Returns to Specialization, Transaction Costs, and the Dynamics of Industry Evolution

When more than one component or activity is needed to produce the final product, a firm may use proprietary standards or adopt a common standard to integrate these components. We call these closed and open firms respectively, and develop a model of industry evolution to study the process by which type of firm comes to dominate the industry. Our simulations show that an industry may diverge from its long run equilibrium configuration for sustained periods of time. Typically, the industry is dominated by closed firms in the early history and by open firms later on. Entry and exit dynamics create transient biases in favor of open firms. First, a closed entrant can capture multiple profits whereas an open entrant faces a lower entry barrier. However, while the odds of closed entry (relative to open entry) are initially greater than one, they decrease with price and eventually open entry becomes more likely than closed entry. Second, though initially closed firms can offset losses in one component with profits from another and thereby have better survival as compared to open firms, when prices fall below a threshold level, a closed firm is more likely to exit than a comparable pair of open firms. Finally, entry by an open firm improves the relative odds of entry by a complementary open firm, especially when the two complementary sectors differ in size or efficiency.Vertical Integration, Externalities, Positive Feedback, Industry Evolution, Transaction Costs, Simulation Models

Can drug price hikes via debranding be prevented?

Steep price hikes following the debranding of off-patent medicines are becoming increasingly common in the UK, adding hundreds of millions to the NHS drugs bill. But can anything be done to prevent this

Product line extensions under the threat of entry: evidence from the UK pharmaceuticals market. ESRI Working Paper 678 September 2020.

Do firms increase product lines to deter entry and, if so, when is such a strategy successful? We use data from UK pharmaceuticals to examine how incumbents respond to change in the threat of entry. In line with the entry deterrence motive, originators’ product launch rate is higher when the risk of entry is moderate, but becomes lower when entry is very likely, and the effect is most pronounced in medium-size markets. We further find that in medium-size markets, originators can deny entry via proliferation if they fill the product space evenly across patients so that each variant has a significant market share of the originators drugs. This does not work in large markets, but here entry is deterred when originators engage in product hopping, i.e., shift most of the patients to newer variants of the drug that may still be protected by intellectual property

Demand estimation and merger simulations for drugs: Logits v. AIDS

We use ADHD drugs sales data from 2000-2003 and compare estimates of elasticities and merger simulations from three different demand models. Models include logit, random coefficients logit, and conditional AIDS demand model with multistage budgeting. The magnitude of cross-price elasticities is larger in the third model in comparison to the first two, and some of the cross-price elasticities are estimated to be negative. Hypothetical merger simulations show larger price effects for the multistage AIDS model in comparison to the discrete choice models

Lockdown drinking: The sobering effect of price controls in a pandemic

Lockdown restrictions reduce the spread of COVID‐19 but disrupt livelihoods and lifestyles that can induce harmful behavior changes, including problematic lockdown drinking fueled by cheap alcohol. Exploiting differences amongst the four constituent countries of the United Kingdom, we use triple difference analysis on alcohol retail sales to examine the efficacy of minimum unit pricing as a price control device to help curb excessive consumption in a pandemic setting. We find the policy is remarkably effective and well‐targeted in reducing demand for cheap alcohol, with minimal spillover effects, and consumers overall buying and spending less

Entry limiting agreements: first mover advantage, authorized generics and pay-for-delay deals

During patent litigation, pay-for-delay (P4D) deals involve a payment from a patent holder of a branded drug to a generic drug manufacturer to delay entry and withdraw the patent challenge. In return for staying out of the market, the generic firm receives a payment, and/or an authorized licensed entry at a later date, but before the patent expiration. We examine why such deals are stable when there are multiple potential entrants. We combine the first-mover advantage for the first generic with the ability of the branded manufacturer to launch an authorized generic (AG) to show when P4D deals are an equilibrium outcome. We further show that limiting a branded firm's ability to launch an AG before entry by a successful challenger will deter such deals. However, removing exclusivity period for the first generic challenger will not

Growth and returns to new products and pack varieties: the case of UK pharmaceuticals

We use quarterly sales data from the UK pharmaceuticals market between 2003 and 2013 and estimate the impact of new introductions, i.e., new products and pack varieties within an anatomical therapy class on business unit growth. Using a dynamic lag adjustment growth model that accounts for endogeneity of new introductions, we find that a new product contributes to 18 per cent growth of the business unit while a new pack variety leads to 7 per cent growth for the business unit in the long run. Further, we find that there is significant variation in growth by size of firm and that the marginal effect of additional products on growth is larger for smaller business units. However, the marginal effect of pack varieties does not differ by firm size

Assessing the impact of health care expenditures on mortality using cross-country data

A significant body of literature has examined the impact of public health expenditure on mortality, using a global cross-section or panel of country-level data. However, while a number of studies do confirm such a relationship, the magnitude of the impact varies considerably between studies, and several studies show statistically insignificant effects. In this paper we re-examine the literature that identifies this effect using cross-country data. Our analysis builds on the two instrumental variables (IV) approaches embodied by key publications in the field – Bokhari et al. (2007) and Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015). Using exactly the same data and econometric specifications as the published studies, we start by successfully replicating their findings. However, further analyses using updated data and ‘streamlined’ econometric specifications, plus statistical data imputation and extensive robustness checks, reveal highly sensitive results. In particular, the relevance of the IVs is seriously compromised in the updated data, leading to imprecise estimations of the relationship. While our results should not be taken to imply that there is no true mortality-reducing impact of public health care expenditures on mortality, the findings do call for further methodological work, for instance in terms of identifying more suitable IVs or by applying other estimation strategies, in an effort to derive more robust estimates of the marginal productivity of public health care funding

Managed Care and the adoption of technology: The case of cardiac catheterization

The diffusion of health care technology is influenced by both the total market share of managed care organizations as well as the level of competition among them. This paper differentiates between HMO penetration and competition and examines their relationship to the adoption of cardiac catheterization laboratories in all non-federal, short-term general community hospitals in the U.S. between 1985 and 1995. Results show that a hospital is less likely to adopt the technology if HMO market penetration increases but more likely to adopt if HMO competition increases. Further, the latter effect is non-linear in the number of adopters. In markets where fewer than a critical number of neighboring hospitals have already adopted, the probability of adoption increases with the number of HMOs, but in markets where more than the critical number of neighbors have already adopted, the probability of adoption decreases with the number of HMOs. Thus, in markets where technology is rare, HMO penetration and competition have countervailing effects on the diffusion of technology such that the net effect could be small