One pot domino synthesis of polyvicinalamine monomers

On a genere de l'imidazole par une reaction de type domino in situ entre le glyoxal, le formaldehyde et deux unites d'ammoniac aqueux. L'addition de bicarbonate aqueux et d'un anhydride carboxylique ou d'un dicarbonate de dialkyle conduit a la formation de la N,N'-diacyl- ou N,N'-dicarbalkoxy-2-hydroxyimidazoline correspondante. Il s'ensuit une reaction de clivage de cycle de Bamberger qui permet d'isoler facilement le cis-1,2-di(acetamido)ethene, le cis-1,2-di(propylamido)ethene, le cis-1,2-di(ethoxyamido)ethene, le cis-1,2-di(tert-butoxyamido)ethene ou le cis-1,2-di(benzamido)ethene sous la forme de solides. La facilite et la generalite offerte par cette approche monotope implique une voie efficace du point de vue des couts en vue de la synthese de routine de precurseurs d'amines oligo- et polyvicinales

"Romes without Empires": Primate Cities, Political Competition, and Economic Growth

Many developing economies are characterized by the dominance of a super metropolis. The coexistence of a primate city with a low level of economic development is not an accident, the former being symptomatic of the causes of the latter. Taking historical Rome as the archetype of a city that centralizes political power to extract resources from the rest of the country, we develop two models of rent-seeking and expropriation which illustrate different mechanisms that relate political competition to economic outcomes. The "voice" model shows that rent-seeking by di?erent interest groups (localized in different specialized cities/regions) will lead to low investment and growth when the number of these groups is low. Increased political competition in the form of more organized groups engaged in countervailing activity leads to more secure property rights and higher growth. The "exit" model allows political competition among those with political power (to tax or expropriate from citizens) over a footloose tax base. It shows that when this power is centralized, tax rates would be higher and growth rates lower. When political power is decentralized across different self-interested rulers in diverse jurisdictions, the competition over the mobile resources leads to lower tax/expropriation rates, raising the long-run rate of growth of the economy.public goods, inequality, redistribution, political economy

Divided We Stand, United We Fall: The Hume-Weber-Jones Mechanism for the Rise of Europe

The "great divergence" in incomes between Europe and the rest of the world occurred relatively recently. Why was it that Western Europe, once a backward outpost on the fringes of the Eurasian continent, able to dominate in terms of income and technology the previously successful Eastern economies? Several mechanisms have been identifed to account for the rise of Europe. This paper formalizes one important mechanism, the intellectual origins of which can be traced back to Hume and Weber and which was fully, though informally, articulated by E.L. Jones. This mechanism emphasizes the contrast between the European states-system and the Eastern empires. Political competition for a mobile tax-base in a states-system forces rulers to expropriate less from their subjects and to supply relatively more "public services". By effectively limiting the "exit" options of the ruled, an empire rewards its ruler with a captive tax-base that can be subjected to relatively higher levels of expropriation without a similar rise in "public services" provided. The states-system thus encourages higher levels of capital accumulation, while the empire stifles it. The successes of the Eastern empires in their consolidation phase are due to the competition they initially faced from neighboring states. Since Europe escaped such consolidation, the process of accumulation there never faced the impediments its Eastern counterparts did. The paper, thus, also provides a structural explanation for the emergence of institutions in Europe that led to relatively secure property rights.public goods, inequality, redistribution, political economy

Using Job Embeddedness Factors to Explain Voluntary Turnover in Five European Countries

This paper investigates actual voluntary turnover from the employee's perspective using a large European dataset integrating the available job factors related to job embeddedness and other variables that have been related to turnover in previous turnover models. The study shows that the traditional turnover model, where ease of movement and desire of movement are regarded as important predictors of turnover, receives support. However, the study also shows the job embeddedness factors play a key role in predicting turnover as well, even after the role of demographic and ease and desire of movement variables are taken into consideration. Thus, this shows that the turnover decision is not only about the individual's attitudes towards work or about the actual opportunities in the labor market, but these decisions are the result of an analysis of complex web of factors that are labeled job embeddedness.

Commodity Chains, Unequal Exchange and Uneven Development

Research shows an uneven partition of value added along commodity chains between transnational firms and producers in developing countries. This paper briefly discusses how such a distribution occurs and how it leads to unequal exchange in trade. A North-South trade model reveals the uneven development consequences of this exchange. The terms of trade between North and South help maintain a gap in capital accumulation between the two regions. The model reveals that capital flows covering the trade deficit of the South with the North may help stimulate the unrequited transfer of real resources from South to North.Unequal exchange, development, commodity chains

Self-perceived age categorization as a determinant of the old age boundary

Using data from the European Social Survey, we investigate the influence of individuals' self-perceptions of being a member of an age group on their assessment of the beginning of ‘old age'. The proper examination of this relationship calls for the consideration of the effects of age and gender as well as the fact that people who concur that a boundary for old age exists (thus provide a numerical response to the relevant survey question) constitute a non-random subsample of the population with respect to the outcome of interest. Therefore, the econometric work features a two-equation selection model that jointly estimates the ‘Old age boundary' and the ‘Numerical response' equations. Our finding is that the two equations are in fact correlated, and – along with age and gender – self-perceived age categorization has a significant effect on the subjective old age boundary. People who categorize themselves in younger age groups than others of the same chronological age have higher old age boundaries.Self-perceived age, age categorization, age boundary, Heckman selection model.

The Region-of-origin effect revisited: More on the voting behavior of Turkey's internal migrants

The purpose of this paper is to provide further insights into how the Turkish internal migrants' party choices are influenced by the voting patterns in their places of origin. We consider the impact of several factors including the timing of the departure from the origin and the migrants' self-declared emotional attachment to their origins. Using a nationwide survey conducted before the 2011 general elections, we find that the ‘region-of-origin' effect is present only among those who identify themselves with their original – rather than current – provinces. Investigations relating to the timing of departure reveal that the effect is absent for those who relocate when aged 18-to-20, i.e. around the age of discretion and the age at which many young people leave their towns to receive higher education. This interpretation is consistent our finding that the region-of-origin effect declines with the years of schooling.Internal migration, political assimilation, region-of-origin effect, voter behavior, Turkey, conditional logit.