REAL PROPERTY-VALIDITY OF REGULATIONS OR CONDITIONS IMPOSED UPON SUBDIVISION PLANNING

The plaintiff, wishing to subdivide its land fronting on Long Island Sound, submitted its plan to the town planning and zoning board whose approval was required by ordinance before land could be subdivided and sold. The board rejected plaintiff\u27s plan as not in conformance with a preliminary town plan, adopted in 1936 pursuant to a state statute, providing for the prospective construction of a road along the shore of the sound. The plaintiff appealed to the board of zoning appeals, which affirmed the decision of the town planning and zoning board. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, held, reversed. A preliminary town plan, adopted without notice to affected property owners and without opportunity for them to be heard, cannot curtail the rights of such owners or limit them in the use of their land. Lordship Park Assn. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Stratford, (Conn. 1950) 75 A. (2d) 379

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DISCRIMINATION IN SELECTION OF GRAND JURORS

Defendant\u27s conviction of murder was affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which rejected defendant\u27s claim that discrimination in selection of the indicting grand jury had violated his constitutional rights. Defendant pointed out that the Negro proportion of grand jurors had uniformly been less than the ratio of Negroes to the total population of the county, and that on the past twenty-one lists the commissioners had consistently limited the number of Negroes to not more than one on each grand jury. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. Limitation of the number of Negroes on a grand jury to the approximate proportion of Negroes in the county eligible for grand jury service would constitute unconstitutional discrimination in violation of the rights of a member of that race against whom an indictment was returned by the grand jury so selected, since the accused is entitled to have charges against him considered by a grand jury in the selection of which there is neither inclusion nor exclusion because of race. Intentional exclusion proved by the statements of the commissioners that they chose for service only those whom they knew and that they knew no eligible Negroes was the actual discrimination on which the unconstitutionality was based. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 70 S.Ct. 629 (1950)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Defendant addressed a crowd of people, white and Negro, on a public sidewalk for the purpose of urging them to attend a certain meeting. During the course of his speech he \u27called Mayor Costello [of Syracuse] a champaign [sic] sipping bum and President Truman a bum. He referred to the American Legion as Nazi Gestapo agents-he also said the fifteenth Ward was run by corrupt politicians and that horse rooms were operating.\u27 He also appealed to the Negroes to rise up and fight for equal rights. The police were called but at first merely observed the gathering. Angry mutterings were heard as the crowd became divided in its sentiments toward the speaker. Pedestrians were unable to pass without going out into the street. Finally, after the police gave defendant several ineffective warnings to stop talking, he was arrested and convicted of disorderly conduct in violation of a state statute, over his objection that his freedom of speech had been unconstitutionally denied. On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, held, affirmed. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech does not make this right absolute. Conviction for disorderly conduct does not infringe upon this right where the speaker on a public street encourages his audience to become divided into hostile camps, interferes with traffic, and deliberately agitates and goads the crowd and police officers into action. People v. Feiner, 300 N.Y. 391, 91 N.E. (2d) 316 (1950)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Defendant addressed a crowd of people, white and Negro, on a public sidewalk for the purpose of urging them to attend a certain meeting. During the course of his speech he \u27called Mayor Costello [of Syracuse] a champaign [sic] sipping bum and President Truman a bum. He referred to the American Legion as Nazi Gestapo agents-he also said the fifteenth Ward was run by corrupt politicians and that horse rooms were operating.\u27 He also appealed to the Negroes to rise up and fight for equal rights. The police were called but at first merely observed the gathering. Angry mutterings were heard as the crowd became divided in its sentiments toward the speaker. Pedestrians were unable to pass without going out into the street. Finally, after the police gave defendant several ineffective warnings to stop talking, he was arrested and convicted of disorderly conduct in violation of a state statute, over his objection that his freedom of speech had been unconstitutionally denied. On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, held, affirmed. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech does not make this right absolute. Conviction for disorderly conduct does not infringe upon this right where the speaker on a public street encourages his audience to become divided into hostile camps, interferes with traffic, and deliberately agitates and goads the crowd and police officers into action. People v. Feiner, 300 N.Y. 391, 91 N.E. (2d) 316 (1950)

REAL PROPERTY-VALIDITY OF REGULATIONS OR CONDITIONS IMPOSED UPON SUBDIVISION PLANNING

The plaintiff, wishing to subdivide its land fronting on Long Island Sound, submitted its plan to the town planning and zoning board whose approval was required by ordinance before land could be subdivided and sold. The board rejected plaintiff\u27s plan as not in conformance with a preliminary town plan, adopted in 1936 pursuant to a state statute, providing for the prospective construction of a road along the shore of the sound. The plaintiff appealed to the board of zoning appeals, which affirmed the decision of the town planning and zoning board. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, held, reversed. A preliminary town plan, adopted without notice to affected property owners and without opportunity for them to be heard, cannot curtail the rights of such owners or limit them in the use of their land. Lordship Park Assn. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Stratford, (Conn. 1950) 75 A. (2d) 379

TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-SALE OF UNMATURED CROP AS CAPITAL GAIN OR ORDINARY INCOME

Petitioner sold a farm owned over six months upon which was a growing but unmatured wheat crop. When taxed upon the amount of sale price apportionable to the crop as ordinary income, he contended that under state law the land was a capital asset and that the growing crop was an inseparable part thereof. He concluded, therefore, that the entire amount should have been taxed as a capital gain. The purchaser testified that he had considered the crop to be worth about $8,500 and that he had deducted this amount in his own tax return as cost of the crop. The commissioner held that a growing crop is not necessarily a capital asset and that the part of the payment apportionable to the crop was ordinary income. On appeal to the Tax Court of the United States, held, affirmed. The amount of gain from the sale of the growing crop was properly treated as ordinary income, not capital gain, since the crop was property held primarily for sale to customers. McCoy v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 828 (1950)

