THE DANGERS OF FIGHTING TERRORISM WITH TECHNOCOMMUNITARIANISM: CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS OF FREE EXPRESSION, EXPLORATION, AND UNMONITORED ACTIVITY IN URBAN SPACES

Part I of this article examines how some commentators can plausibly argue that constitutional liberty and privacy protections do not protect the individual liberty and privacy that modern individuals have come to expect in many public spaces, particularly in urban environments. Constitutional liberalism, this section points out, makes this question a difficult one, because it is marked by scrupulous neutrality towards different visions of “the good life.” In other words, the constitutional order does not condemn those who choose a communitarian way of life and favor those who prefer individualism. Rather, it tolerates both of these (and other) preferences about one’s social and cultural environment, and leaves citizens free to opt for the life of their choice. Part II suggests that it is difficult to make sense of our modern jurisprudence of First Amendment rights, especially as they relate to anonymous communication and association on the Internet and elsewhere, unless one allows room in our constitutional law for a jurisprudence that “captures” and preserves social incarnations of liberty and privacy that were not yet in existence when theConstitution was drafted. Therefore, it is possible for for courts and others to find that freedom-enabling institutions that did not exist earlier in American history, and might cease to exist in the future, deserve certain constitutional protection while they are here. Part III explains that like the virtual liberation offered by the Internet, city life offered and continues to offer an invaluable refuge for substantial expressive activity and intellectual exploration that would be far more elusive without this type of urban existence. It provides individuals with an incredibly rich bazaar of ideas, and allows them to browse among these deas, substantially free from outside monitoring or control. While First Amendment law does not single out urban environments for protection, it protects such environments indirectly by preserving certain opportunities that are characteristic of modern urban life: opportunities for giving speeches to large crowds, for confronting strangers with ideas they may find unfamiliar or provocative, or for speaking or gathering information in the anonymity of the crowd

Post-Confrontational Collective Bargaining Models Successful Negotiations: Successful Contracts - Facilitators Useful?

Post-Confrontational Collective Bargaining Models Successful Negotiations: Successful Contracts - Facilitators Useful? discusses the experience of interest-based bargaining at Eastern Illinois University

The Right to an Artificial Reality? Freedom of Thought and the Fiction of Philip K. Dick

In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, the philosopher Robert Nozick describes what he calls an “Experience Machine.” In essence, it produces a form of virtual reality (VR). People can use it to immerse themselves in a custom-designed dream: They have the experience of climbing a mountain, reading a book, or conversing with a friend when they are actually lying isolated in a tank with electrodes feeding perceptions into their brain. Nozick describes the Experience Machine as part of a philosophical thought experiment—one designed to show that a valuable life consists of more than mental states, like those we receive in this machine. As Nozick says, “we want to do certain things, and not just have the experience of doing them.” An 80-year sequence of experiences generated by the machine would not be of equivalent value to the lifetime of the identical set of experiences we derive from interactions with real people (who are not illusions, but have minds of their own), and with a physical universe that lies outside of us. On the contrary, says Nozick, a solipsistic life in the Experience Machine is a deeply impoverished one

Stanley in Cyberspace: Why the Privacy Protection of the First Amendment Should Be More Like That of the Fourth

The 1969 case Stanley v. Georgia forbade the government from restricting the books that an individual may read or the films he may watch “in the privacy of his own home.” Since that time, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that Stanley’s protection applies solely within the physical boundaries of the home: While obscene books or films are protected inside of the home, they are not protected en route to it—whether in a package sent by mail, in a suitcase one is carrying to one’s house, or in a stream of data obtained through the Internet. However adequate this narrow reading of Stanley may have been in the four decades since the case was decided, it is ill-suited to the twenty-first century, where the in-home cultural life protected by the Court in Stanley inevitably spills over into, or connects with, electronic realms beyond it. Individuals increasingly watch films not, as the defendant in Stanley did, by bringing an eight millimeter film or other physical copy of the film into their house, but by streaming it through the Internet. Especially as eReaders, such as the Kindle, and tablets, such as the iPad, proliferate, individuals read books by downloading digital copies of them. They store their own artistic and written work not in a desk drawer or in a safe, but in the “cloud” of data storage offered to them on far-away servers. Thus, I argue that courts should revisit and revise their understanding of Stanley v. Georgia in the same way that Katz v. United States revised Fourth Amendment law in 1967—by holding that the privacy it protected is not limited to the physical boundaries of the home (as United States v. Olmstead had held in 1928) but covers wire-line communications and other electronic environments in which individuals have an expectation of privacy. This is not to say that the Court’s understanding of Stanley v. Georgia should be revised in precisely the same way. However, Stanley v. Georgia should, at a minimum, be extended to protect web-based interactions, where use of an electronic resource outside of the home, such as the Internet, is an integral component of the act of possessing, viewing, or reading cultural material