Bureaucratic behavior in developing countries remains poorly understood. Why do some
public servants – yet not others – work hard to deliver public services, misuse state
resources, and/or participate in electoral mobilization? A classic answer comes from Weber:
bureaucratic structures shift behavior towards integrity, neutrality, and commitment to
public service. Our paper conducts the first survey experimental test of the effects of
bureaucratic structures. It does so through a conjoint experiment with public servants in the
Dominican Republic. Looking at merit examinations and job stability, we find that Weber
was right – but only partially. Recruitment by examination curbs corruption and political
services by bureaucrats, while enhancing work motivation. Job stability, by contrast, only
decreases political services: tenured bureaucrats are less likely to participate in electoral
mobilization. Examinations thus enhance the quality of bureaucracy (motivation and lower
corruption) and democracy (electoral competition); job stability only enhances the quality
of democracy
