Horizontal mergers for buyer power

Salant et al. (1983) showed in a Cournot setting that horizontal mergers are unprofitable because outsiders react by increasing their output. We show that this negative effect may be compensated by the positive effect that horizontal mergers have on the buyer power of merging firms in input markets.

Long-Term Versus Short-Term Environmental Tax Policy Under Asymmetric Information

[Abstract] We examine the interaction between a firm that uses either a dirty or a clean technology to produce a product over two periods, 1 and 2, and an environmentally conscious regulator that chooses the environmental tax/subsidy policy. The regulator ignores with which technology the firm manufactures the product and only has a prior belief about it. In this context, if the regulator can credibly commit to the policy for both periods, social welfare is generally higher than if it cannot commit, because distortions in firm's production at period 1 for signalling purposes strongly reduces the optimality of an environmental policy of short duration. A period-by-period policy in which the regulator does not commit to the policy terms for period 2 (which will be contingent to information provided by the firm in period 1) is only optimal when clean technology is very expensive to produce with it and the regulator's environmental concern is not very high. The results highlight the importance of taking into account the time horizon in policymaking, as well as the limitations of regulatory policies that seek to elicit information about the type of technology used by firms.Manel Antelo acknowledges financial support from Consellería de Cultura, Educación e Ordenación Universitaria (Xunta de Galicia) through Grant Consolidación e estruturación – 2019 GRC GI-2016 Análise económica dos mercados e institucións and Lluís Bru from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Innovation through Grant PID 2020-115018RB-C33Xunta de Galicia; 2019 GRC GI-201

Why some product innovations are licensed and others are not?

We study in a Stackelberg industry the licensing of a product that embodies an innovation (quality-improving product) whose owner may be the firm that plays as a leader or a follower in setting output in the the product market. We find that the innovation is transferred (and social welfare is reduced) if its owner is the market-leader firm. However, if the innovation is in the hands of the market-follower firm, it is not licensed, even though licensing would be welfare enhancing. Thus, subsidizing R&D with the mandatory licensing of the resulting innovation may be a socially desirable policyFinancial aid from the Xunta de Galicia (Grant Consolidación e Estruturación – 2019 GRC GI-2060) and from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (Grant ECO2017-86305-C4-1-R) is acknowledgedS

Outsourcing or restructuring: The dynamic choice

This paper examines the role of outsourcing when a firm attempts to establish its true level of production costs in an uncertain context. Outsourcing may provide additional information to the firm about the efficiency of its organizational structure. The information flow that outsourcing gives to the firm creates a real option by delaying the final decision relating to its definitive organizational mode, so that temporarily outsourcing and then resuming operations may be the optimal management decision for the firm.Restructuring in-house production Outsourcing Asymmetric information Real option

EXPERIMENTOS SECUENCIALES EN LA GESTIÓN DE LOS RECURSOS COMUNES

. En este trabajo describimos un juego de recursos comunes en el que los participantes deciden que cantidad extraer de manera secuencial. Hay dos opciones, una representa coger una cantidad mayor del stock que la otra. Una vez que un jugador ha tomado su decisión, el stock restante crece a una tasa constante. Consideramos un juego con un número finito de movimientos alternativos y se pudo observar que cambios en la mayor porción del stock que los jugadores pueden extraer y en la tasa de crecimiento del mismo afectan al equilibrio del juego, pero tienen un efecto muy pobre sobre el comportamiento de los individuos en el laboratorio. Además, advertimos una mayor cooperación que la que se predecía bajo ciertas condiciones, así como que ciertos parámetros que eran estratégicamente irrelevantes afectaban al comportamiento. Los resultados de esta investigación podrían ser de utilidad para los responsables de la gestión de determinados recursos naturales renovables que deban aplicar medidas para prevenir la sobreexplotación de los mismos.Experimentos en laboratorio, recursos comunes, juegos.

Regulacion y competencia con informacion asimetrica

Centro de Informacion y Documentacion Cientifica (CINDOC). C/Joaquin Costa, 22. 28002 Madrid. SPAIN / CINDOC - Centro de Informaciòn y Documentaciòn CientìficaSIGLEESSpai