Tumor Suppressors and Cell-Cycle Proteins in Lung Cancer

The cell cycle is the cascade of events that allows a growing cell to duplicate all its components and split into two daughter cells. Cell cycle progression is mediated by the activation of a highly conserved family of protein kinases, the cyclin-dependent kinases (CDKs). CDKs are also regulated by related proteins called cdk inhibitors grouped into two families: the INK4 inhibitors (p16, p15, p19, and p18) and the Cip/Kip inhibitors (p21, p27, and p53). Several studies report the importance of cell-cycle proteins in the pathogenesis and the prognosis of lung cancer. This paper will review the most recent data from the literature about the regulation of cell cycle. Finally, based essentially on the data generated in our laboratory, the expression, the diagnostic, and prognostic significance of cell-cycle molecules in lung cancer will be examined

Identification of protein-protein interactions of human HtrA1.

The human heat shock protein HtrA1, a member of the HtrA family of serine proteases, is a evolutionarily highly conserved factor which displays a widespread pattern of expression. The yeast two-hybrid technique was employed to identify new cellular proteins physically interacting with HtrA1, and thus potential targets of this serine protease. An enzymatically inactive HtrA1 point mutant, HtrA1-S328A, was generated and used as bait in a yeast two-hybrid system. Fifty-two plasmids were isolated from primary positive yeast clones. Subsequent sequencing and BLAST analysis revealed cDNAs encoding for 13 different proteins. These putative binding partners of HtrA1 appeared to be a) components of extracellular matrix; b) factors related to signal pathways, and c) unknown proteins. Among the 13 positive clones identified and reported here, it is worth of note that the interaction of HtrA1 with tubulin and collagen (extracellular matrix proteins) and with tuberin (cytoplasmic protein) is confirmed by other studies, and this further supports previous findings in which HtrA1 can be found active as an intracytoplasmic protein or as secreted protein as well

Le Soprintendenze bibliografiche dello Stato

The intervention sums up the story of the bibliographic Superintendences, ministerial offices funded in 1919 and transferred to the Regions in 1972, and talks about their positioning within the history of the cultural policies from the Italian unification onwards. Sources used have been legislative and regulatory acts, essays on the subject from different periods and written testimonies of sector's operators. The immediate reason for this has been the need to study the development of state and regional policies on this matter when reform interventions deeply modify the balance of the last forty years. The survey has outlined also the persistence of never-solved problems in the planning of public interventions: for example, different functions have been managed by eclectic structures and at the same time the performance of the single functions has been fragmented based on their own institutions

A Proof Without Words and a Maximum Without Calculus

We define a standard optimization problem with quadratic objective function and provide a rigorous visual proof for its solution without using calculus. We then show that such standard problem is a building block for several economic models related to microeconomics, game theory and pricing strategies

Monte Carlo importance sampling optimization for system reliability applications

This paper focuses on the reliability analysis of multicomponent systems by the importance sampling technique, and, in particular, it tackles the optimization aspect. A methodology based on the minimization of the variance at the component level is proposed for the class of systems consisting of independent components. The claim is that, by means of such a methodology, the optimal biasing could be achieved without resorting to the typical approach by trials

Financial Literacy and Bank Runs: An Experimental Analysis

In this experimental study on the determinants of bank run, participants anonymously interact via an experimental bank deciding whether to withdraw or not their deposit. As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), runs result from a fundamental coordination problem. We elicit subjects’ financial literacy and study whether revealing this information helps in solving the equilibrium coordination in such games with multiple equilibria. As a control we also use information about elicited general knowledge. Within the same framework, we let the bank size vary to investigate how it affects coordination on bank run. We find that, when no information is revealed, the likelihood of runs increases with bank size. Whereas, when information on financial literacy is revealed, the likelihood of runs increases in small and decreases in large banks. Our analyses also show that subjects react to information on financial literacy and general knowledge in a different way. Getting to know that a group has higher financial literacy reduces the probability of run. While, when information about general knowledge is revealed, risk aversion at group level becomes relevant and positively affects the probability of bank run. In all specifications, bank run occurrence is positively affected by short-run withdrawal history and by subjects’ experience

Born to Run: Adaptive and Strategic Behavior in Experimental Bank-Run Games

We run a laboratory experiment to investigate how the size of the group affects coordination in a bank-run game played repeatedly by participants facing different fellow depositors. For comparability purposes, we keep the coordination tightness constant across different sizes. Participants exhibit an adaptive behavior, since the main drivers of their decisions to withdraw are: previous-round outcomes and own initial choice. Moreover, they mainly adopt the best response to previous-round feedback. However, a sizeable share of participants adopts the opposite mode of behavior, that we refer to as experimentation. The analysis of the determinants of experimentation suggest that subjects adopt this behavior when the probability to lead the group toward the efficient outcome is higher. Finally, our analysis shows that the size of the bank has a significant effect on participants’ decisions, since they withdraw more and experiment less in large banks