Government Advertising, Political Behavior, and Electoral Effects in Brazil

Political communication and advertising are not performed only by politicians and parties. Governments around the world also invest in advertising at the national, subnational, and local levels. However, the study of government advertising has deserved little-to-no attention in political science. In this dissertation, I aim at filling this gap and try to answer four interrelated questions. First, what is the content of government advertising? Second, how does government advertising affect citizens’ political attitudes and behavior? Third, what factors explain governments’ expenditures with advertising? Fourth, does government advertising have political impacts on outcomes that matter for incumbent governments, more particularly electoral outcomes? This dissertation shows how government advertising matters by using Brazil as a case to be studied. Here, I argue that incumbent governments invest in advertising with the goal of building a reputation for accomplishments and also to signal effort to the electorate. Concerning the impact on attitudes and behaviors, I contend that government advertising and partisan advertising interact with the information environment to realize effects on voters. The dissertation is organized around a literature review on government advertising, a theoretical chapter, and four empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter carries out a content analysis of more than 400 ads from the state of Minas Gerais and its municipal governments and proposes a classification scheme for government ads. The second conducts an online survey experiment on 1,800 Brazilians to verify how government advertising affects the attitudes and behaviors of voters. The third chapter studies the determinants of and the impact of government advertising spending at the subnational level, in the state of Minas Gerais. Finally, the fourth empirical chapter analyzes the impact of government advertising in Brazilian municipalities and takes into account the effect of government advertising in conjunction with campaign spending. The results show that government advertising matters politically, with relevant impacts on incumbent’s vote share, turnout, and other measures of campaign effects in the experimental inquiry. The study has implications for the study of political communications, campaign effects, campaign spending, and incumbency (dis)advantage. It also helps understand better the Brazilian competitive political system

Voto estratégico punitivo : transferência de votos nas eleições presidenciais de 2006

O artigo discute as estratégias dos eleitores que transferiram seus votos para Lula no segundo turno das eleições presidenciais de 2006 a fim de testar a hipótese de que esses eleitores empregaram uma nova forma de voto estratégico no primeiro turno das eleições: o voto estratégico punitivo. Argumentamos que esse tipo de comportamento eleitoral foi decisivo para explicar as seguidas reviravoltas ocorridas nas eleições presidenciais de 2006. O artigo também explora os condicionantes para o voto estratégico em sistemas eleitorais de dois turnos.This article discusses voters' electoral strategies who transferred their votes to Lula in the second round of the 2006 Brazilian presidential elections. The goal is to test the hypothesis that voters applied a new form of strategic voting in the first round of the elections: strategic punitive vote. We argue that this type of electoral behavior was decisive to explain vote choices in the 2006 presidential elections as well as the conditions for strategic voting in ballotage systems

A rotatividade dos servidores de confiança no governo federal brasileiro, 2010-2011

Quais fatores determinam a rotatividade dos servidores de confiança do governo federal brasileiro? Este artigo mostra que mudanças partidárias na direção dos ministérios não necessariamente se traduzem em mudanças na composição dos cargos de confiança. Funcionários de confiança com funções de policymaking são mais afetados pela mudança de ministro do que os demais. Além disso, órgãos afetados por escândalos de corrupção tiveram uma taxa de permanência de seus funcionários de confiança maior do que a dos demais órgãos. Fica evidente a necessidade de considerar a policy expertise dos funcionários, medida em tempo de serviço público, para entender a rotatividade. O artigo aponta para a pertinência de estudar as relações "Executivo-Executivo" no Brasil

