Is the ECB sufficiently accountable and transparent? CEPS Working Document No. 169, July 2001

More than two years after its inception, the ECB is still perceived as lacking transparency by many academics and market participants.1 Our analysis, based on a series of indicators, suggests instead that the ECB is, at least on paper, one of the most transparent and accountable central banks. The discrepancy between theory and public perception suggests that much remains to be done within the given institutional framework to improve the transparency of the ECB. What is the best way to achieve this goal? Several suggestions have been put forward, such as publishing the detailed minutes of the ECB Governing Council meetings. This would result in shifting the true debate to informal meetings of the Governing Council, while formal meetings would only record pre-packaged consensus with no or little discussion. In our view, the best way to make the ECB more accountable is to engage it in substantive discussions about its policy. The ECB should provide more information about the background analysis that leads to policy decisions. For example, the ECB should transform its ‘staff projections’ into true inflation forecasts and it should be more open about the arguments that shape the internal debates, which precedes decisions. Accountability cannot be ensured by the ECB alone. An important role has to be played by its counterparts, such as the European Parliament, the Council of EU Finance Ministers and the public at large

How Can the ECB be Credible?

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020

Austerity: European democracies against the wall. CEPS Paperbacks. July 2013

The crisis in the eurozone has had a dramatic impact on the economic and social fabric of European countries. However important it may be, the economic dimension is only the symptom of a broader problem. The crisis is primarily political in nature. Lorenzo Bini Smaghi argues in this book that the crisis reflects the inability of western democracies to solve problems that have been building for over two decades. He finds that democratically elected officials are loathe to take unpopular decisions that could jeopardise their re-election. Emergency thus becomes the engine of political action, and the justification for corrective measures vis-à-vis the voters. As a consequence, the cure in the form of austerity, administered belatedly and under pressure from the markets, becomes even more painful and unpopular, giving rise to populist movements and endangering democracy itself

"Is the ECB Accountable and Transparent?"

Rightly or wrongly the ECB is widely perceived as in-transparent. Our analysis suggests that on formal criteria the ECB is more transparent and accountable than most other central banks. What could be done to improve the transparency of the ECB? The best way to make the ECB more accountable is to engage it in substantive discussions about its policy where it is pressed to provide the relevant information about the background analysis that have led to policy decisions. For example, the ECB should be pressed to make its inflation forecast public and it should be more open about the arguments, both pro and con, that shape the debates that precedes decisions. Accountability cannot be ensured by the ECB alone. An important role has to be played by its counterparts, such as the European Parliament, the Council of EU Finance Ministers and the public at large. Publication of detailed minutes of the ECB Governing Council meetings would not be useful. This would only result in shifting the true debate to informal meetings of the Governing Council, so that the formal meetings would only record pre-packaged consensus with no or little discussion

Is the ECB sufficiently accountable and transparent? ENEPRI Working Paper No. 7, September 2001

More than two years after its inception, the ECB is still perceived as lacking transparency by many academics and market participants. Our analysis, based on a series of indicators, suggests instead that the ECB is, at least on paper, one of the most transparent and accountable central banks. The discrepancy between theory and public perception suggests that much remains to be done within the given institutional framework to improve the transparency of the ECB. What is the best way to achieve this goal? Several suggestions have been put forward, such as publishing the detailed minutes of the ECB Governing Council meetings. This would result in shifting the true debate to informal meetings of the Governing Council, while formal meetings would only record pre-packaged consensus with no or little discussion. In our view, the best way to make the ECB more accountable is to engage it in substantive discussions about its policy. The ECB should provide more information about the background analysis that leads to policy decisions. For example, the ECB should transform its ‘staff projections’ into true inflation forecasts and it should be more open about the arguments that shape the internal debates, which precedes decisions. Accountability cannot be ensured by the ECB alone. An important role has to be played by its counterparts, such as the European Parliament, the Council of EU Finance Ministers and the public at large