The Future of International Investment Regulation: Towards a World Investment Organisation?

With growth in foreign investment and in the number of companies investing in foreign countries, the application of general principles of public international law has not been deemed adequate to regulate foreign investment and there is, as yet, no comprehensive international treaty on the regulation of foreign investment. Consequently, states have resorted to bilateral investment treaties (BITs), regional trade and international investment agreements (IIAs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) to supplement and complement the regime of protection for foreign investors. In the absence of an international investment court, states hosting foreign investment or investor states have opted for investor-state dispute settlement mechanism (ISDS). This mechanism has brought about its own challenges to the international law of foreign investment due to inconsistency in the application and interpretation of the key principles of international investment law by such arbitration tribunals, and further, there is no appellate mechanism to bring about some cohesion and consistency in jurisprudence. Therefore, there are various proposals mooted by scholars to address these challenges and they range from tweaks to BITs and IIAs, the creation of an appellate mechanism and the negotiation of a multilateral treaty to proposals for reform of ISDS only. After assessing the merits and demerits of such proposals, this study goes further, arguing for the creation of a World Investment Organisation (WIO) with a standing mechanism for settlement of investment disputes in order to ensure legal certainty, predictability and the promotion of the flow of foreign investment in a sustainable and responsible manner

Signalling Demand for Foreign Investment: Postsocialist Countries in the Global Bilateral Investment Treaties Network

A unique dataset on bilateral investment treaties provides a novel source of evidence on the link between neoliberal globalisation and market transition. We argue that postsocialist countries of Europe and Eurasia, more than other developing regions in the world, signed such treaties to signal demand for foreign investment in the spirit of neoliberalism. We calculated the density of the whole BIT network since its inception in 1959 to 2009, and density and centrality of different regional blocks within it, and found strong support for our argument. Yet, even if bilateral investment treaties are designed to promote foreign direct investment, dynamic panel regression models show that signing them does not automatically translate into foreign direct investment inflows for postsocialist European and Eurasian countries in the 1990–2010 period

Credibility, preferences, and bilateral investment treaties

When is a commitment mechanism employed as a solution to a time-inconsistency problem? This article provides a nuanced answer to this question by studying bilateral investment treaties (BITs). We develop a game theoretic model of BIT signing in which the government of a capital-importing country and an investor from a capital-exporting country strategically interact. The model predicts that, on the one hand, when host states highly value foreign direct investment (FDI), the likelihood of BITs increases as their judicial institutions lack credibility. On the other hand, when their preferences for FDI are only modest, the likelihood of BITs increases as their judicial institutions become more credible. We employ Cox proportional hazard models to test our hypotheses, and the results largely support our theory. Our findings have broad implications for the large literature on credible commitment, which has paid insufficient attention to the interplay between preferences and credibility.N

PIGN encephalopathy: Characterizing the epileptology.

Epilepsy is common in patients with PIGN diseases due to biallelic variants; however, limited epilepsy phenotyping data have been reported. We describe the epileptology of PIGN encephalopathy. We recruited patients with epilepsy due to biallelic PIGN variants and obtained clinical data regarding age at seizure onset/offset and semiology, development, medical history, examination, electroencephalogram, neuroimaging, and treatment. Seizure and epilepsy types were classified. Twenty six patients (13 female) from 26 families were identified, with mean age 7 years (range = 1 month to 21 years; three deceased). Abnormal development at seizure onset was present in 25 of 26. Developmental outcome was most frequently profound (14/26) or severe (11/26). Patients presented with focal motor (12/26), unknown onset motor (5/26), focal impaired awareness (1/26), absence (2/26), myoclonic (2/26), myoclonic-atonic (1/26), and generalized tonic-clonic (2/26) seizures. Twenty of 26 were classified as developmental and epileptic encephalopathy (DEE): 55% (11/20) focal DEE, 30% (6/20) generalized DEE, and 15% (3/20) combined DEE. Six had intellectual disability and epilepsy (ID+E): two generalized and four focal epilepsy. Mean age at seizure onset was 13 months (birth to 10 years), with a lower mean onset in DEE (7 months) compared with ID+E (33 months). Patients with DEE had drug-resistant epilepsy, compared to 4/6 ID+E patients, who were seizure-free. Hyperkinetic movement disorder occurred in 13 of 26 patients. Twenty-seven of 34 variants were novel. Variants were truncating (n = 7), intronic and predicted to affect splicing (n = 7), and missense or inframe indels (n = 20, of which 11 were predicted to affect splicing). Seven variants were recurrent, including p.Leu311Trp in 10 unrelated patients, nine with generalized seizures, accounting for nine of the 11 patients in this cohort with generalized seizures. PIGN encephalopathy is a complex autosomal recessive disorder associated with a wide spectrum of epilepsy phenotypes, typically with substantial profound to severe developmental impairment