On the Relationship between Normative Claims and Empirical Realities in Immigration

What is and what ought to be the relationship between empirical research and normative analysis with respect to migration policies? The paper addresses this question from the perspective of political theory, asking about the place of empirical research in philosophical discussions of migration, and, for the most part, leaving to others questions about what role, if any, normative considerations do and should play in empirical research on migration. At the outset the paper also takes note of one important way in which empirical research can and should contribute to normative discussions of migration, quite apart from its role in contributing to political philosophy. DOI: 10.17879/15199614880

Democracy and Respect for Difference: The Case of Fiji

In what follows, I will first offer a capsule history of Fiji. I then will identify some of the moral questions that emerge, both for the inhabitants of Fiji and for us as observers. I will present some tentative answers to these moral questions, reflecting as I go on what this tells us about the possibilities and limits of normative theory, but also trying to note where my normative judgments rest upon features of the story that I think others would want to contest and trying to indicate how alternative readings of the history would affect the normative judgments, if at all. In general, I feel more confident about the importance of the questions I am asking than about the accuracy of my answers, more certain about the inadequacy of theories that do not take these issues into account than about the adequacy of my own theory. I will try to keep that sense in view as I proceed

Inmigración y justicia:¿A quién dejamos pasar?

This paper provides an overview of what justice requires with respect to the admission of immigrants in Europe and North America given two general assumptions: a general right of states to control immigration and a commitment to liberal democratic principles. The paper argues that states are morally constrained in the sorts of criteria they can use to exclude and select immigrants. In particular, they normally cannot use racial or ethnic criteria in selection. Furthermore, states have an obligation to admit as immigrants the immediate relatives (spouse and minor children) or current and permanent residents and an obligation to accept refugees who apply for asylum.Este artículo quiere ofrecer una visión general de lo que la justicia demanda respecto a la admisión de inmigrantes en Europa y en América del Norte si se aceptan dos presupuestos generales: un derecho general de los Estados a controlar la inmigración y el compromiso con los principios liberal-democráticos. El artículo argumenta que los Estados están moralmente constreñidos en cuanto a los tipos de criterios que pueden utilizar para excluir y seleccionar inmigrantes. En particular, normalmente no pueden utilizar criterios raciales o étnicos en la selección. Más aún, los Estados tienen la obligación de admitir como inmigrantes a los parientes cercanos (esposa e hijos menores de edad), o a los ya ciudadanos, a los residentes permanentes y tienen la obligación de aceptar a los refugiados que solicitan asilo

Ethnocentric political theory, secularism and multiculturalism

First published online: 16 June 202

Friends or foes? migrants and sub-state nationalists in Europe

How do sub-state nationalists respond to the growing presence of cultural diversity in their ‘homelands’ resulting from migration? Sub-state nationalists in Europe, in ‘nations without states’ such as Catalonia and Scotland, have been challenging the traditional nation-state model for many decades. While the arguments in favour of autonomy or independence levelled by these movements have become more complex, sub-state nationalist movements remain grounded by their perceived national community that is distinct from the majority nation. Migration to the ‘homeland’ of a sub-state nation, then, presents a conundrum for sub-state elites that we label the ‘legitimation paradox’: too much internal diversity may undermine the claim to cultural distinctiveness. We engage with three common intervening variables thought to influence how sub-state nationalists confront the ‘legitimation paradox’: civic/ethnic nationalism, degree of political autonomy, and party competition. Our overarching argument is that none of these factors have a unidirectional or determinate effect on the sub-state nationalism-immigration nexus, which is why the nuanced case studies that comprise this Special Issue are worthwhile endeavours

Reflections on a crisis: political disenchantment, moral desolation, and political integrity

Declining levels of political trust and voter turnout, the shift towards populist politics marked by appeals to ‘the people’ and a rejection of ‘politics-as-usual’, are just some of the commonly cited manifestations of our culture of political disaffection. Democratic politics, it is argued, is in crisis. Whilst considerable energy has been expended on the task of lamenting the status of our politics and pondering over recommendations to tackle this perceived crisis, amid this raft of complaints and solutions lurks confusion. This paper seeks to explore the neglected question of what the precise nature of the crisis with which we are confronted involves, and, in so doing, to go some way towards untangling our confusion. Taking my cue from Machiavelli and his value-pluralist heirs, I argue that there is a rift between a morally admirable and a virtuous political life. Failure to appreciate this possibility causes narrations of crisis to misconstrue the moral messiness of politics in ways that lead us to misunderstand how we should respond to disenchantment. Specifically, I suggest that: (i) we think that there is a moral crisis in politics because we have an unsatisfactorily idealistic understanding of political integrity in the first place; and (ii) it is a mistake to imagine that the moral purification of politics is possible or desirable. Put simply, our crisis is not moral per se but primarily philosophical in nature: it relates to the very concepts we employ—the qualities of character and context we presuppose whilst pondering over political integrity

Fremde und Bürger: Weshalb Grenzen offen sein sollten

Sollten alle Grenzen geöffnet werden? Die Existenz von Grenzen und Nationalstaaten ist ethisch gesehen unproblematisch. Doch lässt es sich moralisch begründen, diese Grenzen auch zu bewachen, zu verteidigen und Nichteinheimische abzuweisen? Oder anders gefragt: Gibt es ein Recht auf Einwanderung, wie es ein Recht auf Bewegungsfreiheit innerhalb von Staaten gibt? In seinem berühmten Aufsatz aus dem Jahr 1987 argumentiert Carens dafür, dass »Grenzen grundsätzlich offen und Menschen normalerweise frei sein sollten, ihr Herkunftsland zu verlassen und sich in einem anderen Land niederzulassen«. Dies dekliniert er an gängigen ethischen Modellen durch – und findet kein Gegenargument zu seiner These

Fremde und Bürger: Weshalb Grenzen offen sein sollten

Sollten alle Grenzen geöffnet werden? Die Existenz von Grenzen und Nationalstaaten ist ethisch gesehen unproblematisch. Doch lässt es sich moralisch begründen, diese Grenzen auch zu bewachen, zu verteidigen und Nichteinheimische abzuweisen? Oder anders gefragt: Gibt es ein Recht auf Einwanderung, wie es ein Recht auf Bewegungsfreiheit innerhalb von Staaten gibt? In seinem berühmten Aufsatz aus dem Jahr 1987 argumentiert Carens dafür, dass »Grenzen grundsätzlich offen und Menschen normalerweise frei sein sollten, ihr Herkunftsland zu verlassen und sich in einem anderen Land niederzulassen«. Dies dekliniert er an gängigen ethischen Modellen durch – und findet kein Gegenargument zu seiner These