The Logical Burdens of Proof. Assertion and Hypothesis

The paper proposes two logical analyses of (the norms of) justification. In a first, realist-minded case, truth is logically independent from justification and leads to a pragmatic logic LP including two epistemic and pragmatic operators, namely, assertion and hypothesis. In a second, antirealist-minded case, truth is not logically independent from justification and results in two logical systems of information and justification: AR4 and AR4¢, respectively, provided with a question-answer semantics. The latter proposes many more epistemic agents, each corresponding to a wide variety of epistemic norms. After comparing the different norms of justification involved in these logical systems, two hexagons expressing Aristotelian relations of opposition will be gathered in order to clarify how (a fragment of) pragmatic formulas can be interpreted in a fuzzy-based question-answer semantics

On an Intuitionistic Logic for Pragmatics

We reconsider the pragmatic interpretation of intuitionistic logic [21] regarded as a logic of assertions and their justications and its relations with classical logic. We recall an extension of this approach to a logic dealing with assertions and obligations, related by a notion of causal implication [14, 45]. We focus on the extension to co-intuitionistic logic, seen as a logic of hypotheses [8, 9, 13] and on polarized bi-intuitionistic logic as a logic of assertions and conjectures: looking at the S4 modal translation, we give a denition of a system AHL of bi-intuitionistic logic that correctly represents the duality between intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic logic, correcting a mistake in previous work [7, 10]. A computational interpretation of cointuitionism as a distributed calculus of coroutines is then used to give an operational interpretation of subtraction.Work on linear co-intuitionism is then recalled, a linear calculus of co-intuitionistic coroutines is dened and a probabilistic interpretation of linear co-intuitionism is given as in [9]. Also we remark that by extending the language of intuitionistic logic we can express the notion of expectation, an assertion that in all situations the truth of p is possible and that in a logic of expectations the law of double negation holds. Similarly, extending co-intuitionistic logic, we can express the notion of conjecture that p, dened as a hypothesis that in some situation the truth of p is epistemically necessary

Some Logical Notations for Pragmatic Assertions

The pragmatic notion of assertion has an important inferential role in logic. There are also many notational forms to express assertions in logical systems. This paper reviews, compares and analyses languages with signs for assertions, including explicit signs such as Frege’s and Dalla Pozza’s logical systems and implicit signs with no specific sign for assertion, such as Peirce’s algebraic and graphical logics and the recent modification of the latter termed Assertive Graphs. We identify and discuss the main ‘points’ of these notations on the logical representation of assertions, and evaluate their systems from the perspective of the philosophy of logical notations. Pragmatic assertions turn out to be useful in providing intended interpretations of a variety of logical systems

3D technologies for a critical reading and philological presentation of ancient contexts

This paper demonstrates how low cost 3D visualization techniques can be easily used for the transmission of historical and cultural content in museum communication strategy. Specifically, we used computer 3D animation graphics to present information about Queen Nefertari, the Maya chapel and the tomb of Kha in the specific exhibition in the Egyptian Museum of Turin. Movie documentaries support the thematic itineraries of the rooms and offer a virtual trip to the places where the goods displayed were found. The same approach was used for the virtual reconstruction of two Pompeian contexts: the House of the Golden Bracelet and the House of Octavius Quartio. Our research allowed us to create an accurate representation of gardens, statues, architectural spaces, and pools with fountains and frescoed rooms, all virtually reproduced in their original context, using communication methods that combine technology with a synthetic and emotional approach. Techniques of close range photogrammetry made it possible to conduct a 3D survey of sixteen statues and other architectural elements; lost artefacts were reconstructed and areas destroyed by the eruption of 79 AD were evoked. The eruption was partially represented, with fluid dynamic simulations and computer graphics effects in order to transmit accurate scientific information in a simple and immediate language developed by lengthy technical experiments. The synthesis imposed by the short duration of the movie required matching all this information with a self-explanatory approach, which allows the visitor to understand the characteristics of the archaeological goods displayed in the exhibition in a general view that repeats colours, sounds and suggestions of the environments destroyed two thousand years ago

Towards a Psychology in Shades of Grey. An Epistemological Analysis

According to Sergio Salvatore’s Psychology as science of the explanandum, there is an urgent need of a rigorous language for the explanandum in psychology. This attitute is what Salvatore calls “psychology in black and white”. In this paper, we point out that the epistemological method of explication may be a good tool for the conceptual clarification of the terms that may work as the explanandum in a psychological explanation. Two forms of explications are presented, Carnap’s explication and Kant’s explication. Differently from Carnap’s explication, Kant’s explication does not necessarily require a process of formalization and, for this reason, it may be much more suitable for clarifying complex psychological terms (possibly difficult to be formalized). Still, formalization in psychology can accomplish a very important task. Abstracting by some aspects of ‘reality’ (e.g., by some of its colours) we can better elucidate the deeper structure of reality (in black and white) and, with sound epistemological methods, we can even imagine (using again Sergio Salvatore’s metaphor of colours) to see reality in shades of grey