Restructuring Sovereign Debt After NML v. Argentina

The decade and a half of litigation that followed Argentina’s sovereign bond default in 2001 ended with a great disturbance in the Force. A new creditor weapon had been uncloaked: The prospect of a court injunction requiring the sovereign borrower to pay those creditors that decline to participate in a debt restructuring ratably with any payments made to those creditors that do provide the country with debt relief. For the first time holdouts succeeded in fashioning a weapon that could be used to injure their erstwhile fellow bondholders, not just the sovereign issuer. Is the availability of this new weapon limited to the aggravated facts of the Argentine default or has it now moved permanently into the creditors’ arsenal? Only time (and future judicial decisions) will tell. In the meantime, however, sovereigns will occasionally find themselves in financial distress and their debts will occasionally need to be restructured. Venezuela already casts this chilly shadow over the sovereign debt market. If, in a galaxy not too far away, sovereign debt workouts are to have any chance of an orderly completion, a method must be found to neutralize this new weapon. Judging by the secondary market prices of different series of Venezuelan sovereign bonds, large amounts of money are being wagered that it cannot be done

Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will

The purpose of this study was to enrich the environment for llama (Lama glama) and alpaca (Vicugna pacos) in a zoo. The zoo is located in northern Sweden (Umeå, Mickelträsk). The llama herd consists of three individuals of breed qara, two males and one female and the alpaca herd consists of six individuals of breed huacaya, one male, four females and one foal. The species lived in separate enclosures, they lived outside all year round and they had a shelter for wind and rain protection. They feed on pasture and were fed hay and pellet concentrate. A behavioral-study was carried out in April 2014, a five-day study where each of the species were observed 3 h a day, 1,5 h in morning and afternoon. The behavioral of llama and alpaca were observed individually and each behavior was observed in terms of duration and frequency. The study observed if the animals had a possibility to implement their natural behaviors in their enclosures and whether they showed any abnormal- or stereotypical behaviors that can occur in captivity. The questions I wanted to answer were: (1) what behaviors are occurring, (2) Is it possible to indicate from the behaviors if the animals are doing well or not, (3) Is there a difference in behaviors in the morning and afternoon? (4) Is there a difference between the sexes? (5) What actions should be undertaken to enrich and improve the habitat for llamas and alpacas in a zoo? The results from the study show that llamas and alpacas show many normal and natural behaviors, no abnormal-or stereotypical behaviors were visible. Some behaviors were more common in morning and some in afternoon and there were differences in behaviors between the sexes. Example for some environmental enrichment for the llamas and alpacas in the zoo was to add logs, trees, shrubs and sand piles to the enclosure

Restructuring Sovereign Debt After NML v. Argentina

The decade and a half of litigation that followed Argentina’s sovereign bond default in 2001 ended with a great disturbance in the Force. A new creditor weapon had been uncloaked: The prospect of a court injunction requiring the sovereign borrower to pay those creditors that decline to participate in a debt restructuring ratably with any payments made to those creditors that do provide the country with debt relief. For the first time holdouts succeeded in fashioning a weapon that could be used to injure their erstwhile fellow bondholders, not just the sovereign issuer. Is the availability of this new weapon limited to the aggravated facts of the Argentine default or has it now moved permanently into the creditors’ arsenal? Only time (and future judicial decisions) will tell. In the meantime, however, sovereigns will occasionally find themselves in financial distress and their debts will occasionally need to be restructured. Venezuela already casts this chilly shadow over the sovereign debt market. If, in a galaxy not too far away, sovereign debt workouts are to have any chance of an orderly completion, a method must be found to neutralize this new weapon. Judging by the secondary market prices of different series of Venezuelan sovereign bonds, large amounts of money are being wagered that it cannot be done

Talking One\u27s Way Out of a Debt Crisis

The policy of Euro-area officialdom in the period 2010-2011 was to avoid, at all costs, a default and restructuring of the sovereign debt of a member of the monetary union. This policy was motivated principally, but not exclusively, by a fear that the international capital markets, if forcibly reminded of the precarious position of overindebted, growth-challenged members of a monetary union, might recoil generally from lending to European sovereigns. In short, they feared contagion. The only alternative to permitting a debt restructuring, of course, was an official sector bailout. The afflicted countries -- Greece (until 2012), Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus -- received loans from official sector sources sufficient to allow them to repay in full their maturing bond indebtedness. Whenever and wherever the crisis erupted, contagion was thus held in check by the blunt technique of smothering the outbreak -- in money. The proponents of this policy argued at the time, and argue now, that many European sovereigns in 2010 were far too fragile to endure a bout of market contagion. They argued that an acute crisis needed to be averted in order to buy time for the implementation of a gradual but more durable remedy. Had the intervening eight years been used to reduce the debt vulnerabilities of the peripheral (and even some core) states, this argument would now be powerful, indeed invincible. Unfortunately, the opposite happened. Average state indebtedness in Europe today is about one-third larger than it was in 2008. Both the member states and the market saw the reprieve as spreading a reliable official sector safety net under their exposure. So they kept on borrowing and lending. Only the zero interest rate policies of the world’s major central banks during this period have kept debt servicing costs at tolerable levels

Acoustic suspension system

An acoustic levitation system is described, with single acoustic source and a small reflector to stably levitate a small object while the object is processed as by coating or heating it. The system includes a concave acoustic source which has locations on opposite sides of its axis that vibrate towards and away from a focal point to generate a converging acoustic field. A small reflector is located near the focal point, and preferably slightly beyond it, to create an intense acoustic field that stably supports a small object near the reflector. The reflector is located about one-half wavelength from the focal point and is concavely curved to a radius of curvature (L) of about one-half the wavelength, to stably support an object one-quarter wavelength (N) from the reflector

Color, Bacteria, and Mosquito Eggs as Ovipositional Attractants for \u3ci\u3eAedes Aegypti\u3c/i\u3e and \u3ci\u3eAedes Albopictus\u3c/i\u3e (Diptera: Culicidae)

Selected bacterial washes, color, and mosquito eggs were comparatively examined as ovipositional attractants for Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus. Any evidence of additive activity was noted. All colored washes alone were preferred over selected bacterial washes. The combinations of color and bacteria in a single wash were better attractants for oviposition than colored washes alone. The bacterial content of the breeding water was a more important factor than egg presence in oviposition site selection

Large-N Yang-Mills Theory as Classical Mechanics

To formulate two-dimensional Yang-Mills theory with adjoint matter fields in the large-N limit as classical mechanics, we derive a Poisson algebra for the color-invariant observables involving adjoint matter fields. We showed rigorously in J. Math. Phys. 40, 1870 (1999) that different quantum orderings of the observables produce essentially the same Poisson algebra. Here we explain, in a less precise but more pedagogical manner, the crucial topological graphical observations underlying the formal proof.Comment: 8 pages, 3 eps figues, LaTeX2.09, aipproc macros needed; conference proceeding of MRST '99 (10-12 May, 1999, Carleton University, Canada