Bright Line, Substantial Participation, or Something Else: Who is a Primary Violator Under Rule 10b-5?

This Note analyzes the competing theories currently used by courts and commentators to determine when a secondary actor’s conduct arises to the level of a primary violation under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission rule 10b-5 on a theory of aiding and abetting primary violators. This Note proposes a workable and logical standard that can be used to differentiate a primary violation from mere aiding and abetting. Part I of the Note discusses the decision in Central Bank of Denver and the resulting dilemma that faced the lower courts in determining when a secondary actor is a primary violator. Part II provides an analytical discussion of the emergence of two tests often used to determine whether a secondary actor is a primary violator: the “bright line” and “substantial participation” tests. Finally, Part III discusses the elements of a primary violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 as they relate to a secondary actor and proposes a workable and logical test to determine when a secondary actor’s conduct rises to the level of a primary violation

Socioeconomic impact of photovoltaic power at Schuchuli, Arizona

The social and economic impact of photovoltaic power on a small, remote native American village is studied. Village history, group life, energy use in general, and the use of photovoltaic-powered appliances are discussed. No significant impacts due to the photovoltaic power system were observed

Stoneridge v. Scientific-Atlanta: Do Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Require a Misstatement or Omission? (pre-publication draft)

This version is a draft submitted for publication and accepted prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling. The final version, published by QLR and also posted on Digital Commons, was modified subsequently to the Supreme Court ruling. Stoneridge v. Scientific-Atlanta promises to be the most important securities litigation case to reach the Supreme Court since Central Bank of Denver. In this important case, Stoneridge presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to clarify the application of its ruling in Central Bank to liability for secondary actors under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. This Article points out that the fundamental question plaguing the lower courts since Central Bank and resulting in two circuit splits is whether section 10(b) requires that a secondary actor actually make a misstatement or omission in order to be held liable under the rule 10b-5 implied cause of action. This Article asserts that there is ample support in Supreme Court precedent for concluding that the word “deceptive” in section 10(b) does require a misstatement or omission and that the Supreme Court should so hold in Stoneridge

\u3ci\u3eBiden v. Nebraska\u3c/i\u3e: Student Loan Debt Forgiveness and the Dangers of the Administrative State

In April of 2020, then-candidate Joe Biden promised that, if he were elected to the Presidency, he would “[i]mmediately cancel a minimum of $10,000 of student debt per person, as proposed by Senator Warren in the midst of the coronavirus crisis.” Once in office, the Biden administration found that Congress would not pass the type of extensive student loan debt forgiveness that the President wanted. Accordingly, President Biden did what has become all too common in recent presidential administrations— he acted by executive fiat through an administrative agency to accomplish a policy goal that he could not get passed through Congress. The resultant Biden student loan forgiveness plan was challenged in the federal courts, eventually being decided by the United States Supreme Court as Biden v. Nebraska. In Biden v. Nebraska, the Court ruled that the Biden administration had exceeded its statutory authority by promulgating the plan. While this particular attempt to take action by executive fiat was thereby stymied, there is no indication that President Biden and future Presidents will cease trying to enact policy in this way. Further, the administrative state—of which action by executive fiat and the usurpation of legislative power by the Executive Branch is a concomitant part—continues to grow, posing a serious threat to our constitutional order, the rule of law, and our liberties guaranteed thereby. Only by returning to the Christian view of law and policy, which undergirds and provides the foundation for our constitutional system of government, can we hope to address the threat posed by the administrative state and again “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.

Racial Reconciliation: A Biblical Framework

American society is greatly polarized and divided on many issues, including issues relative to racial reconciliation. Attempts at progress in this area are impeded by the United States’s historical backdrop of slavery, the statesponsored oppression of Jim Crow laws, and personal racism, among other complications. Even the American church tolerated and justified these racial divides. Modern discussions are plagued by the widespread misuse of important terms as well as disagreements on what racial reconciliation looks like and how to achieve it. Starting from the belief that God has spoken authoritatively on all issues, this article attempts to provide a biblical framework for addressing issues of racial reconciliation from a Christian perspective. This begins with a biblical model of racial reconciliation, a biblical definition for racism, and the ideological foundation that only the Christian worldview provides. The rest of the framework discusses relevant principles of biblical justice that should govern issues of law and policy, including some discussion of the proper jurisdiction of the church and civil government. Accordingly, only through the Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ is there hope for true racial reconciliation