41 research outputs found
The turn of the valve: representing with material models
Many scientific models are representations. Building on Goodman and Elgin’s notion of representation-as we analyse what this claim involves by providing a general definition of what makes something a scientific model, and formulating a novel account of how they represent. We call the result the DEKI account of representation, which offers a complex kind of representation involving an interplay of, denotation, exemplification, keying up of properties, and imputation. Throughout we focus on material models, and we illustrate our claims with the Phillips-Newlyn machine. In the conclusion we suggest that, mutatis mutandis, the DEKI account can be carried over to other kinds of models, notably fictional and mathematical models
Nietzsche’s Epistemic Perspectivism
Nietzsche offers a positive epistemology, and those who interpret him as a skeptic or a mere pragmatist are mistaken. Instead he supports what he calls per- spectivism. This is a familiar take on Nietzsche, as perspectivism has been analyzed by many previous interpreters. The present paper presents a sketch of the textually best supported and logically most consistent treatment of perspectivism as a first- order epistemic theory. What’s original in the present paper is an argument that Nietzsche also offers a second-order methodological perspectivism aimed at enhancing understanding, an epistemic state distinct from knowledge. Just as Descartes considers and rejects radical skepticism while at the same time adopting methodological skepticism, one could consistently reject perspectivism as a theory of knowledge while accepting it as contributing to our understanding. It is argued that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is in fact two-tiered: knowledge is perspectival because truth itself is, and in addition there is a methodological perspectivism in which distinct ways of knowing are utilized to produce understanding. A review of the manner in which understanding is conceptualized in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science serves to illuminate how Nietzsche was tackling these ideas
Factive Scientific Understanding Without Accurate Representation
This paper analyzes two ways idealized biological models produce factive scientific
understanding. I then argue that models can provide factive scientific understanding of a
phenomenon without providing an accurate representation of the (difference-making) features of
their real-world target system(s). My analysis of these cases also suggests that the debate over
scientific realism needs to investigate the factive scientific understanding produced by scientists’
use of idealized models rather than the accuracy of scientific models themselves
Trustworthiness
I argue that trustworthiness is an epistemic desideratum. It does not reduce to
justified or reliable true belief, but figures in the reason why justified or reliable true beliefs
are often valuable. Such beliefs can be precarious. If a belief's being justified requires that
the evidence be just as we take it to be, then if we are off even by a little, the belief is
unwarranted. Similarly for reliability. Although it satisfies the definition of knowledge, such
a belief is not trustworthy. We ought not use it as a basis for inference or action and ought
not give others to believe it. The trustworthiness of a belief, I urge, depends on its being
backed by reasons—considerations that other members of the appropriate epistemic
community cannot reasonably reject. Trustworthiness is intersubjective. It both depends on
and contributes to the evolving cognitive values of an epistemic community. Philosophical Papers Vol. 37 (3) 2008: pp. 371-38