Human rights education—a republican perspective

The concept of freedomis at the moral core of human rights and human rights education. In the liberal tradition, the prevalent understanding of freedom is non-interference. In the republican tradition, however, freedom is primarily conceived of as non-dominationrather than non-interference. This article discusses whether the republican ideal of freedom is conducive to the ambition of human rights education to strengthen and develop respect for human rights, and to build and promote a culture of human rights. The article arguesthat a republican perspective, although challenging, is important, because it identifies central aspects of freedom that are vital to the fundamental standing of persons and to living a life in dignity, and because it emphasises active citizenship and civic virtue as important for realising freedom. It further argues that a republican perspective requires a multidisciplinary approach to human rights education.publishedVersio

Mediatised human rights education: the (challenging) role of the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation

The purpose of this article is to analyse and discuss Selma and the Quest for the Perfect Faith, a TV series made by The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation and promoted for use in schools, and the accompanying teaching material about freedom of religion made by Save the Children. We discuss the series and material critically from a human rights and a human rights education perspective, and evaluate their suitability for use in religious education. The article is informed by mediatisation theory and argues that freedom of religion is primarily operationalised in accordance with journalistic criteria for presenting religion, and that it does not sufficiently balance the rights of children and the liberty of parents. This is inconsistent with sound human rights education and highlights the need for critical awareness when operationalising educational material produced and distributed by media actors for use in the classroom.publishedVersio

Emplotting a privileged position. The construction of the history of secular humanism in Norwegian religious education textbooks

There has recently been an increasing focus on the inclusion of non-religious world-views in religious education (RE). An important concern for the legitimacy of an RE subject in public education in liberal democracies is that all traditions, whether religious or secular, are treated in an equal and inclusive manner. This article examines the Norwegian case, where secular worldviews have been integrated as a central part of the compulsory national curriculum in RE for over 20 years. It does so by considering how the history of secular humanism is constructed in Norwegian RE textbooks. Theoretically, the article draws on the postmodern historiographic critique presented by Hayden White. A central concept is emplotment and the idea that emplotments convey moral arguments. Three narratives – ‘rationality’, ‘humanity’ and ‘rights and democracy’ – are identified as the core of the history of secular humanism being told in the material. The article suggests that the way these narratives are emplotted grants secular humanism a privileged position and that the fair and balanced representation of worldviews in RE education calls for alternative emplotments of this history.publishedVersio

The Basel I Floor – Transitional Arrangement and Backstop to the Capital Adequacy Framework

Capital requirements are intended to ensure that banks have a certain amount of capital to absorb unexpected losses. These requirements take into account the riskiness of banks’ various loan exposures. Such risk weighting implies higher capital requirements for riskier exposures, e.g. small business loans, than for safer loans such as residential mortgages with a low loan-to-value ratio. Under the current framework for banking regulation, Basel II, banks have the option of internally calculating risk weights for their loan exposures. The risk weights are calculated using risk models that must be approved by the supervisory authorities before the banks can apply them. The former framework, Basel I, had a fixed set of risk weights that banks had to use. Basel II also defines a set of standardised risk weights that banks use when they do not calculate risk weights internally. When banks calculate their own risk weights, the capital requirements can become more risk-sensitive and more consistent with banks’ risk management practices and risk pricing. Banks can attain lower capital requirements measured in NOK by calculating risk weights internally. Basel II was introduced in the European Economic Area (EEA) in 2007. To prevent banks' internal risk weights from reducing risk-weighted assets and thus banks' capital needs too much and too quickly, temporary, lower limits were set for how much capital could be reduced. These limits were set relative to the previous framework, Basel I, which had a fixed set of risk weights. These limits are referred to as the "Basel I floors", or Basel II transitional arrangements, and in this Commentary are hereinafter referred as "the floor". In 2007, the floor was 95 percent of the Basel I requirement. In 2008, the floor was 90 percent and 80 percent in 2009. Although the floor was originally intended to expire at the end of 2009, a floor of 80 percent was retained and continues to apply in Norway and most EU countries. In a press release dated 13 July 2009, the Basel Committee announced that it had agreed to keep the floor in place beyond the end of 2009 without mentioning when it should expire. Applying the floor has become more complicated than necessary because it was not uniformly implemented in the EEA. In the Basel Committee's original proposal, the floor is, in reality, a floor for calculating risk-weighted assets. The EU legislation that implemented Basel II in the EEA defined the floor as a minimum level of capital. The two versions do not always produce the same result. This Commentary first looks at how differing interpretations of the floor result in country-to-country differences in capital requirements for banks. This is followed by a discussion of alternative backstop mechanisms that have been proposed in connection with the new Basel III framework which is being phased in from 2013 to 2019.publishedVersio

