The Value of Public Sector Annual Reports and Annual Reporting Awards as a Signal of Management Performance

Australian public sector reforms have emphasised the accountability of agencies for the performance of management. Despite considerable diversity in public sector organisations, annual reports have been promoted as an appropriate tool to discharge the accountability of all government agencies. However, there remains an absence of consistent empirical evidence as to the value of the annual report for reporting on management performance. Further, debates about the role of public sector annual reports often become intertwined with notions of the quality of reports. Prior research has investigated the incentives of agencies to enter annual reporting awards as a means of signalling the quality of management. However, the research ignores the possibility that the value of annual reports to discharge performance accountability and the value of entry into an annual reporting award may vary depending on the type of public sector agency and on the relationships between stakeholders. This study focuses on the Queensland public sector and the Queensland Annual Reporting Award (QARA) and uses a series of case studies to examine the value of the annual report as a means of discharging accountabilities. The results reveal a cross sectional variation in the perceived value of the annual report in discharging accountabilities. In some cases it was thought that alternative forms of communication provided a more suitable means to discharge the accountability demands of stakeholders. Further, while annual reporting awards provide a mechanism to supply a credible signal of quality, it will only be used in those situations where the participants identify direct benefits of entry

Glucocorticoids can activate the α-ENaC gene promoter independently of SGK1

The role of SGK1 (serum- and glucocorticoid-induced protein kinase 1) in the glucocorticoid induction of α-ENaC (epithelial Na+ channel α subunit) gene transcription was explored by monitoring the transcriptional activity of a luciferase-linked, α-ENaC reporter gene construct (pGL3-KR1) expressed in H441 airway epithelial cells. Dexamethasone evoked a concentration-dependent (EC50∼4 μM) increase in transcriptional activity dependent upon a glucocorticoid response element in the α-ENaC sequence. Although dexamethasone also activated endogenous SGK1, artificially increasing cellular SGK1 activity by expressing a constitutively active SGK1 mutant (SGK1-S422D) in hormone-deprived cells did not activate pGL3-KR1. Moreover, expression of catalytically inactive SGK1 (SGK1-K127A) suppressed the activation of endogenous SGK1 without affecting the transcriptional response to dexamethasone. Increasing cellular PI3K (phosphoinositide 3-kinase) activity by expressing a membrane-anchored form of the catalytic PI3K-P110α subunit [CD2 (cluster of differentiation 2)-P110α] also activated endogenous SGK1 without affecting pGL3-KR1activity. A catalytically inactive form of CD2-P110α (R1130P), on the other hand, prevented the dexamethasone-induced activation of SGK1, but did not inhibit the activation of pGL3-KR1. However, expression of SGK1-S422D or CD2-P110α enhanced the transcriptional responses to maximally effective concentrations of dexamethasone and this effect occurred with no change in EC50. Dexamethasone-induced (0.3–300 nM) activation of pGL3-KR1 was unaffected by inhibitors of PI3K (PI-103 and wortmanin) and by rapamycin, a selective inhibitor of the TORC1 (target of rapamycin complex 1) signalling complex. Dexamethasone-induced activation of the α-ENaC gene promoter can thus occur independently of SGK1/PI3K, although this pathway does provide a mechanism that allows this transcriptional response to dexamethasone to be enhanced

The Queensland public sector annual report awards : an analysis of the incentives for public sector entities to enter

This study investigates why some public sector entities enter the Queensland Public Sector Annual Report Awards (QARA), while others do not. Organisers of such awards aim to provide incentives for public sector entities to improve the quality of their reporting. It is assumed that entities which voluntarily enter the QARA must receive positive net benefits for the entity as a whole and/or personal benefits to the mangers (bureaucrats) responsible. Agency theory provides a theoretical basis for prior public sector research which has been largely US based. This study extends that research by applying it to a different institutional setting: the Queensland public sector. Agency relationships within the Queensland public sector are identified for: state government departments, statutory bodies, and government owned corporations; and local government councils. This allows an analysis of the incentives for monitoring and signalling within these agency relationships. Specifically, this study focuses on the use of quality annual reports to signal quality of management, and the concept that QARA entry highlights the quality of annual reports. Therefore it is possible to identify potential benefits of entering QARA and to predict which entities are more likely to enter the competition. The proposition that entities could obtain benefits from entering the QARA was initially confirmed by obtaining documentary evidence relating to entries since the award's inception in 1981, with more detailed evidence obtained for the year 1996. Supplementary evidence was obtained by interviewing representatives from each entity type. This enabled a richer understanding of the role of annual reports, and the benefits and costs of QARA entry for individual types of entities. This supplied confirmation of the agency theory developed for the Queensland public sector. It was found that there were three key agency relationships for departments; four key agency relationships for statutory bodies and government owned corporations; and five key agency relationships for councils. For most public sector entities, the annual report was primarily used as a signalling tool to actors within the public sector and to external creditors (where applicable). The study concludes that there are benefits to be obtained by entities which enter the QARA. These benefits relate to the concept that QARA entry highlights the quality of an annual report, and that quality reporting is a signal of quality of management. When this quality is recognised by others, the entity as a whole may be rewarded by increased access to resources, and the managers responsible may obtain personal benefits such as public recognition, and improved job prospects

The Value of Public Sector Annual Reports and Annual Reporting Awards as a Signal of Management Performance

Australian public sector reforms have emphasised the accountability of agencies for the performance of management. Despite considerable diversity in public sector organisations, annual reports have been promoted as an appropriate tool to discharge the accountability of all government agencies. However, there remains an absence of consistent empirical evidence as to the value of the annual report for reporting on management performance. Further, debates about the role of public sector annual reports often become intertwined with notions of the quality of reports. Prior research has investigated the incentives of agencies to enter annual reporting awards as a means of signalling the quality of management. However, the research ignores the possibility that the value of annual reports to discharge performance accountability and the value of entry into an annual reporting award may vary depending on the type of public sector agency and on the relationships between stakeholders. This study focuses on the Queensland public sector and the Queensland Annual Reporting Award (QARA) and uses a series of case studies to examine the value of the annual report as a means of discharging accountabilities. The results reveal a cross sectional variation in the perceived value of the annual report in discharging accountabilities. In some cases it was thought that alternative forms of communication provided a more suitable means to discharge the accountability demands of stakeholders. Further, while annual reporting awards provide a mechanism to supply a credible signal of quality, it will only be used in those situations where the participants identify direct benefits of entry