THE POSSIBILITY OF REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT

In the essay “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” Dr. Richard Feldman examines reasonable disagreements between peers. More specifically, he asks whether such disagreements are possible, and also whether the parties to such a disagreement could think that both their own belief and the belief of their peer with whom they disagree are reasonable. Feldman argues that there cannot be any such thing as a reasonable disagreement, and furthermore, that the parties to a disagreement are not epistemically licensed to think that their own belief and their opponents belief are both reasonable. As Feldman notes, “open and honest discussion seems to have the puzzling effect of making reasonable disagreement impossible”. My project herein will be (in §2) to explain Feldman’s notion of a reasonable disagreement, and then reconstruct and assess his argumentation, and (in §3) advance three objections to Feldman’s argument. I will focus on denying Feldman’s answer to his first question—that reasonable disagreement between peers is not possible—and my suggestion is that if any of these three objections to Feldman’s argument go through, then the argument falls. And if Feldman’s argument falls, then his argument no longer provides grounds for our thinking that reasonable disagreement is impossible

SHORT ESSAY: SHOULD WE GRANT EPISTEMIC TRUST TO OTHERS?

In the essay “Epistemic Self-Trust and the Consensus Gentium Argument,” Dr. Linda Zagzebski examines the reasonableness of religious belief. More specifically, she argues that truth demands epistemic self-trust—roughly, a trust in the reliability of our own faculties. Furthermore, it is asserted that this self-trust commits me to an epistemic trust in others, which in turn provides grounds for believing that because many other people (to whom we have granted this epistemic trust) believe in God, this prevalence of belief thereby provides a reason for me to believe in God, too. A critical step in Zagzebski’s argument is the move from epistemic self-trust to granting this sort of trust to other people—a move for which a sub-argument can be drawn out of her essay. My paper’s focus will be to examine Zagzebski’s sub-argument for her second premise (i.e., granting epistemic trust to others) to which I will advance two objections

RAWLS’ DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE: ABSOLUTE vs. RELATIVE INEQUALITY

In the book “A Theory of Justice”, John Rawls examines the notion of a just society. More specifically, he develops a conception of justice—Justice as Fairness—derived from his novel interpretation of the social contract. Central to his account are two lexically-ordered principles of justice by which primary social institutions, or the basic structure of society, are ideally to be organized and regulated. Broadly speaking, the second of Rawls’ two principles pertains to “the distribution of income and wealth”, and its formulation is to be understood as an expression of Rawls’ Difference Principle—roughly, the principle that “inequality in expectation is permissible only if lowering it would make the [worst-off] class even more worse off.”1 2 I want to suggest that Rawls’ Difference Principle (DP) entails the following worrisome outcome: Because DP maximizes the absolute level of expectation (and disregards the relative level), it authorizes potentially immense levels of inequality, such that this inequality itself can become a source of social discord and injustice. This paper will (§2) present Rawls’ formulation of DP, (§3) motivate the worrisome outcome entailed by DP, and (§4) offer a prima facie plausible solution in the form of an addendum to DP

Pion interactions in Hydrogen and Deuterium

Not availabl

Future NASA solar system exploration activities: A framework for international cooperation

The goals and approaches for planetary exploration as defined for the NASA Solar System Exploration Program are discussed. The evolution of the program since the formation of the Solar System Exploration Committee (SSEC) in 1980 is reviewed and the primary missions comprising the program are described

Mars Rotorcraft: Possibilities, Limitations, and Implications For Human/Robotic Exploration

Several research investigations have examined the challenges and opportunities in the use of small robotic rotorcraft for the exploration of Mars. To date, only vehicles smaller than 150 kg have been studied. This paper proposes to examine the question of maximum Mars rotorcraft size, range, and payload/cargo capacity. Implications for the issue of whether or not (from an extreme design standpoint) a manned Mars rotorcraft is viable are also discussed

Rotary-Wing Decelerators for Probe Descent Through the Atmosphere of Venus

An innovative concept is proposed for atmospheric entry probe deceleration, wherein one or more deployed rotors (in autorotation or wind-turbine flow states) on the aft end of the probe effect controlled descent. This concept is particularly oriented toward probes intended to land safely on the surface of Venus. Initial work on design trade studies is discussed

Average Emissivity Curve of BATSE Gamma-Ray Bursts with Different Intensities

Six intensity groups with ~150 BATSE gamma-ray bursts each are compared using average emissivity curves. Time-stretch factors for each of the dimmer groups are estimated with respect to the brightest group, which serves as the reference, taking into account the systematics of counts-produced noise effects and choice statistics. A stretching/intensity anti-correlation is found with good statistical significance during the average back slopes of bursts. A stretch factor ~2 is found between the 150 dimmest bursts, with peak flux 4.1 ph cm^{-2} s^{-1}. On the other hand, while a trend of increasing stretching factor may exist for rise fronts for burst with decreasing peak flux from >4.1 ph cm^{-2} s^{-1} down to 0.7 ph cm^{-2} s^{-1}, the magnitude of the stretching factor is less than ~ 1.4 and is therefore inconsistent with stretching factor of back slope.Comment: 21 pages, 3 figures. Accepted to Ap