Alcohol Consumption Among Hospitality and Nonhospitality Majors: Is it an Issue of Personality

Young adults, including university students, are more likely than other groups to engage in risky alcohol consumption. Employees at hospitality establishments and students at hospitality programs have been found to engage in heavy drinking. Excessive alcohol consumption has been linked to serious illness, cognitive difficulties, risky behaviors and sexual dysfunction. High levels of alcohol consumption, high rates of liver cirrhosis, elevated risk of alcohol-associated cancer and high prevalence of alcoholism have been found among restaurant employees. Research has started to explore some of the antecedent conditions and influences that may lead to high levels of alcohol consumption. Initial findings suggest that social modeling, subjective and group norms, personality variables, structural elements of the work place, and living conditions may be associated with alcohol consumption, while work-place stress appears not related to alcohol consumption (Borchgrevink, Borchgrevink, & Sciarini, in review; Borchgrevink, Sciarini, & Borchgrevink, 2010; Kjærheim et al., 1995; Kjærheim, Mykletun, & Haldorsen, 1996; Larsen, 1994; Larsen & Jørgensen, 2003.) Research also suggests that personality variables, such as extroversion and neuroticism, which are found to be predictive of alcohol consumption (Cook, Young, Taylor & Bedford, 1998), are also associated with hospitality as occupational choice (Teng, 2008)

Management of Financial Crises in Cross-Border Banks

Financial integration in Europe is increasing. The emergence of large, cross-border banks poses new challenges to the authorities. The management of financial crises in such banks will involve a number of authorities in many countries. Conflicts of interest between the authorities in different countries may hinder effective crisis solutions. Crisis management agreements between supervisory authorities and central banks aim to clarify the division of responsibilities and facilitate the exchange of relevant information. The Nordic central bank governors signed an agreement in 2003. This article provides an overview of developments and discusses the challenges facing the authorities

Analyses of Effects of the Residential Mortgage Loan Regulation

This article analyses the effects of the regulation on residential mortgage loans issued in 2017. The analyses are preliminary as tax data for 2017 are not yet available. Residential mortgage loan requirements were laid down in the form of a regulation in 2015 and tightened on 1 January 2017. The current regulation applies until summer 2018.publishedVersio

Basel I-gulvet – overgangsregel og sikkerhetsmekanisme i kapitaldekningsregelverket

Kapitalkravene skal sørge for at banker har en viss mengde kapital til å møte uventede tap. Kravene tar hensyn til hvor risikable bankenes ulike utlån er. Denne risikovektingen innebærer at det kreves mer kapital for mer risikable utlån, for eksempel utlån til små foretak, enn for sikrere utlån som boliglån med lav belåningsgrad. Under den gjeldende internasjonale standarden for bankregulering, Basel II, kan banker selv beregne risikovektene for sine utlån. Risikovektene beregnes i risikomodeller som må godkjennes av tilsynsmyndighetene før bankene kan ta dem i bruk. Det gamle regelverket, Basel I, hadde et fast sett med risikovekter som bankene måtte benytte. Basel II har også et sett standardiserte risikovekter som benyttes av banker som ikke beregner risikovektene selv. Når bankene selv beregner risikovektene, kan kapitalkravet bli mer risikosensitivt og gi økt samsvar mellom kapitalkravet og risikostyringen og prisingen i bankene. Bankene kan oppnå lavere kapitalkrav målt i kroner ved å beregne risikovektene selv. Basel II ble innført i EØS-området i 2007. For å unngå at bankenes egne risikoberegninger skulle redusere risikovektede eiendeler, og dermed kapitalbehovet i bankene, for mye og for raskt, ble det satt midlertidige, nedre grenser. Grensene ble satt i forhold til det gamle regelverket, Basel I. Disse grensene kalles Basel I-gulvet, eller overgangsregelen i Basel II, heretter kalt gulvet i denne aktuelle kommentaren. I 2007 var gulvet 95 prosent av kravet i Basel I. I 2008 var gulvet 90 prosent og i 2009 80 prosent. Gulvet skulle i utgangspunktet bare vare ut 2009, men gulv på 80 prosent er blitt videreført og gjelder fremdeles i Norge og i de fleste EU-land. Baselkomiteen vedtok i pressemelding 13. juli 2009 å videreføre gulvet etter 2009 uten å nevne når gulvet bør opphøre. Å anvende gulvet er blitt mer komplisert enn nødvendig fordi det ikke ble implementert på en enhetlig måte i EØS. I Baselkomiteens opprinnelige forslag er gulvet i realiteten et gulv for beregning av risikovektede eiendeler. EU-regelverket som innførte Basel II i EØS, definerte isteden gulvet som en nedre grense for kapitalen. De to versjonene gir ikke alltid samme resultat. Denne kommentaren ser først på hvordan ulike tolkninger av gulvet gir forskjeller i kapitalkrav mellom banker i ulike land. Deretter drøftes alternative sikkerhetsmekanismer som har vært foreslått i forbindelse med det nye Basel III-regelverket som skal fases inn i EU fra 2013 til 2019.publishedVersio

