61 research outputs found
John R. betz, After Enlightenment: The Post-Secular Vision of j. G. Hamann, Wiley-blackwell, 2009
Speech, Writing, and Play in Gadamer and Derrida
I revisit the Derrida-Gadamer debate in order to analyze more closely the problem of the foundation of reason and of interpretation. I explore the theme of play as a metaphor of non-foundation in both philosophers and analyze how both extract this quality from their readings of Plato's Phaedrus. Does Derrida not essentialize the game by declaring that the playful experience of a Gadamerian dialogue must produce a metaphysical presence in the form of a hermeneutic intention? I find that the circular structure of understanding permits â for both philosophers â no clear signifiant either in speech or in writing. The game of interpretation produces â in changing endlessly between reading and rhetoric â an endless chain from one signifier to the next signifier without ever imitating a divine logos
ăç§ăăšăæ±ă : è„żç°ćčŸć€éăšăăă€ă«ă»ăăŻăăŁăłăźćŻŸè©±
This article attempts to crystallize Nishidaâs and Bakhtinâs common ideas about the âIâ and the âThouâ as paradoxical models of self-perception as well as of the perception of the Other. Stylistic unity, inter-subjectivity, and selfreflection are examined as phenomena of consciousness that are presented in similar manners by both philosophers. Both Bakhtin and Nishida insist on the paradoxical character of the perception of the Other. A fusion of the âIâwith the âThouâ is not beneficial to the âIâ at the moment it wants to understand the âThouâ. The aim must be to understand the âThouâ as a âThouâ by maintaining the status of the âIâ. In Bakhtinâs view, to understand the âOtherâ is an act of cultural creation. The âOthernessâ of the âThouâ is established as an important component of the âIââs understanding of the âThouâ as the âThouâ. In Nishidaâs later philosophy, the âIâ-âThouâ relation has been extended to a relation between the âIâ and the World. The immediate, âirrationalâ experience of the Other through action or an âanswering actâ leads to self-realization through action within a dialogically organized stylistic place. Only when this dialogical âplaceâ is philosophically established, are we able to see the world as a world of mutually determining individuals. On the basis of their respective philosophies of the âIâ and the âThouâ both Nishida and Bakhtin develop original ideas about the phenomenon of space
Pan-asianisme et eurasianisme : dĂ©veloppements philosophiques de lâespace culturel en Russie et au Japon 1900-1945
Thorsten Botz-Bornstein Lâobjectif de ce sĂ©minaire Ă©tait de montrer comment au Japon et en Russie certains philosophes rĂ©ussissaient Ă combiner les notions de temps et dâespace afin de dĂ©crire une sorte de « dĂ©veloppement spatial » (mestorazvitie en russe). Des idĂ©es complexes comme celles dâautarcie (pravitenlâniza en russe) visaient Ă garantir une autonomie culturelle aux diffĂ©rents peuples tout en les inscrivant dans un systĂšme plus large. PrĂšs de la moitiĂ© du sĂ©minaire a servi Ă Ă©claircir..
Pan-asianisme et eurasianisme : dĂ©veloppements philosophiques de lâespace culturel en Russie et au Japon 1900-1945
Thorsten Botz-Bornstein Lâobjectif de ce sĂ©minaire Ă©tait de montrer comment au Japon et en Russie certains philosophes rĂ©ussissaient Ă combiner les notions de temps et dâespace afin de dĂ©crire une sorte de « dĂ©veloppement spatial » (mestorazvitie en russe). Des idĂ©es complexes comme celles dâautarcie (pravitenlâniza en russe) visaient Ă garantir une autonomie culturelle aux diffĂ©rents peuples tout en les inscrivant dans un systĂšme plus large. PrĂšs de la moitiĂ© du sĂ©minaire a servi Ă Ă©claircir..
The Neuro-Image: a Deleuzian Film-Philosophy of Digital Screen Culture, by Patricia Pisters
What is the difference between a mind and a brain or, more precisely, between a mind-image and a brain-image? Media and Film Studies professor Patricia Pisters of the University of Amsterdam engages in the monumental project of establishing, in over 350 pages of monograph, the idea that â[t]odayâs viewers no longer look through a characterâs eyes; instead, they move through his or her brain or mental landscapeâ, as the text on the back cover argues. Either we literally enter brain-worlds, as happens for instance in Inception (Christopher Nolan, 2010), or a brain enters a body, as in Avatar (James Cameron, 2009). In Inception individuals infiltrate the subconscious of their targets, while in Avatar a remotely controlled human brain enters an alienâs body. As a consequence, argues Pisters, âa transdisciplinary encounter between film, philosophy, and neuroscience is not only important but also necessary to pursueâ (27)
Hartmannas ir Sezemanas. Husserlio fenomenologijos kritika ir intuicijos problema
[full article and abstract in Lithuanian; abstract in English]
This article deals with the problem of the relationship between intuition and construction. Nicolai Hartmann and Vasily Sesemann understand Husserlâs phenomenology as the practice of intuitive knowledge, which can be contrasted to conceptual construction. Both authors seek to join intuition and conceptual knowledge using the concept of dialectics, or the genesis of knowing. Their positions differ in valuing the relationship between intuition and construction. Hartmann emphasizes the perspective of the natural sciences as a necessary element of knowledge, and Sesemann criticizes scientific knowledge as objectifying and therefore insufficient to understand consciousness and values. Firstly, I discuss how Hartmann understands intuition and construction. Then I analyze how Sesemann explained the irrationality of givenness. Finally, I discuss how both philosophers justify the synthesis of intuition and construction.[straipsnis ir santrauka lietuviĆł kalba; santrauka anglĆł kalba]
Straipsnyje nagrinÄjama intuicijos ir konstravimo santykio problema paĆŸinime. Nikolajus Hartmannas ir Vosylius Sezemanas supranta Edmundo Husserlio fenomenologijÄ
kaip intuicija besiremiantÄŻ paĆŸinimÄ
, kuris yra prieĆĄingas konstravimu grindĆŸiamam ĆŸinojimui. Abu autoriai kritikuoja Husserlio prieigÄ
ir siĆ«lo susieti intuicijÄ
ir konstravimÄ
naudojant dialektikÄ
ir ĆŸinojimo genezÄs eksplikacijÄ
. Hartmannas pabrÄĆŸia gamtos mokslĆł svarbÄ
paĆŸinime, o Sezemanas kritikuoja mokslinÄŻ paĆŸinimÄ
kaip nepakankamÄ
, nes ĆĄis objektyvuoja sÄ
monÄ ir negali suprasti vertybiĆł. Pirma, nagrinÄju, kaip Hartmannas supranta intuicijos ir konstrukcijos santykÄŻ paĆŸinime. Antra, analizuoju, kaip Sezemanas atskleidĆŸia duoties iracionalumÄ
. Galiausiai, aptariu, kaip abu autoriai siekia susieti intuicijÄ
ir konstravimÄ
- âŠ