Evaluation of a Potential for Enhancing the Decision Support System of the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center with NASA Earth Science Research Results

NASA's objective for the Applied Sciences Program of the Science Mission Directorate is to expand and accelerate the realization of economic and societal benefits from Earth science, information, and technology. This objective is accomplished by using a systems approach to facilitate the incorporation of Earth observations and predictions into the decision-support tools used by partner organizations to provide essential services to society. The services include management of forest fires, coastal zones, agriculture, weather prediction, hazard mitigation, aviation safety, and homeland security. In this way, NASA's long-term research programs yield near-term, practical benefits to society. The Applied Sciences Program relies heavily on forging partnerships with other Federal agencies to accomplish its objectives. NASA chooses to partner with agencies that have existing connections with end-users, information infrastructure already in place, and decision support systems that can be enhanced by the Earth science information that NASA is uniquely poised to provide (NASA, 2004)

Strategy revision opportunities and collusion

This paper studies whether and how strategy revision opportunities affect levels of collusion in indefinitely repeated two-player games. Consistent with standard theory, we find that such opportunities do not affect strategy choices, or collusion levels, if the game is of strategic substitutes. In games of strategic complements, by contrast, revision opportunities lead to more collusion. We discuss alternative explanations for this result

Trust, Salience and Deterrence: Evidence from an Antitrust Experiment

We present results from a laboratory experiment identifying the main channels through which different law enforcement strategies deter organized economic crime. The absolute level of a fine has a strong deterrence effect, even when the exogenous probability of apprehension is zero. This effect appears to be driven by distrust or fear of betrayal, as it increases significantly when the incentives to betray partners are strengthened by policies offering amnesty to “turncoat whistleblowers”. We also document a strong deterrence effect of the sum of fines paid in the past, which suggests a significant role for salience or availability heuristic in law enforcement

Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up

We propose a unified framework to study relational contracting and hold-up problems in infinite horizon stochastic games. We first illustrate that with respect to long run decisions, the common formulation of relational contracts as Pareto-optimal public perfect equilibria is in stark contrast to fundamental assumptions of hold-up models. We develop a model in which relational contracts are repeatedly newly negotiated during relationships. Negotiations take place with positive probability and cause bygones to be bygones. Traditional relational contracting and hold-up formulations are nested as opposite corner cases. Allowing for intermediate cases yields very intuitive results and sheds light on many plausible trade-offs that do not arise in these corner cases. We establish a general existence result and a tractable characterization for stochastic games in which money can be transferred. This paper formulates a theory of relational contracting in dynamic games. A crucial feature is that existing relational contracts can depreciate and ensuing negotiations then treat previous informal agreements as bygones. The model nests the traditional formulation of relational contracts as Pareto-optimal equilibria as a special case. In repeated games both formulations are always mathematically equivalent. We provide ample illustrations that in dynamic games the traditional formulation is restrictive in so far that it rules out by assumption many plausible hold-up problems - even for small discount factors. Our model provides a framework that naturally unifies the analysis of relational contracting and hold-up problems