The Dynamics of Twisted Tent Maps

This paper is a study of the dynamics of a new family of maps from the complex plane to itself, which we call twisted tent maps. A twisted tent map is a complex generalization of a real tent map. The action of this map can be visualized as the complex scaling of the plane followed by folding the plane once. Most of the time, scaling by a complex number will "twist" the plane, hence the name. The "folding" both breaks analyticity (and even smoothness) and leads to interesting dynamics ranging from easily understood and highly geometric behavior to chaotic behavior and fractals.Comment: 87 pages. This is my Ph.D. thesis from IUPU

INCREASING TEACHER AVAILABLILITY : RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF POLICY, INCENTIVES, AND MANAGEMENT TOOLS TO PRODUCE DISTRICT COST-SAVINGS

The impact the lack of teacher availability has on school budgets and the burden imposed on school finances resulted in one small school district paying in excess of 500,000 per year for the 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 school years for substitute teacher expenditures. As a result of fiscal exigencies, leaders in low economic school districts are more strategic than ever in managing scarce financial resources (Miller, Murnane, & Willet, 2008; Odden & Picus, 2014; Roza, 2007, 2009). This problem of practice was an effort to reduce the financial burden of teacher absenteeism by identifying and implementing effective strategies for increasing teacher availability found in the literature and vetted by stakeholders. Stakeholder opinions, perceptions, and experiences regarding the lack of teacher availability combined with best practices found in the literature provided the basis for a comprehensive policy on teacher attendance. After partially implementing several strategies found in the literature and vetted by stakeholders, district data showed a 169,619.68 or a 28.2% savings during the 2013-2014 school year. From August 2014 until March 2015, the district spent $295,603.92 in substitute costs with two months remaining in the school year. At this rate, projected substitute spending for school year 2015 is$369,504.90. The difference in the $601,131.93 costs for the 2012-2013 school year compared to the 2015 school year is a savings of$231,627.03 or 38.5%. Adoption and implementation of the entire comprehensive attendance policy should result in even greater savings

Evaluating User Satisfaction and Perceived Quality of Electronic Health Records in Mississippi

Electronic Health Records (EHRs) is a health information technology that has already begun to change the way healthcare providers care for patients. EHRs can potentially enhance the quality and efficiency of patient care (Simon et al., 2010); however, some research shows that EHRs do not always do so. The lack of improved efficiency and quality of care can lead to frustrated and dissatisfied users. The effects of different aspects of EHR implementation could affect user satisfaction and perceived quality of EHRs. This study investigates the how time since implementation, training, and leadership affect user satisfaction and perceived quality of the EHR system in clinics in Mississippi. The results of the study indicate that training and leadership have an effect on users’ perceived quality and satisfaction with EHRs. These findings reveal that clinics and EHR providers should focus on training and leadership to improve user satisfaction and perceived quality of EHRs

CAFA\u27s Impact on Litigation as a Public Good

Class actions regulate when government fails. Perhaps this use as an ex post remedy when ex ante regulation founders explains the fervor and rhetoric surrounding Rule 23\u27s political life. In truth, the class action does more than aggregate; it augments government policing and generates external societal benefits. These societal benefits - externalities - are the spillover effects from facilitating small claims litigation. In federalizing class actions through the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), Congress, in some ways, impeded class action practice, thereby negating its positive externalities and inhibiting backdoor regulation. This Article critically considers those effects on the common good. It also develops an implicit but overlooked theme within the CAFA debate - the notion that litigation itself is a public good

Financing Issue Classes: Benefits and Barriers to Third-Party Funding

This essay, written for NYU\u27s symposium on Litigation Funding: The Basics and Beyond, explores the costs and benefits of using third-party financing to fund issue class actions

Aggregation, Community, and the Line Between

This is the published version

Between \u27Merit Inquiry\u27 and \u27Rigorous Analysis\u27: Using Daubert to Navigate the Gray Areas of Federal Class Action Certification

In recent years, the class action certification hearing has become the latest forum for disputes over the reliability of expert testimony. Since these hearings may involve complex technical matters, litigants frequently try to introduce expert testimony to either establish or challenge the basic requirements for class certification. Yet, most courts do not conduct a Daubert analysis before admitting expert testimony during certification, evaluate the evidence according to a uniform standard, or adequately weigh opposing expert opinions. Even though the Federal Rules of Evidence codify procedures to ensure the reliability of expert testimony, courts have been reluctant to employ them during class certification. This hesitation primarily arises from a fear of moving into the substantive merits of the case. Certifying a class based on unreliable expert testimony forces courts to decertify the class later in the process, encourages frivolous suits that strong-arm risk averse defendants into settlement, wastes judicial resources, and undermines the legitimate purposes of the class action mechanism. Ideally, to make a fair and informed decision on certification, judges should use the wide latitude in the current gray area between Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin\u27s prohibition on an inquiry into the case\u27s merits and General Telephone Company v. Falcon\u27s rigorous analysis requirement to (1) routinely apply Daubert as a precursor to admitting expert evidence, (2) adequately weigh opposing expert opinions as well as the rest of the evidence, and (3) employ a preponderance of the evidence standard to determine the sufficiency of the plaintiffs\u27 proof before resolving ambiguities in favor of the plaintiffs and erring on the side of certification. This Comment takes a closer look at the judicial handling of experts in federal class certification hearings, the amount of proof required for certification, and how courts evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence. The Comment ultimately argues that courts should admit expert affidavits and reports only if they survive an initial Daubert analysis

Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation

When transferee judges receive a multidistrict proceeding, they select a few lead plaintiffs\u27 lawyers to efficiently manage litigation and settlement negotiations. That decision gives those attorneys total control over all consolidated plaintiffs\u27 claims and rewards them richly in common-benefit fees. It\u27s no surprise then that these are coveted positions, yet empirical evidence confirms that the same attorneys occupy them time and again. Anytime repeat players exist and exercise both oligopolistic leadership control across multidistrict proceedings and monopolistic power within a single proceeding, there is concern that they will use their dominance to enshrine practices and norms that benefit themselves at consumers\u27 (or here, clients) expense. Apprehensiveness should increase when defense lawyers are repeat players too, as they are in multidistrict litigation. And anxiety may peak when the circumstances exhibit these anti-competitive characteristics, but lack regulation as they do here. Without the safeguards built into class\u27 certification, judicial monitoring and appellate checks disappear. What remains is a system that may permit lead lawyers to act, at times, like a cartel. Basic economic principles demonstrate that noncompetitive markets, can result in higher prices and lower outputs, and agency costs chronicle ways in which unmonitored agents\u27 self-interest can lead them astray. By analyzing lead lawyers\u27 common-benefit fees, the non-class deals that they design, and the results they generate for their clients, this Article introduces new empirical evidence that multidistrict litigation is not immune to market or agency principles. It demonstrates that repeat players on both sides continually achieve their goals in tandem-defendants end massive suits and lead plaintiffs\u27 lawyers increase their common-benefit fees. But this exchange may result in lower payouts to plaintiffs, stricter evidentiary burdens in claims processing, or more coercive plaintiff-participation measures in master settlements. These circumstances warrant regulation. Even though judges entrench and enable repeat players, they are integral to the solution. By tinkering with selection and compensation methods and instilling automatic remands after leaders negotiate master settlements, judges can capitalize on competitive forces already in play. Tapping into the vibrant rivalries within the plaintiffs\u27 bar allows judges to use dynamic market solutions to remap the existing regulatory landscape by invigorating competition and playing to attorneys\u27 adversarial strengths