Political appointments and coalition management in Brazil, 2007-2010

Studies on coalition management in presidential systems usually focus on two types of goods used by the president and formateur party to hold together coalitions: exchange goods (such as individual budget amendments) and coalition goods (such as ministries). This research note analyzes, with an original dataset of party members and political appointees in Brazil, a different type of good: presidential political appointments. Our study shows that partisan political appointees vary greatly among Brazilian ministries and within them. We also found that there is a disconnect between how many seats a political party holds in Congress and the number of political appointment offices it controls. This has implications for the literature on bureaucracy and politics and the literature on coalition management.La investigación sobre el manejo de coaliciones en sistemas presidenciales normalmente se concentra en dos tipos de bienes utilizados por el presidente y su partido para formar coaliciones: intercambio de bienes (a modo de enmiendas presupuestarias individuales) y los bienes propios de la coalición (a través de gabinetes ministeriales). En base a un banco de datos original sobre afiliación y nombramientos partidários para cargos de confianza en el poder ejecutivo brasileño, este artículo analiza un tipo diferente de bien de intercambio: los nombramientos presidenciales. Nuestro estudio demuestra que los patrones de nombramientos partidarios varían horizontalmente (de ministerio a ministerio) y verticalmente (dentro de un ministerio específico). El análisis también muestra que no hay relación entre el número de legisladores que pertenecen a un partido y la capacidad de este de efectuar nombramientos políticos

Nominaciones Partidárias e Coaliciones en Brasil, 2007-2010

Studies on coalition management in presidential systems usually focus on two types of goods used by the president and formateur party to hold together coalitions: exchange goods (such as individual budget amendments) and coalition goods (such as ministries). This research note analyzes, with an original dataset of party members and political appointees in Brazil, a different type of good: presidential political appointments. Our study shows that partisan political appointees vary greatly among Brazilian ministries and within them. We also found that there is a disconnect between how many seats a political party holds in Congress and the number of political appointment offices it controls. This has implications for the literature on bureaucracy and politics and the literature on coalition management.La investigación sobre el manejo de coaliciones en sistemas presidenciales normalmente se concentra en dos tipos de bienes utilizados por el presidente y su partido para formar coaliciones: intercambio de bienes (a modo de enmiendas presupuestarias individuales) y los bienes propios de la coalición (a través de gabinetes ministeriales). En base a un banco de datos original sobre afiliación y nombramientos partidários para cargos de confianza en el poder ejecutivo brasileño, este artículo analiza un tipo diferente de bien de intercambio: los nombramientos presidenciales. Nuestro estudio demuestra que los patrones de nombramientos partidarios varían horizontalmente (de ministerio a ministerio) y verticalmente (dentro de un ministerio específico). El análisis también muestra que no hay relación entre el número de legisladores que pertenecen a un partido y la capacidad de este de efectuar nombramientos políticos

Nominaciones Partidárias e Coaliciones en Brasil, 2007-2010

Studies on coalition management in presidential systems usually focus on two types of goods used by the president and formateur party to hold together coalitions: exchange goods (such as individual budget amendments) and coalition goods (such as ministries). This research note analyzes, with an original dataset of party members and political appointees in Brazil, a different type of good: presidential political appointments. Our study shows that partisan political appointees vary greatly among Brazilian ministries and within them. We also found that there is a disconnect between how many seats a political party holds in Congress and the number of political appointment offices it controls. This has implications for the literature on bureaucracy and politics and the literature on coalition management.La investigación sobre el manejo de coaliciones en sistemas presidenciales normalmente se concentra en dos tipos de bienes utilizados por el presidente y su partido para formar coaliciones: intercambio de bienes (a modo de enmiendas presupuestarias individuales) y los bienes propios de la coalición (a través de gabinetes ministeriales). En base a un banco de datos original sobre afiliación y nombramientos partidários para cargos de confianza en el poder ejecutivo brasileño, este artículo analiza un tipo diferente de bien de intercambio: los nombramientos presidenciales. Nuestro estudio demuestra que los patrones de nombramientos partidarios varían horizontalmente (de ministerio a ministerio) y verticalmente (dentro de un ministerio específico). El análisis también muestra que no hay relación entre el número de legisladores que pertenecen a un partido y la capacidad de este de efectuar nombramientos políticos