910 ff.: III, B 843 f.).

On the one hand and significantly, in Bauch's synthesis practical or personal freedom takes center stage. The unity of nature and freedom he presents concerns the concrete subject, and thus human action or the facticity of reason. Bauch does not conceive of the encompassing causality that grounds both specifications of causality as freedom. Strictly speaking, Bauch's synthesis is not a synthesis of nature and freedom but of causality and freedom (1935: 271 f., 275, 278): Bauch thinks of freedom *in* nature, not of nature *as* grounded in freedom. Bauch's "original" (1935: 275) or "immediate" (1935: 272) synthesis is a synthesis of causality and freedom in the concrete subject, not of nature and freedom.

Yet on the other hand, for Bauch, the world has to be conceived of as originated from an idea, and hence as a world that develops in levels reaching from inorganic nature to culture. This "self-unfolding" of the idea is supposed to overcome the conception of the two "separated" realms of nature and freedom in favor of their "co-existence". Their respective laws of reason originate from

8 Bauch conceives of the idea as the objective relation of validity that, as the whole of conditions of objects, constitutes reality as well as its cognition. Everything is included in the idea, reaching from the content of sensation via the categories up to the concepts and their relationships. See on this Krijnen (2008: ch. 5.3).

9 See on Bauch's concept of the person as the factor that actualizes validity or values Krijnen (2015b: 2018).

an “overarching unity”, that is the idea as the origin and aim of the whole of reality (Bauch 1935: 271 f., 278–281). The world emerges from it, as we could say, like the world of phenomena does from Kant’s cosmological freedom. Nevertheless, in Bauch’s conception, freedom is not this origin. Although freedom for him is a “transcendental” predicate (1935: 283), he does not conceive of the original unity, which is the idea, in terms of this predicate. Rather, it is culture that is for Bauch the “logical place” (1935: 285) of freedom. Differing from both Kant and Hegel, although Bauch himself suggests identity, Bauch’s synthesis of nature and freedom is a synthesis of the acting and hence culture producing subject. Freedom, in essence, is practical freedom, not transcendental freedom in the cosmological sense.¹⁰

With this it becomes clear that Bauch mixes up two unities: the unity as the idea from which the world emerges and the unity as concrete subjectivity that unites nature and culture. This is a consequence of the fundamental axiomatic relation. Here, the actualization of the idea is conceived of as an activity of a concrete subject that directs itself to values belonging intrinsically to its own subjectivity. In doing so, it forms itself as a person and shapes reality as culture. Freedom is freedom of the concrete subject. Apparently, the fundamental axiomatic relation reproduces the Kantian model of freedom as causality. Freedom, by contrast, is not a Hegelian manifestation of the One idea that differentiates itself and is in all other with itself. Rather, it seems to presuppose such a Hegelian unity.

Culture as a Manifestation of the Idea: Speculative Idealism of Freedom

Let me conclude with some remarks about Hegel’s conception of freedom and its actualization. Indeed, with Hegel we touch upon the limits of transcendental idealism of culture. Time and again Hegel reproached the sketched causal model of freedom for its *formalism*, being a case of merely abstract freedom.¹¹ Although transcendental philosophy continuously speaks of ‘self-development’, ‘self-determination’, ‘self-justification’, it cannot conceive freedom as the manifestation of an overarching unity differentiated in itself; a unity which is and remains with itself in everything else. On the contrary, in transcendental philosophy such a foundational unity remains presupposed.

Thus Hegel’s criticism of formalism should be distinguished from the simplistic reproach raised time and again against transcendental philosophy, namely that forms are empty shells somehow applied to a formless content. Since

10 In contemporary transcendental philosophy of Wagner and Flach too, Kant’s doctrine of freedom as a transcendental predicate, i. e. transcendental freedom qua cosmological freedom and thus as a freedom that underlies nature and culture, is annihilated. See on this Krijnen (2017a). Wagner and Flach fall victim to the same problem as Bauch, not conceiving of the original unity as transcendental freedom.

