1,448 research outputs found
Why do markets freeze?
Consider the sale of mortgages by a loan originator to a buyer. As widely noted, such a transaction is subject to a severe adverse selection problem: the originator has a natural information advantage and will attempt to sell only the worst mortgages. However, a second important feature of this transaction has received much less attention: both the seller and the buyer may have existing inventories of mortgages similar to those being sold. The authors analyze how the presence of such inventories affects trade. They use their model to discuss implications for regulatory intervention in illiquid markets.Mortgage loans
Formal and informal financing in a Chicago neighborhood
This article documents not only the actual use of banks, but also the widespread use of alternative financing mechanisms, using data from a survey of households and businesses in a Hispanic neighborhood of Chicago.Bank loans ; Chicago (Ill.) ; Consumer behavior ; Mortgages
Coordinating Development: Can Income-based Incentive Schemes Eliminate Pareto Inferior Equilibria?
Individuals’ inability to coordinate investment may significantly constrain economic development. In this paper we study a simple investment game characterized by multiple equilibria and ask whether an income-based incentive scheme can uniquely implement the high investment outcome. A general property of this game is the presence of a crossover investment point at which an individual’s incomes from investment and non-investment are equal. We show that arbitrarily small errors in the government’s knowledge of this crossover point can prevent unique implementation of the high investment outcome. We conclude that informational requirements are likely to severely limit a government’s ability to use income-based incentive schemes as a coordination device.Coordination, Public Policy, Income Taxation, Implementation
Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals, Second Version
Prior research on “strategic voting” has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse off. We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous, i.e., independent of the voting rule used. We depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote, and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off. Moreover, in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposing individual better off even when he has diametrically opposing preferences. In this case, unanimity is the Pareto dominant voting rule. Voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal. The proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher.Strategic voting; agenda setting; multilateral bargaining
Borrower Runs
Microfinance institutions and other lenders in developing countries rely on the promise of future loans to induce repayment. However, if borrowers expect that others will default, and so loans will no longer be available in the future, then they will default as well. We refer to such contagion as a borrower run. The optimal lending contract must provide additional repayment incentives to counter this tendency to default.
Market run-ups, market freezes, and leverage
The authors study trade between a buyer and a seller when both may have existing inventories of assets similar to those being traded. They analyze how these inventories affect trade, information dissemination, and price formation. The authors show that when the buyer's and seller's initial leverage is moderate, inventories increase price and trade volume, but when leverage is high, trade may become impossible (a "market freeze"). Their analysis predicts a pattern of trade in which prices and trade volume first increase, and then markets break down. The authors use their model to discuss implications for regulatory intervention in illiquid markets. ; Superseded by Working Paper 12-8Inventories ; Trade ; Markets
Cosigned Or Group Loans
We analyze lending contracts when social sanctions are used to enforce repayments and borrowers differ in their unobserved sanctioning abilities. Symmetric group loans are preferred to cosigned loans when borrowers are relatively equal, and cosigned loans are preferred when borrowers are unequal. This explains why microlenders that target the poor (e.g., the Grameen Bank) use symmetric group loans while other untargeted lenders use cosigned loans. Complicated menus of loan contracts that induce borrowers to self select can do no better than these simple loan contracts unless borrowers are very productive. In particular, we explain why group lending arrangements offering different loan terms to members of the same group are seldom observed.Microcredit, Social Sanctions, Grameen Bank
Predatory lending in rational world
Regulators express growing concern over “predatory lending,” which we take to mean lending that reduces the expected utility of borrowers. We present a rational model of consumer credit in which such lending is possible, and identify the circumstances in which it arises with and without competition. Predatory lending is associated with imperfect competition, highly collateralized loans, and poorly informed borrowers. Under most circumstances competition among lenders eliminates predatory lending.Predatory lending
Predatory mortgage lending
Regulators express growing concern over predatory loans, which we take to mean loans that borrowers should decline. Using a model of consumer credit in which such lending is possible, we identify the circumstances in which it arises both with and without competition. We find that predatory lending is associated with highly collateralized loans, inefficient refinancing of subprime loans, lending without due regard to ability to pay, prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and poorly informed borrowers. Under most circumstances competition among lenders attenuates predatory lending. We use our model to analyze the effects of legislative interventions.Predatory lending
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