Have the Politics of Rate Regulation Produced a Better No-Fault Regime for Ontario ?

Au cours des dix dernières années, l'Ontario a modifié trois fois et de façon substantielle son régime d'assurance automobile sans égard à la responsabilité. Ces réformes sont le reflet des pressions exercées par les assureurs et les avocats. Cependant, le principal motif avancé était, surtout pour la dernière révision, la volonté du gouvernement de réglementer le taux des primes d'assurance. Un heureux compromis semble avoir été trouvé avec la Automobile Insurance Rate Stability Act. Les avocats ont vu les possibilités de poursuites accrues, quoique de façon limitée. Les assureurs ont obtenu plus de certitude dans leurs prévisions, en raison de délais restreints et du plafonnement des indemnités dans le cas de blessures moins importantes. Les primes d'assurance ont été en partie réduites à cause d'une diminution des indemnités, mais surtout par un transfert des coûts générés par les accidents d'automobile vers d'autres sources d'indemnisation. La loi entraîne ainsi une forme de subvention de la conduite automobile. Il y a également des lacunes au niveau de l'indemnisation, surtout en ce qui concerne l'assistance médicale à long terme, qui touche principalement les membres les plus vulnérables de la société. Ces insuffisances pourraient et devraient être facilement corrigées. Jusqu'à maintenant, le contrôle exercé sur les primes a semblé donner à l'Ontario un meilleur régime d'assurance automobile sans égard à la responsabilité.Ontario has changed its no-fault legislation substantially three times in the past decade. These changes have reflected the interest group lobbying of the insurance industry and the practising bar. However, the main and explicit motivation, especially for the latest revision, has been the government's desire to regulate rates. With the Automobile Insurance Rate Stability Act the government appears to have struck a very successful compromise. The lawyers have been allowed an increased, albeit limited, right to sue in tort. The insurers have achieved more certainty, with stricter time and monetary limits on benefits for non-catastrophic injury. Rates have been reduced in part through lower benefit levels, but primarily by throwing the cost of automobile accidents on to other collateral sources. There is, therefore, some subsidization of driving inherent in the legislation. There are also compensation gaps, especially in long term health care, that affect mainly the most vulnerable members of society. Both these shortcomings could and should be easily corrected. So far, it would appear that the politics of rate regulation have generated an improved no-fault automobile accident compensation scheme for Ontario

Judicial Immunity: In Search of an Appropriate Limiting Formula

During the last half of the twentieth century the common law courts have consistently expanded the potential tort liability base of professional and occupational groups. In general, arguments about the adverse consequences of broader liability rules have been rejected in favour of the plaintiff's claims for relief In sharp contract is the English Court of Appeal’s confirmation, and perhaps extension, of the longstanding and restrictive principles of judicial immunity. This article identifies the common law and statutory rules of judicial tort immunity, and discusses them in relation to their theoretical foundations. Are judges who sit in a court of law sufficiently distinguishable from other occupational groups to justify this special protection, or are judges simply more sensitive to the adverse consequences of tort liability within their own sphere? The article concludes that there is a valid case for a certain degree of immunity, but not the virtually total immunity suggested in the few modem cases on point.Au cours de la deuxième moitié' du vingtième siècle, les tribunaux de common law n’ont cessé d’étendre les limites de la responsabilité civile des groupes professionnels. En règle générale, les arguments fondés sur les conséquences néfastes d’un élargissement de la responsabilité ont été rejetés en faveur du dédommagement de la victime. C’est toutefois clairement à rebours de cette tendance que s ’inscrit une décision récente de la Cour d ’appel de l’Angleterre qui confirme et peut-être même élargit la traditionnelle immunité des juges. Le présent article examine les principes de common law et les dispositions législatives régissant l ’immunité des juges et évalue leur fondement théorique. La fonction des juges est-elle si différente des autres professions pour justifier cette protection particulière ou bien se peut-il simplement que les juges soient plus sensibles aux répercussions d ’une extension de la responsabilité dans leur domaine d ’activité? L’auteur conclut que les jugesdevraient bénéficier d ’une certaine immunité, mais non de l ’immunité virtuellement complète que la jurisprudence récente semble consacrer

Suppressing Damages in Involuntary Parenthood Actions: Contorting Tort Law, Denying Reproductive Freedom, and Discriminating Against Mothers

Involuntary parenthood actions are negligence actions, usually medical malpractice cases involving a failed sterilization, inadequate warning about the risks of pregnancy, or a failed abortion. In Canada, they will soon also involve product liability claims against negligent birth control manufacturers, providers and regulators. This article considers whether the parents\u27 damages ought to include the cost of raising the child. No Canadian appellate court has ever ruled on this point, although it has been adjudicated extensively by the highest courts elsewhere in the common law world. At least 7 different rules limiting such recovery have been endorsed in the Canadian lower courts. Most of the limiting rules are unique to involuntary parenthood cases, deviating from the outcome that would prevail were the standard rules of negligence law applied. Many have no rational foundation. This article concludes that the failure to compensate parents for the cost of raising the child cannot be justified. Rather the refusal to compensate for reasonable child rearing expenses constitutes discrimination against parents, especially women who are mothers. This discrimination is sometimes, perhaps often, perpetrated by judges who refuse to accept and protect a woman\u27s right to reproductive freedom. These mothers are under-compensated, and the medical establishment that failed them is under-deterred