Voting procedures and parliamentary representation in the European Parliament

Parliamentary representation is a fluid concept. Yet, while the behaviour of elected representatives during roll call votes has been widely analysed, we know little about how parliamentarians act when their individual voting choices are not made public. This paper explores the relationship between voting procedures and the likelihood that Members of the European Parliament prioritise the interests of their EP party group versus the interests of their national party. Using an original survey, I find that MEPs are more likely to prioritise the interests of their national party over those of their EP party group when voting by show of hands or electronically, as opposed to by roll call. Moreover, this voting procedure effect is particularly salient among MEPs elected from 2004/07 accession countries

The choice for EU theorists: Establishing a common framework for analysis

European Union (EU) studies have entered a highly contentious and, arguably, creative phase. A range of theoretical perspectives, seemingly quite highly differentiated from one another, now compete for influence and lsquospacersquo. However, the questions remain: is EU studies developing theories which are truly competing theories? Or is it developing theories that do not compete so much as they aim to explain distinctly different pieces of the EU puzzle? This paper responds directly to these two questions, while reviewing recent literature on EU governance. It argues, first, that we lack theories of EU governance that are true rivals; and, second, that leading models explain different outcomes at different levels in a multi-level system of governance. The result is somewhat phoney debates between compatible theories masquerading as rivals, and between lsquocomparative politicsrsquo and lsquointernational relationsrsquo approaches. Above all, perhaps, we find middle range theories posing as general or lsquometa-theoriesrsquo. In the absence of a plausible general theory of EU governance, theorists must choose precisely which type of outcome theywish to explain

The logic of access to the European Parliament: Business lobbying in the committee on economic and monetary affairs

This article is an attempt to test empirically a theory of access that investigates the logic behind the lobbying behaviour of business interests in the European Parliament. The theoretical framework tries to explain the degree of access of different organizational forms of business interest representation (companies, associations and consultants) to the supranational assembly in terms of a theory of the supply and demand of 'access goods'. On the basis of 14 exploratory and 27 semi-structured interviews, the hypotheses are checked in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) of the European Parliament. Surprisingly, European and national associations enjoy a similar degree of access to the Parliament. Individual companies and consultants have a much lower degree of access than the two collective forms of interest representation. In the conclusion, these results are analysed in the light of the existing literature on party cohesion and coalition formation in the European Parliament

Les députés européens entre allégeances multiples et logique d'institution

La question de la légitimation dans l'Union européenne présente des aspects très différents selon que l'on envisage ses politiques, ses institutions ou le projet d'intégration lui-même, et se pose en des termes contrastés selon l'angle d'approche adopté. Le présent article a pour objet d'envisager la question du point de vue du Parlement européen et de ses membres. Il examine la manière dont les comportements et discours des parlementaires européens sont conditionnés par l'impératif de légitimation et, inversement, analyse comment cet impératif est redéfini en fonction de l'inclusion des députés dans un réseau d'allégeances complexe et contrasté. L'hypothèse centrale est que la légitimation de leurs positions et décisions est l'une des clés du fonctionnement de l'institution, tant dans ses aspects internes qu'externes.The question of legitimisation in the European Union can be seen in very different lights depending on whether its politics, its institutions or the integration project itself is under scrutiny, and is posed in contrasting terms according to the angle of approach which is adopted. This article aims to envisage the question from the point of view of the European Parliament (EP) and of its members (MEPs). It examines the way in which the behaviour and speech of MEPs are conditioned by the imperative of legitimisation and, conversely, analyses how this imperative is redefined by the inclusion of the MEPs in a network of complex and contrasting allegiances. The central hypothesis is that the legitimisation of their positions and decisions is one of the keys to the functioning of the institution, as much in its internal as in its external aspects