19 research outputs found
La dilution du principe fédératif et la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême du Canada
Le fédéralisme, en tant que principe constitutionnel sous-jacent ou implicite, peut d’abord servir à guider les tribunaux dans l’interprétation et l’application des dispositions du texte constitutionnel et, ensuite, à combler les lacunes qui s’y trouvent, le cas échéant. Or, malgré la grande importance que la Cour suprême du Canada semble accorder au principe fédératif dans certaines décisions récentes, elle n’y a pas eu recours principalement comme guide dans l’interprétation des dispositions expresses de la Constitution, particulièrement celles qui sont relatives au partage des compétences législatives entre les deux ordres de gouvernement, mais plutôt afin de combler ses vides, ses silences. Le partage des compétences législatives constitue pourtant le cœur du principe fédératif. En plus d’un demi-siècle de jurisprudence à titre de dernier tribunal d’appel, la Cour suprême ne s’est appuyée expressément sur le fédéralisme dans ses raisonnements juridiques que plutôt rarement, et cela, de façon somme toute peu cohérente. L’analyse des quelques décisions dans lesquelles la Cour suprême invoque nommément ce principe dans ses raisonnements en matière de partage des compétences révèle qu’elle a généralement opté pour une conception moderne de ce dernier. Par contre, la plus haute cour canadienne revient, à l’occasion, au paradigme classique, essentiellement lorsqu’il favorise l’exercice des compétences législatives du Parlement fédéral ou, inversement, lorsque l’application du paradigme moderne aurait pu encourager l’exercice des compétences provinciales. L’absence de théorie fédérative dans la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême l’empêche d’établir et de maintenir un sain équilibre fédératif en contexte canadien.As an underlying or implicit constitutional principle, federalism may serve as a guide for the courts in interpreting and applying the provisions of a constitutional text and, thereafter, in closing any gaps if there are any to be found. Yet, despite the significant importance that the Supreme Court of Canada seems to give to the federative principle in some recent decisions, it has not resorted to it primarily as a guide for interpreting the express provisions of the Constitution, particularly those pertaining to the sharing of legislative jurisdictions between two levels of government, but rather to fill in the gaps and account for whatever seems implicit. The distribution of legislative powers constitutes, however, the very heart of the federative principle. In addition to a half-century of rulings in its role of court of last appeal, the Supreme Court has, in its legal reasoning, only rarely rested its cases directly on federalism while doing so in a rather incoherent manner. The analysis of the few decisions in which the Supreme Court has nominally invoked this principle in its reasoning regarding the distribution of powers shows that the court has generally chosen a modern conception of such distribution. Yet on other occasions, the highest court of the land returns on occasion to the classical paradigm, essentially when favouring the federal Parliament’s exercising of legislative powers or, conversely, when the application of the modern paradigm would have encouraged the exercising of provincial powers. The absence of a federative theory underlying the reasoning of the Supreme Court in its rulings now prevents it from establishing and maintaining a sound federative equilibrium in the Canadian context
Canadian Federalism and the Principle of Subsidiarity: Should We Open Pandora\u27s Box?
Over the last 10 years, the Supreme Court of Canada has referred explicitly to the principle of subsidiarity even though it is not found in the federation’s formal constitutional structure. Two examples are found in the 2010 decisions COPA and Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act. As a result, this paper focuses on the role currently played by the principle of subsidiarity in Canadian federalism. More specifically, it identifies the actual and potential effects of this principle on the balance of power between the federal and provincial governments. The first part briefly examines the close ties existing, at the the oretical level, between the principles of subsidiarity and federalism. The second part considers the place given to the principle of subsidiarity in Canadian constitutional law, first as a notion underlying the adoption of a federal form of government, and the n as a legal principle for regulating the exercise of powers. The paper demonstrates that the cooperative view of federalism adopted by the Supreme Court has generated a large number of de facto overlapping powers, creating fertile ground for the discreet, but increasingly apparent, emergence of a constitutional principle of subsidiarity in Canada
Canadian Federalism and the Principle of Subsidiarity: Should We Open Pandora\u27s Box?
