The Scheme of Movement as an Organizer of Action in Classical and Relativistic Mechanics

This paper reports on the use of the concept of scheme as one of the references for analyzing the process of making out the meaning of relative time. It is part of the current perspective that discusses the inclusion of Modern Physics topics in high school education; the paper investigates the conditions for such inclusion to occur. To this end, a didactic sequence was produced based on the transition between the key concepts of Classical Mechanics and the Special Theory of Relativity, where one of the central points was the discussion of the influence of the reference frame in the study of motion. The research activities lasted 16 classroom hours in a third-grade year high school and were quite diverse, with lectures, group discussions, open problem-solving, and thought experiments. We analyzed, in this paper, episodes of verbal interaction and written activities of the students related to the concept of reference frame and its influence on the notion of relative time. The theoretical framework used for the analysis of the students' productions was the Theory of Conceptual Fields, which was supported by the content analysis technique. Different operational invariants were identified in the students' schema of motion and time. We concluded our research by indicating that there must be a reciprocal assimilation between the schema of time and motion for the students to be able to propose correct answers to problems in Mechanics

The toxicity of the "Senecio brasiliensis", Lessing

O artigo não apresenta resumo.The author abserved occasionally and experimentally that the "Senecio brasiliensis", Less, may produce mediate or immediate poisoning in domestic animals, evidenced clinically by jaundice, death occuring in all cases

A aplicação do princípio da insignificância aos crimes contra a ordem tributária

Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso (graduação)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Direito, 2019.O princípio da insignificância, desenvolvido pela teoria funcionalista de Claus Roxin, gera diversas controvérsias a respeito de sua extensão e adequada aplicação. Tendo como base os princípios da subsidiariedade e da lesividade, busca-se com o presente trabalho realizar uma análise daquele preceito na seara penal, os casos em que ele é cabível nos crimes tributários, os demais institutos correlatos e, por fim, examinar a constitucionalidade e a adequação à sistemática penal da atual aplicação da bagatela.The insignificance principle, developed by the functionalist theory of Claus Roxin, is an institute that causes many controversies based on its extension and suitable application. Based on subsidiarity and lesivity principles, this paper seek to perform an analysis of this principle in the criminal area, in which cases is appropriate its application onto tributaries crimes, related institutes and, last, exam if the insignificance has been applied according the Constitution and the criminal system

Controle gerencial no fundo de investimento : alternativas tecnológicas para a redução dos conflitos de agência

Apesar de amplamente debatidas no âmbito do direito das companhias, as análises das estruturas de poder e da caracterização do poder de controle nos fundos de investimento ainda são temas de recente enfrentamento pela doutrina brasileira. Nesse contexto, o presente trabalho se dedica a compreender a manifestação do fenômeno, no Brasil, do poder de controle nos fundos de investimento, a partir dos conceitos já consolidados no direito acionário, bem como objetiva a analisar as consequências da ocorrência do controle gerencial nos fundos de investimento, sobretudo com relação à acentuação dos conflitos de agência entre os administradores-controladores e os cotistas, a partir da dissociação entre propriedade de cotas e poder diretivo dos fundos de investimento. Para a elaboração da pesquisa, utilizou-se de revisão bibliográfica nacional e internacional sobre o tema, assim como de pesquisa de jurisprudência administrativa, no âmbito de decisões proferidas pela Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, e de notícias publicadas pelos principais jornais de economia no cenário global. Em um primeiro momento, sistematizou-se as características mais substanciais dos fundos de investimento para o objeto deste estudo, conforme previstas no regime legal introduzido pela Lei nº 13.874/2019 (“Lei da Liberdade Econômica”) e pela regulação administrativa da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, relativa às normas gerais aplicáveis aos fundos de investimento (Instrução CVM nº 555/2014). No capítulo seguinte, apresentou-se a taxonomia do poder de controle, bem como se realizou a sua subsunção para a realidade dos fundos de investimento no Brasil. A partir disso, foram explicadas as relações de agência e explorados os conflitos de agência, potencializados pelo controle gerencial nos fundos de investimento, correlacionando-os ao arcabouço legal e regulatório dos fundos de investimento no Brasil, a partir de uma análise crítica. No capítulo final, objetivou-se a explorar uma possível solução estrutural para fins de redução dos conflitos de agência nos fundos de investimento, alicerçada no conceito de “democratização societária” e na tecnologia como instrumento de transformação do direito societário e do mercado de capitais. Em sede de conclusão, verificou-se que os fundos de investimento, no direito brasileiro, são ambientes férteis à instalação do controle gerencial por parte dos administradores, o que pode estimular o desenvolvimento de conflitos de agência e, consequentemente, implicar prejuízos aos cotistas. Notou-se, também, inexistir um regime jurídico próprio de freios e contrapesos para coibir abusos dos controladores nos fundos de investimento. Por fim, constatou-se que, em que pese existam alternativas tecnológicas aptas a reduzir os conflitos de agência, tais alternativas - por si sós - não são suficientes para solucionar o problema, devendo ser aliadas a incentivos regulatórios para estimular o ativismo nas tomadas de decisão, por parte dos interessados no fundo.Despite being widely debated within the scope of corporate law, the analysis of the power structures and the characterization of the controlling power in investment funds are still themes that have recently been confronted by Brazilian doctrine. In this context, the present work is dedicated to understanding the manifestation of the phenomenon, in Brazil, of the power of control in investment funds, based on concepts already consolidated in corporate law. It also aims to analyze the consequences of the occurrence of managerial control in investment funds, especially concerning the accentuation of agency conflicts between the administrators controllers and investors, based on the dissociation between the ownership of equity and the directive power of investment funds. For the elaboration of the research, a national and international bibliographic review on the theme was used, as well as research of administrative jurisprudence, in the scope of decisions handed down by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission, and news published by the main economic newspapers on the global scenario. In a first moment, the most substantial characteristics of investment funds for this work were systematized, as provided for in the legal regime introduced by Law No. 13,874/2019 (“Economic Freedom Law”) and by the administrative regulation of the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission, concerning the general rules applicable to investment funds (CVM Instruction No. 555/2014). In the following chapter, the taxonomy of the power of control was presented, as well as its subsumption to the reality of investment funds in Brazil. After that, the agency relations were explained and the agency conflicts, enhanced by managerial control in investment funds, were explored, correlating them to the legal and regulatory framework of investment funds in Brazil, from a critical analysis. In the final chapter, the objective was to explore a possible structural solution for the reduction of agency conflicts in investment funds, based on the concept of "corporate democratization" and on technology as an instrument of transformation of corporate law and the capital market. In conclusion, it was verified that investment funds, under Brazilian law, are fertile environments for the installation of managerial control by the administrators, which can stimulate the development of agency conflicts and, consequently, losses to the investors. It was also noted that there is no specific legal regime of checks and balances to restrain abuses by controllers in investment funds. Finally, it was found that, although there are technological alternatives capable of reducing agency conflicts, these alternatives - by themselves - are not enough to solve the problem and should be allied to regulatory incentives to stimulate activism in decision-making by the fund's stakeholders