18 research outputs found

    The Euratom Safeguards On-site Laboratories at the Reprocessing Plants of La Hague and Sellafield

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    In the European Union, nuclear material is reprocessed from irradiated power reactor fuel at two sites ¿ La Hague in France and Sellafield in the United Kingdom. These are the largest nuclear sites within the EU, processing many hundreds of tons of nuclear material in a year. Under the Euratom Treaty, the European Commission has the duty to assure that the nuclear material is only used for declared purposes. The Directorate General for Energy (DG ENER), acting for the Commission, assures itself that the terms of Article 77 of Chapter VII of the Treaty have been complied with. In contrast to the Non Proliferation Treaty, the Euratom Treaty requires to safeguard all civil nuclear material in all EU member states ¿ including the nuclear weapons states. The considerable amount of fissile material separated per year (several tonnes) calls for a stringent system of safeguards measures. The aim of safeguards is to deter diversion of nuclear material from peaceful use by maximizing the chance of early detection. At a broader level, it provides assurance to the public that the European nuclear industry, the EU member states and the European Union honour their legal duties under the Euratom Treaty and their commitments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Efficient and effective safeguards measures are essential for the public acceptance of nuclear activities.JRC.E.7-Nuclear Safeguards and Forensic

    Diagnosis, monitoring and prevention of exposure-related non-communicable diseases in the living and working environment: DiMoPEx-project is designed to determine the impacts of environmental exposure on human health

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    Inwendige standaardisatie bij protonenactiveringsanalyse van milieumaterialen

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    Validation of Non-Standard Analytical Methods Used in Nuclear Material Measurement for Safeguards Purposes

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    The Analytical Service (AS) of the Nuclear Safeguards and Forensics unit of the European Commission's Joint Research Centre is the laboratory responsible for performing the destructive analysis for nuclear safeguards in the frame of the EURATOM treaty. The AS operates a pool of analytical techniques to determine the concentration and isotopic composition of uranium and plutonium, and also to measure the level of impurities in uranium materials. Because of the sensitive nature of these measurements, it is crucial to ensure the quality of the delivered results which should be unbiased, with a proper uncertainty and in accordance with the International Target Values. Some of the methods in use have been adapted from existing commercial instruments and from established norms while some others have been fully developed in-house (Hybrid K-edge Densitometry for U/Pu assay, "COMPUCEA" for U concentration /enrichment or "ELANA" for light element analysis). In the latter case the validation of the methods requires a complete study to identify, characterise and control the key parameters (such as the repeatability, reproducibility and robustness) of the method. This characterisation may be hindered by the lack of certified reference materials with a suitable matrix. To address this issue, the laboratory has to gain confidence in the robustness of its methods by other means such as inter- or intra- laboratory comparison exercises or simulation models. This paper presents the pool of analytical techniques used for nuclear safeguards purposes in the Analytical Service of JRC-Karlsruhe and describes the approaches implemented to validate these methods.JRC.G.II.6-Nuclear Safeguards and Forensic

    Analytical Chemistry of Plutonium

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    In 1940, shortly after the discovery of fission, McMillan and Abelson studied the recoil range of fission products induced by neutrons incident on a thin uranium foil (McMillan, 1939; McMillan and Abelson, 1940). While fission products were mostly ejected from the foil, two activities were significantly retained, one with a half-life of 23 min and the other with a half-life of 2.3 days. The shorter activity was known (Meitner et al., 1937) to belong to 239U, produced by neutron capture in 238U; the longer-lived activity was demonstrated to be the beta-decay daughter of 239U, an isotope of the new element neptunium, which had an atomic number of 93. By analogy, just as the beta decay of 239U produces 239Np, the subsequent beta decay of 239Np must also produce an isotope of a new element with atomic number 94 (plutonium), which was not observable in earlier experiments because of a lack of sensitivity for the detection of radioactive species with long half-lives.JRC.DG.E.8-Nuclear safeguards and Securit

    Improving Resilience to Nuclear and Radiological Threats

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    On the 49th edition of the International Seminars on the Planetary Emergencies, we presented a proposal focussed on the development of novel technologies for nuclear safeguards, security, and forensics to counteract illicit activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. The aim of the project is to enhance border security and response to illicit movement and use of such materials, which is a central goal of the Directorate for Nuclear Safety and Security of the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC). Here, we briefly describe the scenarios that generate radiological threats and the current activities carried out by the JRC to address the risks associated with a misuse of nuclear materials and thus contribute to improve nuclear security. We then present the lines along which the proposed project will develop.JRC.G.II.6-Nuclear Safeguards and Forensic

