The Case for Auctioning Countermeasures in the WTO

A prominent problem with the WTO dispute settlement procedures is the practical difficulty faced by small and developing countries in finding the capacity to effectively retaliate against trading partners that are in violation of their WTO commitments. In light of this problem, Mexico has proposed that retaliation rights be made tradeable.' We offer a first formal analysis of the possibility that retaliation rights within the WTO system be allocated through auctions. We show that the auctions exhibit externalities among bidders, and we characterize equilibrium bidder behavior under alternative auction formats. A key feature of auction format is whether the country in violation of its WTO commitments is prevented from bidding to retire the right of retaliation: if so, then the possibility of auction failure' arises, in which no bids are made despite positive valuation by the bidders; if not, then auction failure is precluded, and indeed the right of retaliation is always retired. We also evaluate these different auction formats from normative (revenue, efficiency) standpoints.

MHD performance calculations with oxygen enrichment

The impact of oxygen enrichment of the combustion air on the generator and overall plant performance was studied for the ECAS-scale MHD/steam plants. A channel optimization technique is described and the results of generator performance calculations using this technique are presented. Performance maps were generated to assess the impact of various generator parameters. Directly and separately preheated plant performance with varying O2 enrichment was calculated. The optimal level of enrichment was a function of plant type and preheat temperature. The sensitivity of overall plant performance to critical channel assumptions and oxygen plant performance characteristics was also examined

The case for tradable remedies in WTO dispute settlement

In response to concerns over the efficacy of the WTO dispute settlement system, especially in regard to its use by developing countries, Mexico has tabled a proposal to introduce tradable remedies within the Dispute Settlement Understanding. The idea is that a country that has won cause before the WTO, and who is facing non-implementation by the author of the illegal act but feels that its own capacity to exercise its right to impose countermeasures is unlikely to lead to compliance, can auction off that right. The attractiveness of this idea is that it offers an additional possibility to injured WTO members to get something from the dispute settlement mechanism without putting into question the legal nature of the existing contract, that is, the predominantly decentralized system of enforcement in the WTO. Examining all disputes brought to the WTO since its inception, the authors find some support for Mexico's perception that developing countries face a practical problem when they attempt to carry through with effective retaliation within the WTO system. And based on the formal results of Bagwell, Mavroidis, and Staiger (2003), they describe arguments that lend some support to the efficacy of Mexico's proposed solution from the perspective of formal economic theory.Information Technology,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,General Technology,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Trade and Services,Economic Theory&Research,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Information Technology,World Trade Organization

The case for auctioning countermeasures in the WTO

A major accomplishment of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in creating the World Trade Organization (WTO) was the introduction of new dispute settlement procedures. These procedures were intended to provide a significant step forward, relative to GATT, in the settling of trade disputes, in large part by ensuring that violations of WTO commitments would be met with swift retaliation ("suspension of concessions") by the affected trading partners. While the dispute settlement procedures of the WTO indeed represent a considerable improvement over those in GATT, nine years of experience under the new procedures suggests that significant problems of enforcement remain in the WTO

The Case for Tradable Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement

It has been almost two years since the process leading to the reform of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) was initiated. The Ministerial Conference in Doha provided the legal mandate (§30) to do so. Negotiations started in early March 2002 and were supposed to be concluded by end of May 2003. This has not been the case. The situation is quite ambivalent from a purely legal perspective right now: negotiators seem to take the view (WTO Doc. TN/DS/9 of 6 June 2003) that although the deadline for concluding negotiations has lapsed, they still have the mandate to continue negotiating, which is what they have been doing ever since. The negotiations so far reveal convergence on some issues and divergence on others. The proposals with a high level of support have been reflected in a document (WTO Doc. TN/DS/9 of 6 June 2003) and those that could not gather momentum are, at least for the time being, kept aside (although, technically, they are still on the negotiating table since it is up to the country proposing them to introduce them at some stage). In this paper we essentially focus on one proposal of the latter kind, the Mexican proposal to allow WTO Members to trade their rights for retaliation. This proposal is definitely the most ambitious and innovative proposal (judging by the pace of institutional reforms throughout the history of dispute settlement in the GATT/WTO) ever submitted in this context. At the same time, it is a meritorious proposal and deserves to be discussed in a comprehensive manner. This paper aims to offer arguments in this perspective

It’s a Question of Market Access

In this paper, we argue that market access issues associated with the question of the optimal mandate of the World Trade Organization should be separated from nonmarket access issues. We identify race-to-the-bottom and regulatory-chill concerns as market access issues and suggest that the WTO should address these concerns. We then describe ways that WTO principles and procedures might be augmented to do so. As for nonmarket access issues, we argue that as a general matter these are best handled outside the WTO, and that, while implicit links might be encouraged, explicit links between the WTO and other labor and environmental organizations should not as a general matter be forged. We view this as a measured approach to labor and the environment within the WTO

It\u27s a Question of Market Access

In this paper, we argue that market access issues associated with the question of the optimal mandate of the World Trade Organization should be separated from nonmarket access issues. We identify race-to-the-bottom and regulatory-chill concerns as market access issues and suggest that the WTIO should address these concerns. We then describe ways that WTO principles and procedures might be augmented to do so. As for nonmarket access issues, we argue that as a general matter these are best handled outside the WTO, and that, while implicit links might be encouraged, explicit links between the WTO and other labor and environmental organizations should not as a general matter be forged. We view this as a measured approach to labor and the environment within the WTO

Glycemia Determines the Effect of Type 2 Diabetes Risk Genes on Insulin Secretion

OBJECTIVE—Several single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) in diabetes risk genes reduce glucose- and/or incretin-induced insulin secretion. Here, we investigated interactions between glycemia and such diabetes risk polymorphisms. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS—Insulin secretion was assessed by insulinogenic index and areas under the curve of C-peptide/glucose in 1,576 subjects using an oral glucose toler-ance test (OGTT). Participants were genotyped for 10 diabetes risk SNPs associated with -cell dysfunction: rs5215 (KCNJ11), rs13266634 (SLC30A8), rs7754840 (CDKAL1), rs10811661 (CDKN2A/2B), rs10830963 (MTNR1B), rs7903146 (TCF7L2), rs10010131 (WFS1), rs7923837 (HHEX), rs151290 (KCNQ1), an