L'invention d'une bourgeoisie chiite au Liban. Mobilisations politiques, ressources économiques et formation d'un groupe social

The thesis analyses the making of the Shiite middle- and upper/entrepreneurial-class in Lebanon from the 1960s till the present day. The trajectory explores the historical, political and social (internal and external) factors that brought a sub-proletariat to mobilise and become an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie in the span of less than three generations. This work proposes the main theoretical hypothesis to unpack and reveal the trajectory of a very recent social class that through education, diaspora, political and social mobilisation evolved in a few years into a very peculiar bourgeoisie: whereas Christian-Maronite middle class practically produced political formations and benefited from them and from Maronite’s state supremacy (National Pact, 1943) reinforcing the community’s status quo, Shiites built their own bourgeoisie from within, and mobilised their “cadres” (Boltanski) not just to benefit from their renovated presence at the state level, but to oppose to it. The general Social Movement Theory (SMT), as well as a vast amount of the literature on (middle) class formation are therefore largely contradicted, opening up new territories for discussion on how to build a bourgeoisie without the state’s support (Social Mobilisation Theory, Resource Mobilisation Theory) and if, eventually, the middle class always produces democratic movements (the emergence of a social group out of backwardness and isolation into near dominance of a political order). The middle/upper class described here is at once an economic class related to the control of multiple forms of capital, and produced by local, national, and transnational networks related to flows of services, money, and education, and a culturally constructed social location and identity structured by economic as well as other forms of capital in relation to other groups in Lebanon

The Cedar Revolution, Youth Participation, and Youth Organizations in Lebanon’s Post Intifada Civic Engagement Sectarianism and Identity

Civil Society in Lebanon is undoubtedly one of the most vibrant in the Middle East. During the civil war (1975-1990) civil society became more active to compensate for the absence of a strong central government. When the military actions settled down, CSOs started perceiving their role as complementary to that of the government and became even more aware and self-conscious of their capacity, thus rendering NGOs indispensable to the survival of communities. In addition to that, new globalization concepts settled in: sustainable development, participatory democracy, governance, transparency, accountability, health-related issues and environment. At any rate, an important turning point for civil society in Lebanon was the early 2005 ‘Cedar Revolution’ which provoked enormous global interest and attention. The incidents of social and political mobilization that took place in 2005 were indicative that political and social groups, once regarded as militias and impotent groups preserving the status quo, could in fact mediate between the people and the state; or at least, these were the initial aspirations. It is also a fact that the withdrawal of Syria, the increase of civil society activism across the region and the post-2006 war all contributed to a significant rise in numbers of civil society organizations. Due to the relatively liberal legal environment, a veritable raise of civil society activism has been witnessed.1 Civil society activism in Lebanon is mainly divided between the social and the political sectors. A conspicuous number of well-functioning civil society groups working on democratization and human rights related issues are present in the country today. When it comes to this sector, in particular, Cavatorta and Durac have identified two major trends. The first one is directly related to the sectarian nature of Lebanon’s political and social structure. Many organizations, including those that work on human rights and democratization issues, “often subscribe to the political agenda of one particular sect, even though not necessarily formally so”.2 However, a second trend that has been growing in these last years, relates more “to the work of associations attempting to build what can be termed a nationalist Lebanese activist sector” that attempts to overcome or weaken sectarian barriers and create a political and legal system that is responsive to ordinary Lebanese citizens, and not necessarily as members of a specific sect

Emerging Transnational Identities: Indian Skilled Migration in the UAE

India has been the source of the largest annual outflows to the GCC countries. The increasing significance of GCC countries as a destination for migrant workers is illustrated by the change in total migrant stock in those countries, which grew from 8.9 million in 1990 to 22.3 million in 2013, accelerating the importance of the economic relations between India and the GCC to a measure that cannot be over-emphasised and continues to gain momentum over the years. Both the economic transformation and reform, and socio-political atmosphere across the Gulf is partially owed to its Indian immigrant population. Even though there is a relevant amount of literature available on Indian labourers and low-salaried workers in the UAE, the international mobility of medium and highly skilled human capital and the resulting outcomes for the country of origin and country of destination have still not been appropriately explored. This research attempts to shift the focus away from traditional analysis of labour mobility and poses an emphasis on the international transfer of human talent as a key for diplomacy, economic resources, and creative power in business, science, technology, arts and culture. I am examining how the size and spread of the Indian community in the UAE endorses the rise of transnationalism, by which skilled emigrants participate in the full measure of economy and society in one country, while maintaining association with their country of origin, accelerating knowledge transfers and spurring creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship. At the same time, the demand for directly productive talent in the workforce is interrelated with the demand for capital, and with the UAE facing still low rates of local expertise and India developing high levels of under employment, a migration flow will inevitably form towards the country that offers superior economic opportunities. Through the application of a renewed perspective on migration as a tool for diplomacy, members of the Indian diaspora are now no longer perceived as "lost children". Instead, the migrant identity has evolved, mobilising as transnational entrepreneurs or return migrants, who are uniquely positioned among the discourse of 'brain drain' and 'brain gain', and are increasingly influencing the policies and practices of both the Indian and UAE governments. Through this study, I will attempt to partially assess the magnitude of emigration of India's high-skill population through the exploration of the determinants of emigrant mobility using the individual stories of NRI entrepreneurs in the UAE. I will also be discussing the historical patterns of migration to the GCC region and the socio-economic impact of skilled immigration of Indian expatriates in the UAE economy. Furthermore, I will be examining the extent played by remittances, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and knowledge and technology transfers as key economic resources towards the development of the national economy and the potential reversal of the impact of 'brain drain'. Lastly, the research will contribute to a limited literature on transnational entrepreneurs and return and reverse migration, as the most understudied aspect of international migration, to illustrate how the migrant identity is fluid and evolving, and ultimately beneficial to both the host and home economy

genere e storia: percorsi

riflessione storiografica sul tema del genere come categoria ad uso della storia medievale, moderna e contemporane