Over the last 10 years, the Supreme Court of Canada has referred explicitly to the principle of subsidiarity even though it is not found in the federation’s formal constitutional structure. Two examples are found in the 2010 decisions COPA and Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act. As a result, this paper focuses on the role currently played by the principle of subsidiarity in Canadian federalism. More specifically, it identifies the actual and potential effects of this principle on the balance of power between the federal and provincial governments. The first part briefly examines the close ties existing, at the the oretical level, between the principles of subsidiarity and federalism. The second part considers the place given to the principle of subsidiarity in Canadian constitutional law, first as a notion underlying the adoption of a federal form of government, and the n as a legal principle for regulating the exercise of powers. The paper demonstrates that the cooperative view of federalism adopted by the Supreme Court has generated a large number of de facto overlapping powers, creating fertile ground for the discreet, but increasingly apparent, emergence of a constitutional principle of subsidiarity in Canada
El paper del Tribunal Suprem en l'evoluciĂł de la FederaciĂł canadenca: quin equilibri de poders?
Cal remarcar, en el si de les federacions contemporĂ nies, una certa tendència a la concentraciĂł dels poders resultant de l'aplicaciĂł judicial de les normes relatives a la divisiĂł de poders entre els nivells de govern. CanadĂ no Ă©s una excepciĂł en aquest sentit. Com a Ă rbitre Ăşltim dels conflictes federatius, el Tribunal Suprem ha infĂłs un camĂ d'evoluciĂł cap a la centralitzaciĂł de la federaciĂł canadenca. Pel que fa als conflictes sobre el repartiment de competències legislatives, aquesta tendència es basa en una diluciĂł del valor normatiu del principi del federalisme, l'adopciĂł d'un concepte anomenat cooperatiu del repartiment de competències i l'hegemonia de l'enfocament interpretatiu evolutiu. Igualment cridat a jugar un paper fonamental en certs moments clau de la història constitucional del paĂs, el Tribunal va haver d'intentar conciliar les qĂĽestions de legitimitat i de legalitat. Si l'adopciĂł d'un enfocament positivista de la interpretaciĂł constitucional li va donar aquesta difĂcil tasca en les referències sobre la repatriaciĂł del poder constituent a principis dels anys 1980, una visiĂł mĂ©s Ă mplia de l'ordre normatiu canadenc li va permetre, en gran mesura, de tornar-hi en la referència de 1998 sobre la secessiĂł del Quebec. Per una col·lectivitat nacional minoritĂ ria com Ă©s la del Quebec dins de la federaciĂł canadenca, el manteniment d'un equilibri de poders Ă©s de vital importĂ ncia, ja que li permet conservar la seva esfera autonòmica fonamental per a la seva expansiĂł col·lectiva
Quelques réflexions sur le processus de nomination des juges au Québec
Le principe de l’indépendance judiciaire commande une réduction de la marge de manœuvre présentement laissée au gouvernement québécois dans le choix des juges. Il en va de la confiance du public en l’administration de la justice. Si le principe de la responsabilité ministérielle nous amène à préférer un processus de sélection par le gouvernement à la suite d’un processus collégial à celui d’une sélection par le seul ministre de la Justice, les principes de transparence et d’obligation de rendre compte militent en faveur de la nécessité d’une justification publique. Pour diminuer le risque que des considérations non pertinentes, telles les allégeances ou les contributions politiques des candidats à la magistrature, n’interviennent dans le processus, la sélection d’une personne, à partir d’une courte liste de candidats jugés aptes à l’exercice d’une telle fonction, devrait être motivée par le gouvernement devant l’assemblée législative, sans référence toutefois à l’identité des autres candidats.Based on the principle of judicial independence, the Québec government’s current latitude in selecting judges needs to be reduced. It is a matter of public confidence in the administration of justice. Although the principle of ministerial responsibility has resulted in our giving preference to a process where the government selects judges using a collegial approach rather than a process that involves the Minister of Justice alone, the principles of transparency and accountability argue in favour of the need for public justification. To reduce the risk that inappropriate considerations, such as the political allegiance or contributions of candidates for judicial office, affect the selection process, the government should choose one person from a short list of candidates considered qualified to serve as judges and provide the reasons for its choice before the legislative assembly without mentioning the identity of the other candidates