Speech, Writing, and Play in Gadamer and Derrida

I revisit the Derrida-Gadamer debate in order to analyze more closely the problem of the foundation of reason and of interpretation. I explore the theme of play as a metaphor of non-foundation in both philosophers and analyze how both extract this quality from their readings of Plato's Phaedrus. Does Derrida not essentialize the game by declaring that the playful experience of a Gadamerian dialogue must produce a metaphysical presence in the form of a hermeneutic intention? I find that the circular structure of understanding permits – for both philosophers – no clear signifiant either in speech or in writing. The game of interpretation produces – in changing endlessly between reading and rhetoric – an endless chain from one signifier to the next signifier without ever imitating a divine logos

「私」と「汝」 : 西田幾多郎とミハイル・バクティンの対話

This article attempts to crystallize Nishida’s and Bakhtin’s common ideas about the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ as paradoxical models of self-perception as well as of the perception of the Other. Stylistic unity, inter-subjectivity, and selfreflection are examined as phenomena of consciousness that are presented in similar manners by both philosophers. Both Bakhtin and Nishida insist on the paradoxical character of the perception of the Other. A fusion of the ‘I’with the ‘Thou’ is not beneficial to the ‘I’ at the moment it wants to understand the ‘Thou’. The aim must be to understand the ‘Thou’ as a ‘Thou’ by maintaining the status of the ‘I’. In Bakhtin’s view, to understand the ‘Other’ is an act of cultural creation. The “Otherness” of the ‘Thou’ is established as an important component of the ‘I’’s understanding of the ‘Thou’ as the ‘Thou’. In Nishida’s later philosophy, the ‘I’-‘Thou’ relation has been extended to a relation between the ‘I’ and the World. The immediate, “irrational” experience of the Other through action or an “answering act” leads to self-realization through action within a dialogically organized stylistic place. Only when this dialogical “place” is philosophically established, are we able to see the world as a world of mutually determining individuals. On the basis of their respective philosophies of the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ both Nishida and Bakhtin develop original ideas about the phenomenon of space

Pan-asianisme et eurasianisme : développements philosophiques de l’espace culturel en Russie et au Japon 1900-1945

Thorsten Botz-Bornstein L’objectif de ce séminaire était de montrer comment au Japon et en Russie certains philosophes réussissaient à combiner les notions de temps et d’espace afin de décrire une sorte de « développement spatial » (mestorazvitie en russe). Des idées complexes comme celles d’autarcie (pravitenl’niza en russe) visaient à garantir une autonomie culturelle aux différents peuples tout en les inscrivant dans un système plus large. Près de la moitié du séminaire a servi à éclaircir..

Pan-asianisme et eurasianisme : développements philosophiques de l’espace culturel en Russie et au Japon 1900-1945

Thorsten Botz-Bornstein L’objectif de ce séminaire était de montrer comment au Japon et en Russie certains philosophes réussissaient à combiner les notions de temps et d’espace afin de décrire une sorte de « développement spatial » (mestorazvitie en russe). Des idées complexes comme celles d’autarcie (pravitenl’niza en russe) visaient à garantir une autonomie culturelle aux différents peuples tout en les inscrivant dans un système plus large. Près de la moitié du séminaire a servi à éclaircir..

The Neuro-Image: a Deleuzian Film-Philosophy of Digital Screen Culture, by Patricia Pisters

What is the difference between a mind and a brain or, more precisely, between a mind-image and a brain-image? Media and Film Studies professor Patricia Pisters of the University of Amsterdam engages in the monumental project of establishing, in over 350 pages of monograph, the idea that “[t]oday’s viewers no longer look through a character’s eyes; instead, they move through his or her brain or mental landscape”, as the text on the back cover argues. Either we literally enter brain-worlds, as happens for instance in Inception (Christopher Nolan, 2010), or a brain enters a body, as in Avatar (James Cameron, 2009). In Inception individuals infiltrate the subconscious of their targets, while in Avatar a remotely controlled human brain enters an alien’s body. As a consequence, argues Pisters, “a transdisciplinary encounter between film, philosophy, and neuroscience is not only important but also necessary to pursue” (27)

Hartmannas ir Sezemanas. Husserlio fenomenologijos kritika ir intuicijos problema

[full article and abstract in Lithuanian; abstract in English] This article deals with the problem of the relationship between intuition and construction. Nicolai Hartmann and Vasily Sesemann understand Husserl’s phenomenology as the practice of intuitive knowledge, which can be contrasted to conceptual construction. Both authors seek to join intuition and conceptual knowledge using the concept of dialectics, or the genesis of knowing. Their positions differ in valuing the relationship between intuition and construction. Hartmann emphasizes the perspective of the natural sciences as a necessary element of knowledge, and Sesemann criticizes scientific knowledge as objectifying and therefore insufficient to understand consciousness and values. Firstly, I discuss how Hartmann understands intuition and construction. Then I analyze how Sesemann explained the irrationality of givenness. Finally, I discuss how both philosophers justify the synthesis of intuition and construction.[straipsnis ir santrauka lietuvių kalba; santrauka anglų kalba] Straipsnyje nagrinėjama intuicijos ir konstravimo santykio problema pažinime. Nikolajus Hartmannas ir Vosylius Sezemanas supranta Edmundo Husserlio fenomenologiją kaip intuicija besiremiantį pažinimą, kuris yra priešingas konstravimu grindžiamam žinojimui. Abu autoriai kritikuoja Husserlio prieigą ir siūlo susieti intuiciją ir konstravimą naudojant dialektiką ir žinojimo genezės eksplikaciją. Hartmannas pabrėžia gamtos mokslų svarbą pažinime, o Sezemanas kritikuoja mokslinį pažinimą kaip nepakankamą, nes šis objektyvuoja sąmonę ir negali suprasti vertybių. Pirma, nagrinėju, kaip Hartmannas supranta intuicijos ir konstrukcijos santykį pažinime. Antra, analizuoju, kaip Sezemanas atskleidžia duoties iracionalumą. Galiausiai, aptariu, kaip abu autoriai siekia susieti intuiciją ir konstravimą