11 See on this extensively Krijnen (2022).

transcendental philosophy conceives principles of validity as conditions of the possibility for something conditioned, it overcomes such formalism, at least in principle. The neo-Kantians clearly saw the reciprocal and well-ordered relationship of principle and concreteness. Rickert, for instance, overcomes a formalistic conception of principles through his heterology, in which ‘content’ itself proves to be a form and a necessary moment in the whole of thought (1921: 50 ff., 1924: 8 ff.); Bauch (1923: 181 ff.; 1926: 131 ff.), like Cassirer (1976), contributed outstandingly to an understanding of principles as functions. Principles are not merely formal but have a content-logical character.

Hegel’s criticism, instead, holds that transcendental philosophy does not live up to its own claim regarding the content-logical character of principles. It turns out that the problem of a subjective unity of value and reality, of nature and freedom refers itself to a more general problem. If, in the fundamental axiomatic relation, culture is conceived of as the result of a subject actualizing values, than an objective formal relation is perpetuated that Hegel scrutinized. Namely that the actuality of freedom – and culture is according to transcendental idealism actualized freedom – *nolens volens* cannot be understood as the result of self-formation and thus as objectified freedom. Conceptually, the existence of freedom, culture, is out of reach. The fundamental axiomatic relation fails to qualify culture sufficiently because due to its formalism, as Hegel (1991: § 508) puts it, a “principle of determination” is missing. This is to say that transcendental idealism misses the methodological moment – decisive for Hegel’s speculative idealism – that sublates any externality between opposites: the *‘realization of the concept’* (by moments of the concept itself: universality, particularity, and singularity). Rather, in transcendental idealism ‘form’ and ‘content’ (‘matter’), or more concretely ‘nature’ and ‘freedom’, remain opposed to each other. Therefore the laws of freedom, values, ideas etc. are only applicable by presupposing certain pre-given content-related determinations—determinations that are at the same time excluded by, or at least not expressed in the form as the principle of validity. The formality of transcendental idealism hinders it to comprehend actions in their actuality. Taken by themselves, values in the sense of transcendental philosophy make up only an abstract moment of human self-determination, not the principle of human self-determination. In the latter case, they should also contain the conditions of their own actualization instead of excluding them.

Hegel’s speculative idealism offers a different architectonic of reason for comprehending freedom than transcendental idealism. It does not conceive of actualizing freedom in a power- and causal-theoretical fashion. Against this, Hegel presents a model of self-knowledge of the Idea as the true ground of everything and with that a model of its manifestation, not of causality. The process of self-knowledge, at a certain point of its development, is confronted with the problem of the existence of the Idea and thus of freedom too. Culture is a configuration of the Idea giving itself existence; it is a manifestation of the Idea. Only as a manifestation of the Idea can culture be conceived of philosophically.

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Kristijan Krijnen

Kultura i sloboda u transcendentnom i spekulativnom idealizmu

Apstrakt

Osnivači moderne filozofije kulture, neo-kantovci, a posebno jugozapadna škola, uveli su koncept kulture u rasprave kao kontra-koncept konceptu prirode. Uzimajući kao polaznu tačku koncepciju kulture Hajnriha Rikerta, pokazuje se kako se kultura shvata kao samoformiranje (konkretnog) subjekta (delatnika). Ona vodi ka transcendentnom idealizmu slobode, tipičnom za kantovsku vrstu transcendentne filozofije. Međutim, u ovakvom formiranju sebe i sveta subjekta pretpostavlja se da je priroda u nekoj meri uobličena vrednostima, a time i slobodom. U okviru transcendentnog idealizma, ova pretpostavka se ne može uverljivo objasniti. Hegel, nasuprot ovome, shvata kulturu kao manifestaciju ideje koja vodi ka spekulativnom idealizmu slobode. Poreklo kulture, odnosno njenu prvobitnu determinisanost, ne treba shvatati u smislu suprotstavljanja prirodi, a shodno tome, ni u smislu suprotstavljanja subjektu (delatniku) mišljenja i delanja koji se formira tako što formira svoj svet, odnosno kulturu. Umesto toga, poreklo kulture trebalo bi da se shvati u smislu manifestacije ideje kao istinski transcendentnog subjekta kao apsolutnog osnova valjanosti, a time i kao osnova samog bića. Priroda i kultura su prvenstveno određene njihovim idealnim karakterom i odnosima koji iz toga proizlaze.

Ključne reči: priroda, kultura, vrednost, sloboda, transcendentni idealizam, spekulativni idealizam, Rikert, Bauh, Kant, Hegel

