395 research outputs found

    On the Computational Complexity of Measuring Global Stability of Banking Networks

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    Threats on the stability of a financial system may severely affect the functioning of the entire economy, and thus considerable emphasis is placed on the analyzing the cause and effect of such threats. The financial crisis in the current and past decade has shown that one important cause of instability in global markets is the so-called financial contagion, namely the spreading of instabilities or failures of individual components of the network to other, perhaps healthier, components. This leads to a natural question of whether the regulatory authorities could have predicted and perhaps mitigated the current economic crisis by effective computations of some stability measure of the banking networks. Motivated by such observations, we consider the problem of defining and evaluating stabilities of both homogeneous and heterogeneous banking networks against propagation of synchronous idiosyncratic shocks given to a subset of banks. We formalize the homogeneous banking network model of Nier et al. and its corresponding heterogeneous version, formalize the synchronous shock propagation procedures, define two appropriate stability measures and investigate the computational complexities of evaluating these measures for various network topologies and parameters of interest. Our results and proofs also shed some light on the properties of topologies and parameters of the network that may lead to higher or lower stabilities.Comment: to appear in Algorithmic

    Default Risk and Equity Returns: A Comparison of the Bank-Based German and the U.S. Financial System

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    In this paper, we address the question whether the impact of default risk on equity returns depends on the financial system firms operate in. Using an implementation of Merton's option-pricing model for the value of equity to estimate firms' default risk, we construct a factor that measures the excess return of firms with low default risk over firms with high default risk. We then compare results from asset pricing tests for the German and the U.S. stock markets. Since Germany is the prime example of a bank-based financial system, where debt is supposedly a major instrument of corporate governance, we expect that a systematic default risk effect on equity returns should be more pronounced for German rather than U.S. firms. Our evidence suggests that a higher firm default risk systematically leads to lower returns in both capital markets. This contradicts some previous results for the U.S. by Vassalou/Xing (2004), but we show that their default risk factor looses its explanatory power if one includes a default risk factor measured as a factor mimicking portfolio. It further turns out that the composition of corporate debt affects equity returns in Germany. Firms' default risk sensitivities are attenuated the more a firm depends on bank debt financing

    Bank insolvencies, priority claims and systemic risk

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    We review an extensive literature debating the merits of alternative priority structures for banking liabilities put forward by financial economists, legal scholars and policymakers. Up to now, this work has focused exclusively on the relative advantages of each group of creditors to monitor the activities of bankers. We argue that systemic risk is another dimension that this discussion must include. The main message of our work is that when bank failures are contagious then when regulators assign priority rights need also to take into account how the bankruptcy resolution of one institution might affect the survival of other institutions that have acted as its creditors. When the network structure is fixed the solution is straightforward. Other banks should have priority to minimize the risk of their downfall. However, if the choice of policy can affect the structure of the network, policy design becomes more complex.This is a fruitful avenue for future research

    Systemic importance of financial institutions: regulations, research, open issues, proposals

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    In the field of risk management, scholars began to bring together the quantitative methodologies with the banking management issues about 30 years ago, with a special focus on market, credit and operational risks. After the systemic effects of banks defaults during the recent financial crisis, and despite a huge amount of literature in the last years concerning the systemic risk, no standard methodologies have been set up to now. Even the new Basel 3 regulation has adopted a heuristic indicator-based approach, quite far from an effective quantitative tool. In this paper, we refer to the different pieces of the puzzle: definition of systemic risk, a set of coherent and useful measures, the computability of these measures, the data set structure. In this challenging field, we aim to build a comprehensive picture of the state of the art, to illustrate the open issues, and to outline some paths for a more successful future research. This work appropriately integrates other useful surveys and it is directed to both academic researchers and practitioners
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