The Basel I Floor – Transitional Arrangement and Backstop to the Capital Adequacy Framework

Capital requirements are intended to ensure that banks have a certain amount of capital to absorb unexpected losses. These requirements take into account the riskiness of banks’ various loan exposures. Such risk weighting implies higher capital requirements for riskier exposures, e.g. small business loans, than for safer loans such as residential mortgages with a low loan-to-value ratio. Under the current framework for banking regulation, Basel II, banks have the option of internally calculating risk weights for their loan exposures. The risk weights are calculated using risk models that must be approved by the supervisory authorities before the banks can apply them. The former framework, Basel I, had a fixed set of risk weights that banks had to use. Basel II also defines a set of standardised risk weights that banks use when they do not calculate risk weights internally. When banks calculate their own risk weights, the capital requirements can become more risk-sensitive and more consistent with banks’ risk management practices and risk pricing. Banks can attain lower capital requirements measured in NOK by calculating risk weights internally. Basel II was introduced in the European Economic Area (EEA) in 2007. To prevent banks' internal risk weights from reducing risk-weighted assets and thus banks' capital needs too much and too quickly, temporary, lower limits were set for how much capital could be reduced. These limits were set relative to the previous framework, Basel I, which had a fixed set of risk weights. These limits are referred to as the "Basel I floors", or Basel II transitional arrangements, and in this Commentary are hereinafter referred as "the floor". In 2007, the floor was 95 percent of the Basel I requirement. In 2008, the floor was 90 percent and 80 percent in 2009. Although the floor was originally intended to expire at the end of 2009, a floor of 80 percent was retained and continues to apply in Norway and most EU countries. In a press release dated 13 July 2009, the Basel Committee announced that it had agreed to keep the floor in place beyond the end of 2009 without mentioning when it should expire. Applying the floor has become more complicated than necessary because it was not uniformly implemented in the EEA. In the Basel Committee's original proposal, the floor is, in reality, a floor for calculating risk-weighted assets. The EU legislation that implemented Basel II in the EEA defined the floor as a minimum level of capital. The two versions do not always produce the same result. This Commentary first looks at how differing interpretations of the floor result in country-to-country differences in capital requirements for banks. This is followed by a discussion of alternative backstop mechanisms that have been proposed in connection with the new Basel III framework which is being phased in from 2013 to 2019

Regulering av systemviktige banker – og de store nordiske bankene

Internasjonalt ble flere store banker støttet av myndighetene under finanskrisen. Det bidrar til økt forventning om støtte i fremtiden. Når det forventes at en bank vil bli støttet av myndighetene, får banken både insentiver til å ta for høy risiko og billigere finansiering til å vokse seg enda større. Derfor er det behov for bedre regulering av de største bankene. Artikkelen går igjennom ulike tiltak som er foreslått, og ser på hvordan noen av disse tiltakene kunne slått ut for de seks største nordiske bankene.2 Samtlige av disse bankene vil kunne bli berørt av tiltak som er foreslått, men i ulik grad, fordi de seks bankene er ulike. Avslutningsvis gis en kort oversikt over status i G20- landenes arbeid med regulering av systemviktige banker