AGENCY-ELECTION TO SUE UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL OR AGENT

Plaintiff brought action against a principal and his agent to foreclose a mechanic\u27s lien on the principal\u27s real property, alleging that he had expended labor and materials in the improvement of the principal\u27s land pursuant to a contract between himself and the agent. Though plaintiff joined the agent as a party defendant, he did not pray for relief against him. Both defendants moved to dismiss the action. Held, action dismissed as to the agent. Whether or not the principal was disclosed at the time the contract arose, the action was properly dismissed as against the agent. If the principal was disclosed, the agent was not liable on the contract; and if the principal was undisclosed, the creditor had to elect whether to proceed against the agent or the principal. Failure to seek relief against the agent constituted an election to sue the principal. Campbell v. Murdock, (D.C. Ohio 1950) 90 F. Supp. 297

Hyperoxemia and excess oxygen use in early acute respiratory distress syndrome : Insights from the LUNG SAFE study

Publisher Copyright: © 2020 The Author(s). Copyright: Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.Background: Concerns exist regarding the prevalence and impact of unnecessary oxygen use in patients with acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS). We examined this issue in patients with ARDS enrolled in the Large observational study to UNderstand the Global impact of Severe Acute respiratory FailurE (LUNG SAFE) study. Methods: In this secondary analysis of the LUNG SAFE study, we wished to determine the prevalence and the outcomes associated with hyperoxemia on day 1, sustained hyperoxemia, and excessive oxygen use in patients with early ARDS. Patients who fulfilled criteria of ARDS on day 1 and day 2 of acute hypoxemic respiratory failure were categorized based on the presence of hyperoxemia (PaO2 > 100 mmHg) on day 1, sustained (i.e., present on day 1 and day 2) hyperoxemia, or excessive oxygen use (FIO2 ≥ 0.60 during hyperoxemia). Results: Of 2005 patients that met the inclusion criteria, 131 (6.5%) were hypoxemic (PaO2 < 55 mmHg), 607 (30%) had hyperoxemia on day 1, and 250 (12%) had sustained hyperoxemia. Excess FIO2 use occurred in 400 (66%) out of 607 patients with hyperoxemia. Excess FIO2 use decreased from day 1 to day 2 of ARDS, with most hyperoxemic patients on day 2 receiving relatively low FIO2. Multivariate analyses found no independent relationship between day 1 hyperoxemia, sustained hyperoxemia, or excess FIO2 use and adverse clinical outcomes. Mortality was 42% in patients with excess FIO2 use, compared to 39% in a propensity-matched sample of normoxemic (PaO2 55-100 mmHg) patients (P = 0.47). Conclusions: Hyperoxemia and excess oxygen use are both prevalent in early ARDS but are most often non-sustained. No relationship was found between hyperoxemia or excessive oxygen use and patient outcome in this cohort. Trial registration: LUNG-SAFE is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, NCT02010073publishersversionPeer reviewe

Effect of angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor and angiotensin receptor blocker initiation on organ support-free days in patients hospitalized with COVID-19

IMPORTANCE Overactivation of the renin-angiotensin system (RAS) may contribute to poor clinical outcomes in patients with COVID-19. Objective To determine whether angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitor or angiotensin receptor blocker (ARB) initiation improves outcomes in patients hospitalized for COVID-19. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS In an ongoing, adaptive platform randomized clinical trial, 721 critically ill and 58 non–critically ill hospitalized adults were randomized to receive an RAS inhibitor or control between March 16, 2021, and February 25, 2022, at 69 sites in 7 countries (final follow-up on June 1, 2022). INTERVENTIONS Patients were randomized to receive open-label initiation of an ACE inhibitor (n = 257), ARB (n = 248), ARB in combination with DMX-200 (a chemokine receptor-2 inhibitor; n = 10), or no RAS inhibitor (control; n = 264) for up to 10 days. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES The primary outcome was organ support–free days, a composite of hospital survival and days alive without cardiovascular or respiratory organ support through 21 days. The primary analysis was a bayesian cumulative logistic model. Odds ratios (ORs) greater than 1 represent improved outcomes. RESULTS On February 25, 2022, enrollment was discontinued due to safety concerns. Among 679 critically ill patients with available primary outcome data, the median age was 56 years and 239 participants (35.2%) were women. Median (IQR) organ support–free days among critically ill patients was 10 (–1 to 16) in the ACE inhibitor group (n = 231), 8 (–1 to 17) in the ARB group (n = 217), and 12 (0 to 17) in the control group (n = 231) (median adjusted odds ratios of 0.77 [95% bayesian credible interval, 0.58-1.06] for improvement for ACE inhibitor and 0.76 [95% credible interval, 0.56-1.05] for ARB compared with control). The posterior probabilities that ACE inhibitors and ARBs worsened organ support–free days compared with control were 94.9% and 95.4%, respectively. Hospital survival occurred in 166 of 231 critically ill participants (71.9%) in the ACE inhibitor group, 152 of 217 (70.0%) in the ARB group, and 182 of 231 (78.8%) in the control group (posterior probabilities that ACE inhibitor and ARB worsened hospital survival compared with control were 95.3% and 98.1%, respectively). CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE In this trial, among critically ill adults with COVID-19, initiation of an ACE inhibitor or ARB did not improve, and likely worsened, clinical outcomes. TRIAL REGISTRATION ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT0273570