A micro-political perspective on subsidiary initiative-taking:Evidence from German-owned subsidiaries in France

As classical micro-political studies have shown, management behavior is not only constrained or enabled by certain cultural, structural and institutional patterns, but is shaped by individual interests and actor rationales. Based on the assumption that actors are neither the organs of given structures nor acting fully autonomously, the paper highlights how key foreign subsidiary managers interpret and integrate individual, sociopolitical, organizational as well as some home and host country factors into distinct subsidiary initiatives, which they then try to accomplish in negotiations with the headquarters. Empirically the paper builds on three explorative case studies undertaken in German-owned subsidiaries in France, covering all main forms of subsidiary initiatives (local, global and MNC internal subsidiary initiatives). (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved

Subsidiary Role and Skilled Labour Effects in Small Developed Countries

noThe proportion of skilled labour in subsidiaries is influenced by size and development of host country, and subsidiary role, the latter being connected to autonomy and intra-organisational relationships. In this paper, we conceptually explore subsidiary¿s proportion of skilled labour in relation to subsidiary role within the context of a small developed country. Specifically, we draw on the literature of strategic development of multinational corporations, and insights of inward foreign direct investments in small developed countries. This is presented in a unifying framework in order to predict diverse categorizations of subsidiary role¿s impact on the proportion of skilled labour in subsidiaries

The contested space of multinationals: Varieties of institutionalism, varieties of capitalism

The article argues that institutionalist theory applied to multinationals focuses on the issue of institutional duality', that is, that within multinationals, actors are pressured to conform to the expectations of their home context whilst also being subjected to the transfer of practices from the home context of the MNC itself. This institutional duality leads to conflicts that can be labelled as forms of 'micropolitics'. The head office managers transfer practices, people and resources to subsidiaries in order to maintain control and achieve their objectives. Local subsidiaries have differential capacities to resist these transfers or to develop them in their own interests depending on their institutional context. The article distinguishes institutional contexts that produce 'Boy Scout' subsidiaries, doing what they are told and consequently allowing locally distinctive capabilities to be undermined and those that produce 'subversive strategists' which look to deepen their connection with the local context not the MNC itself. These processes are exacerbated by the demands of capital markets which impose performance requirements on MNCs and lead to continuous organizational restructuring. Head offices become stronger in their attempts to impose standards in all their subsidiaries. The consequences of these processes are that except for a few pockets of 'subversive strategists', multinationals produce subsidiary 'clones' with little ability to leverage the specific assets which the institutional context provides. As it is the subversive strategists that are best placed to be innovative, the problem for the MNC is how to manage this tension