31 research outputs found
Merit, Tenure, and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence From a Conjoint Experiment in the Dominican Republic
Bureaucratic behavior in developing countries remains poorly understood. Why do some
public servants – yet not others – work hard to deliver public services, misuse state
resources, and/or participate in electoral mobilization? A classic answer comes from Weber:
bureaucratic structures shift behavior towards integrity, neutrality, and commitment to
public service. Our paper conducts the first survey experimental test of the effects of
bureaucratic structures. It does so through a conjoint experiment with public servants in the
Dominican Republic. Looking at merit examinations and job stability, we find that Weber
was right – but only partially. Recruitment by examination curbs corruption and political
services by bureaucrats, while enhancing work motivation. Job stability, by contrast, only
decreases political services: tenured bureaucrats are less likely to participate in electoral
mobilization. Examinations thus enhance the quality of bureaucracy (motivation and lower
corruption) and democracy (electoral competition); job stability only enhances the quality
of democracy
Voter Information Campaigns and Political Accountability: Cumulative Findings From a Preregistered Meta-analysis of Coordinated Trials
Voters may be unable to hold politicians to account if they lack basic information about their representatives’ performance. Civil society groups and international donors therefore advocate using voter information campaigns to improve democratic accountability. Yet, are these campaigns effective? Limited replication, measurement heterogeneity, and publication biases may undermine the reliability of published research. We implemented a new approach to cumulative learning, coordinating the design of seven randomized controlled trials to be fielded in six countries by independent research teams. Uncommon for multisite trials in the social sciences, we jointly preregistered a meta-analysis of results in advance of seeing the data. We find no evidence overall that typical, nonpartisan voter information campaigns shape voter behavior, although exploratory and subgroup analyses suggest conditions under which informational campaigns could be more effective. Such null estimated effects are too seldom published, yet they can be critical for scientific progress and cumulative, policy-relevant learning.FSW – Publicaties zonder aanstelling Universiteit Leide
Voter information campaigns and political accountability: cumulative findings from a preregistered meta-analysis of coordinated trials
Voters may be unable to hold politicians to account if they lack basic information about their representatives’ performance. Civil society groups and international donors therefore advocate using voter information campaigns to improve democratic accountability. Yet, are these campaigns effective? Limited replication, measurement heterogeneity, and publication biases may undermine the reliability of published research. We implemented a new approach to cumulative learning, coordinating the design of seven randomized controlled trials to be fielded in six countries by independent research teams. Uncommon for multisite trials in the social sciences, we jointly preregistered a meta-analysis of results in advance of seeing the data. We find no evidence overall that typical, nonpartisan voter information campaigns shape voter behavior, although exploratory and subgroup analyses suggest conditions under which informational campaigns could be more effective. Such null estimated effects are too seldom published, yet they can be critical for scientific progress and cumulative, policy-relevant learning