217 research outputs found
Lookin' Out My Backdoor! Investigating Backdooring Attacks Against DL-driven Malware Detectors
The Good, the Bad, and the Binary: An LSTM-Based Method for Section Boundary Detection in Firmware Analysis
CANflict: Exploiting Peripheral Conflicts for Data-Link Layer Attacks on Automotive Networks
Current research in the automotive domain has proven the limitations of the
CAN protocol from a security standpoint. Application-layer attacks, which
involve the creation of malicious packets, are deemed feasible from remote but
can be easily detected by modern IDS. On the other hand, more recent link-layer
attacks are stealthier and possibly more disruptive but require physical access
to the bus. In this paper, we present CANflict, a software-only approach that
allows reliable manipulation of the CAN bus at the data link layer from an
unmodified microcontroller, overcoming the limitations of state-of-the-art
works. We demonstrate that it is possible to deploy stealthy CAN link-layer
attacks from a remotely compromised ECU, targeting another ECU on the same CAN
network. To do this, we exploit the presence of pin conflicts between
microcontroller peripherals to craft polyglot frames, which allows an attacker
to control the CAN traffic at the bit level and bypass the protocol's rules. We
experimentally demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on high-, mid-,
and low-end microcontrollers, and we provide the ground for future research by
releasing an extensible tool that can be used to implement our approach on
different platforms and to build CAN countermeasures at the data link layer.Comment: To appear in CCS'2
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