14 research outputs found
Why do dogs (Canis familiaris) select the empty container in an observational learning task?
Many argue that dogs show unique susceptibility to human communicative signals that make them suitable for being engaged in complex co-operation with humans. It has also been revealed that socially provided information is particularly effective in influencing the behaviour of dogs even when the humanâs action demonstration conveys inefficient or mistaken solution of task. It is unclear, however, how the communicative nature of the demonstration context and the presence of the human demonstrator affect the dogsâ object-choice behaviour in observational learning situations. In order to unfold the effects of these factors, 76 adult pet dogs could observe a communicative or a non-communicative demonstration in which the human retrieved a tennis ball from under an opaque container while manipulating another distant and obviously empty (transparent) one. Subjects were then allowed to choose either in the presence of the demonstrator or after she left the room. Results showed a significant main effect of the demonstration context (presence or absence of the humanâs communicative signals), and we also found some evidence for the response-modifying effect of the presence of the human demonstrator during the dogsâ choice. That is, dogs predominantly chose the baited container, but if the demonstration context was communicative and the human was present during the dogsâ choice, subjectsâ tendency to select the baited container has been reduced. In agreement with the studies showing sensitivity to humanâs communicative signals in dogs, these findings point to a special form of social influence in observational learning situations when it comes to learning about causally opaque and less efficient (compared to what comes natural to the dog) action demonstrations
Wild-born Orangutans (Pongo abelii) engage in triadic interactions during play
It has long been held that triadic interactions, or interactions between individuals that include shared perception and goals concerning an outside entity, require elaborate cognitive processes such as joint attention. With their connection to shared intentionality, triadic interactions have been a key topic of interest for developmental and evolutionary psychologists, notably when making comparisons between humans and other ape species. There is good evidence that chimpanzees and bonobos engage in triadic interactions; however, convincing evidence for orangutans are more limited and so far have been found only in the context of feeding. I engaged 11 wild-born sanctuary orangutans through the medium of a stick, allowing them to decide how to use the object and how to interact with me. The participating orangutans developed idiosyncratic ways of using the stick and engaging with me during the activity, and six of them alternated their gaze between the stick and me. When I interrupted the activity, the participating orangutans displayed more numerous and different behaviors than before the interruption to actively reengage me in the game. Much like human infants, they appeared more interested in the social interaction than in the stick. These findings confirm that triadic interactions occur in nonenculturated orangutans and are consistent with studies of other nonhuman great ape species, which also show triadic interactions, suggesting that joint attention and potentially shared intentionality may have an early origin in our evolutionary history
Shared Intentionality and the Cooperative Evolutionary Hypothesis
One important application of theories of collective intentionality concerns the evolution of social understanding and even of human thinking (Tomasello M, A natural history of human thinking, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2014). A promising idea behind this approach is the Cooperative Evolutionary Hypothesis (CEH), namely, the idea that humansâ capacity for social cooperation is at the heart of their ability to understand othersâ mental states and behavior, leading to an explanation of how humans came to share thoughts and language. However, some of the most popular defenses of CEH face important problems. In this paper, we take Tomaselloâs account (J Soc Ontol 2(1):117â123, 2016); A natural history of human thinking. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2014; Origins of human communication. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2008) as a leading example of the CEH which faces such insurmountable problems. In particular, we argue that Tomaselloâs analysis of cooperation and spontaneous help is problematic. We locate a source of such issues in the assumption that the right account of joint action and simple forms of shared intentionality is that which is offered by Bratmanâs theory of shared intentions. The second part of the article proposes and defends an alternative framework for understanding shared intentionality that can help substantiate CEH