A Network Analysis

In the run-up to Paris, individual countries and multilateral banks made new promises to provide millions of dollars for adaptation (and mitigation) action in developing countries, with a view to reaching the usd 100 billion target announced in Copenhagen and confirmed in Paris. But where are all these funds going to? To what extent do they reach the poorest and most vulnerable, those most in need of support? The focus of this paper is on bilateral aid for adaptation to climate change. Using oecd data on adaptation aid, we examine how donors allocate this aid|and to what extent they indeed prioritise those `particularly' vulnerable to climate change. To understand donor behaviour, we build on the large literature on aid allocation in general, and on adaptation aid in particular. Yet, as opposed to traditional dyadic analyses, we conceptualise aid allocation as a network, in which the provision of adaptation aid is a network tie. This network approach, we argue, is better able to capture interactions between donors, for the allocation decisions of others likely in uence a donor's allocation decision. Donors on the one hand coordinate their allocation, but on the other hand also compete for political and economic influence through the provision of aid, including aid for adaptation. In order to capture these coordination dynamics in addition to the dyadic relationships between donors and recipients we employ Temporal Exponential Random Graph Models. Our analysis indicates that donors consider recipient need and recipient merit when deciding on how to allocate adaptation aid: more vulnerable and more democratic countries are more likely to receive adapation aid. More importantly, however, donors consider their own economic and political interests: trading partners and former colonies are much more likely to receive adaptation aid. Finally, we also found evidence for donor coordination: countries that already receive adaptation aid from other countries are less likely to form additional ties, that is, they are less likely to also receive adaptation aid from additional donors

The impact of environmental interest groups in international negotiations: Do ENGOs induce stronger environmental commitments?

Although there is a substantial amount of research that studies how environmental interest groups/non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) influence international environmental negotiations, both the theoretical work and the empirical evidence were not yet able to answer comprehensively if this makes it more likely that states, in turn, commit to stronger environmental agreements. This article seeks to contribute to clarifying this. First, the authors argue that a higher degree of ENGO access to official negotiations and a larger number of ENGOs actively participating during bargaining processes can facilitate outcomes of environmental negotiations. The authors then analyze quantitative data on international environmental regimes and their members' commitment levels from 1946 to 1998 and obtain robust support for their claims. However, the rationale on the introduced explanatory factors also implies that the impact of ENGO access on states' commitment levels should vary conditional on the number of ENGOs actively participating. The paper finds evidence for such an interaction, although the results go against our expectations. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V

Aid for adaptation to climate change in Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom

This policy brief analyses bilateral adaptation aid from Germany, Sweden and the UK between 2010 and 2014, with a focus on overall volumes and geographic distribution

The influence of NGOs in environmental negotiations : a quantitative approach

Although previous work largely suggests that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) might have a positive impact on international environmental negotiations to the extent that states in turn are more likely to agree on stronger environmental commitments, the empirical evidence is unclear. In order to address this shortcoming, this article firstly employs a spatial bargaining model, which demonstrates that NGOs primarily help states facilitating information problems in negotiations. The authors then analyze quantitative data on international environmental regimes and find evidence that NGOs do indeed positively influence environmental treaty negotiations. More specifically, the stronger the engagement of those civil-society actors and the more NGOs are effectively involved during negotiations, the higher the degree of regime members’ commitment, i.e., their depth of cooperation afterwards. Finally, the theory on those variables implies that the impact of NGO pressure on state commitment levels should vary conditional on the number of NGOs involved. The paper finds evidence for this interaction, although the results go against conventional wisdom