Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications

We provide several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability of the informed agent's strategy. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as Leland and Pyle (1977), Glosten (1989), and DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), that were not previously covered

De jure determinants of new firm formation: how the pillars of constitutions influence entrepreneurship

This paper provides empirical evidence supporting the view that constitutions are the primary and fundamental institutional determinant of entrepreneurship. It shows that some of the provisions contained in national constitutions are positively and significantly associated with a standard measure of entrepreneurial dynamics, namely the rate of new business density. Using for 115 countries a novel dataset containing the characteristics of the constitutions enacted in the world, applying an IV-GMM treatment to deal with the endogeneity of constitutional rules, and controlling for de facto variables, the paper finds that provisions about the right to conduct/establish a business, the right to strike, consumer protection, anti-corruption, and compulsory education promote higher rates of new firm formation. Contrasting results are instead obtained for provisions concerning protection of intellectual property rights

Geophysics Field Camp 2017

Electrical resistivity and induced polarization surveys were conducted in the Las Cienegas National Conservation Area for the Nature Conservancy and in accordance with the Bureau of Land Management. Data collected around Empire Ranch HQ shows a thin, high resistivity layer at the surface underlain by a lower resistivity layer, indicative of typical regional alluvium. H0 and H1 show resistivity of approximately 80 Ω-m down to 5 and 10 meters, underlain by 25 Ω-m and 20 Ω-m respectively. H2 and H3 shows resistivity of 60 Ω-m down to 5 and 15 meters, respectively, underlain by 20 Ω-m resistivity. Moving east, the data displays a distinct change. A thin, high-resistivity surface layer is underlain by an extremely low resistivity layer, typical of clays. H5, Z2 and H6 display surface resistivity between 20 Ω-m and 15 Ω-m, typical alluvium values. The massive underlying layer displays resistivity values of approximately 5 Ω-m. Continuing east, H7 shows a thick layer of high (80 Ω-m) resistivity surface material down to 25 meters, underlain again by a massive, low resistivity layer with a typical clay value of 5 Ω-m. H8 and Z3, collected in the Cieneguita cienegas complex, both display a 5 Ω-m surface layer down to 5 meters, indicative of clays. The surface layer is underlain by a 15 Ω-m, low-porosity layer, essentially devoid of clays, interpreted as Late Tertiary and Quaternary basin fill.The Geophysics Field Camp Reports are made available by the Laboratory for Advanced Subsurface Imaging (LASI) and the University of Arizona Libraries. Visit the LASI website for more information http://www.lasi.arizona.edu

Causes of sprawl: a portrait from space

We study the extent to which U. S. urban development is sprawling and what determines differences in sprawl across space. Using remote-sensing data to track the evolution of land use on a grid of 8.7 billion 30 � 30 meter cells, we measure sprawl as the amount of undeveloped land surrounding an average urban dwelling. The extent of sprawl remained roughly unchanged between 1976 and 1992, although it varied dramatically across metropolitan areas. Ground water availability, temperate climate, rugged terrain, decentralized employment, early public transport infrastructure, uncertainty about metropolitan growth, and unincorporated land in the urban fringe all increase sprawl. Copyright (c) 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology..

An externality-robust auction - theory and experimental evidence

An auction is said to be externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the remaining bidders’ payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist even if externalities between bidders arise from certain types of interdependent preferences. One important example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which are frequently used to explain overbidding in auctions. Another important example are cross-shareholdings between firms that compete in an auction. For the independent private values model, we derive an auction that coincides with the second-price auction (SPA) in terms of efficiency and expected revenue, and, in contrast to the second-price auction, is also externality-robust. The externality-robust auction (ERA) is a first-price auction in which truthful bidding is encouraged by bonus payments. We test the robustness property experimentally by comparing the outcomes of the SPA and the ERA. We replicate the earlier finding of significant average overbidding in the SPA, while we find no overbidding on average in the ERA. We also conduct additional treatments where bidders play against the computer, and we use controls for cognitive skills and joy of winning to further pin down the reasons behind the subjects’ bidding behavior and to understand the sources of individual heterogeneity