    Use of Reference Materials for Destructive Analysis at the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) and the Euratom On-Site Laboratories at Sellafield and La Hague

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    In order to verify declared nuclear activities for safeguards purposes, high-performance analyses are a key element. The Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission runs for this purpose the Analytical Service at JRC-ITU, and on behalf of the Directorate Gerneral (DG) ENERGY (Euratom Safeguards) the two on site laboratories, at Sellafield, UK, and at La Hague, F. Destructive analyses provide highest accuracy and precision and therefore are part of the analytical techniques used. The isotopic composition and concentration of uranium and plutonium and analysis of impurities are performed using isotope dilution thermal ionisation mass spectrometry, titration, inductively coupled mass spectrometry, and carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen element content assay by fusion extraction. Reference materials play a crucial role to guarantee traceability, accuracy, and comparability of safeguard analyses. All three laboratories have different approaches in choosing the reference materials due to the local requirements. JRC-ITU produces internal reference materials complementary to certified reference material. The experience over the last 10 years is discussed with a focus on the set up of a technique for laser sealing of ampoules for long-term storage of liquid reference material.JRC.E.7-Nuclear Safeguards and Forensic

    Alternative nuclear certified reference materials for safeguards and industry

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    Large-Sized Dried (LSD) spikes are Certified Reference Materials (CRMs) used in nuclear safeguards for accurate determination of nuclear material inventories by Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry (IDMS). They are a metrological quality tool to meet the existing requirements for reliable accountancy and verification measurements (IAEA STR-368). LSD spikes are produced by drying down accurately weighed quantities of uranium and plutonium nuclear reference solutions into vials. The dried deposits are not stable over time. To keep the spikes integrity and to prevent unintended losses of material, the CRMs need to be protected with a matrix or coating material. This substance is a critical component for the quality and long-term stability of these CRMs. IDMS relies on the mechanical integrity of the spikes; they need to be robust during transport and storage for their guaranteed life-time. The main requirements for coating materials are good adherence to glass, mechanical stability, resistance to radiation and long term stability. The material should furthermore, not interfere with the preparation and mass spectrometric measurements. Under the project "Innovative nuclear CRMs for EURATOM safeguards and industry" (INS-CRM), the JRC Directorate G for Nuclear Safety and Security examines alternative substances for coating spikes. The main candidate is CarboxyMethyl Cellulose (CMC) which seems to meet the requirements mentioned above. The goal of the project is to find the right methodology and composition for the preparation of the coatings. Additionally, the mechanical integrity needs to be proven under simulated transport and radiation conditions, and finally the spikes shelf life will be determined. Furthermore, to understand better the interaction between the matrix and the actinides, the structure and chemical properties have to be investigated using different analytical techniques. It is also planned to test several U/Pu ratios for CRMs suitable for different sample types. This paper reports on the current status of the project.JRC.G.II.6-Nuclear Safeguards and Forensic

    Alternative nuclear certified reference materials for safeguards and industry

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    Large Scale Dried (LSD) spikes are Certified Reference Materials (CRMs) used in nuclear safeguards for an accurate determination and verification of nuclear material inventories by Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometric (IDMS). They are a metrological quality tool for nuclear plant operators and safeguards laboratories to meet the existing requirements for reliable accountancy and verification measurements (IAEA STR-368). LSD spikes are produced by dispensing and drying down accurately-weighed quantities of Uranium and Plutonium nuclear reference solutions into vials. The dried deposits are not stable over time. To keep the integrity of the spike and to prevent unintended losses of material, the CRMs need to be protected with a matrix or coating material. This material is a critical component for the quality and long-term stability of these CRMs. IDMS relies on the mechanical integrity of the spikes; they need to be robust during transport and storage for their guaranteed life-time. The main requirements for the matrix/coating are good adherence to glass, mechanical stability, resistance to radiation and long term stability. Besides, the material should readily dissolve in nitric acid and should not interfere with chromatographic separation and subsequent mass spectrometric measurements. Under the project "Innovative nuclear CRMs for EURATOM safeguards and industry" (INS-CRM), the JRC Directorate G (Geel and Karlsruhe) is doing research on alternative substances to be used as matrix and/or coating in the spikes. The main candidate is the CarboxyMethyl Cellulose (CMC) which seems to meet the requirements above mentioned. The main goal of the project is to find the right methodology and composition for the preparation of the coatings. Furthermore, the mechanical integrity needs to be proved under simulated transport and radiation conditions. Finally, the self-life of the spikes will be determined. It is also planned to introduce and to test several U/Pu ratios for CRMs suitable for different sample types.JRC.G.II.6-Nuclear Safeguards and Forensic
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