The Contemplative Mind and Life: First-Person Methods and the Challenge of Pure Consciousness and Phenomenal Selfhood for the “Neurophenomenological” Research Program

A new paradigm in cognitive science has emerged called the “enactive approach”, which has given rise to a research program known as “neurophenomenology”. This research program attempts to calibrate third- and first-person methods to investigate consciousness. In his recent and representative work Mind in Life, Evan Thompson has put forward the thesis that there is a “deep continuity between life and mind”. While I remain sympathetic to the neurophenomenological approach as an exemplar par excellence of how the science of consciousness ought to proceed, I argue against this continuity thesis from three perspectives: (1) the nature and potential of first-person approaches to consciousness; (2) the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) the egological or non-egological nature of consciousness and selfhood. My argument begins by laying out the foundations of enactive cognitive science, the continental analysis of time-consciousness and Thompson‟s attempt to close the empirical gap between life and mind with the help of the neurophenomenological bridging strategy (dynamic systems theory). Next, I discuss the phenomenology of different types of (structured) experiences and the fact that continental and contemplative methods share a common logic. I then argue that first-person methods (i) offer prima facie evidence that there are perceptual and non-perceptual types of experience, and (ii) grant us “cognitive access” to both types of experience. Following this, I consider at least one non-perceptual type of experience (pure consciousness) that breaks down the dynamic and relational structure of time-consciousness. I argue that pure consciousness is phenomenally lived-through but without egocentricity (subject-pole). Furthermore, a sophisticated distinction between (i) a minimal, core sense of (ego-) self and (ii) a non-egological but phenomenally lived-through subjectivity, is capable of shedding light on long-lasting debates surrounding the existence and non-existence of self (ātman). This especially holds true with regards to Buddhist philosophy and objectors to the doctrine of not-self (anatta/anātman). Finally, the nature of pure consciousness will lead me to challenge Thompson‟s continuity thesis, on the grounds that phenomenological evidence shows that the contemplative mind (pure consciousness) is decidedly not dynamic and intentional in structure. Thus there is a conceptual discontinuity between the biological domain and the phenomenological domain, being a decisive conceptual disanalogy between the contemplative mind (consciousness proper) and life. I thus conclude that prima facie: (1) first-person methods give us cognitive access to the objective and subjective domain of consciousness; (2) continental phenomenology is mistaken about the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) consciousness qua awareness per se is non-egological. Having completed my argument against the continuity thesis, I will briefly recommend specific avenues for future neurophenomenological research to (a) adjudicate between continental and contemplative phenomenological views of consciousness; (b) judge whether or not Thompson‟s continuity thesis can be upheld; and (c) introduce new ways of studying (phenomenal) selfhood. In this way, I hope not only to argue against Thompon‟s continuity thesis, but to also point towards the potential of the neurophenomenological research program to advance our understanding of consciousness and phenomenal selfhood

Frequency response of electrolyte-gated graphene electrodes and transistors

The interface between graphene and aqueous electrolytes is of high importance for applications of graphene in the field of biosensors and bioelectronics. The graphene/electrolyte interface is governed by the low density of states of graphene that limits the capacitance near the Dirac point in graphene and the sheet resistance. While several reports have focused on studying the capacitance of graphene as a function of the gate voltage, the frequency response of graphene electrodes and electrolyte-gated transistors has not been discussed so far. Here, we report on the impedance characterization of single layer graphene electrodes and transistors, showing that due to the relatively high sheet resistance of graphene, the frequency response is governed by the distribution of resistive and capacitive circuit elements along the graphene/electrolyte interface. Based on an analytical solution for the impedance of the distributed circuit elements, we model the graphene/electrolyte interface both for the electrode and the transistor configurations. Using this model, we can extract the relevant material and device parameters such as the voltage-dependent intrinsic sheet and series resistances as well as the interfacial capacitance. The model also provides information about the frequency threshold of electrolyte-gated graphene transistors, above which the device exhibits a non-resistive response, offering an important insight into the suitable frequency range of operation of electrolyte-gated graphene devices

High surface area graphene foams by chemical vapor deposition

Three-dimensional (3D) graphene-based structures combine the unique physical properties of graphene with the opportunity to get high electrochemically available surface area per unit of geometric surface area. Several preparation techniques have been reported to fabricate 3D graphene-based macroscopic structures for energy storage applications such as supercapacitors. Although reaserch has been focused so far on achieving either high specific capacitance or high volumetric capacitance, much less attention has been dedicated to obtain high specific and high volumetric capacitance simultaneously. Here, we present a facile technique to fabricate graphene foams (GF) of high crystal quality with tunable pore size grown by chemical vapor deposition. We exploited porous sacrificial templates prepared by sintering nickel and copper metal powders. Tuning the particle size of the metal powders and the growth temperature allow fine control of the resulting pore size of the 3D graphene-based structures smaller than 1 μm. The as-produced 3D graphene structures provide a high volumetric electric double layer capacitance (165 mF cm-³). High specific capacitance (100 Fg-¹) is obtained by lowering the number of layers down to single layer graphene. Furthermore, the small pore size increases the stability of these GFs in contrast to the ones that have been grown so far on commercial metal foams. Electrodes based on the as-prepared GFs can be a boost for the development of supercapacitors, where both low volume and mass are required

Uniformly coated highly porous graphene/MnO2 foams for flexible asymmetric supercapacitors

Supercapacitors are called to play a prominent role in the newly emerging markets of electric vehicles, flexible displays and sensors, and wearable electronics. In order to compete with current battery technology, supercapacitors have to be designed with highly conductive current collectors exhibiting high surface area per unit volume and uniformly coated with pseudocapacitive materials, which is crucial to boost the energy density while maintaining a high power density. Here, we present a versatile technique to prepare thickness-controlled thin-film micro graphene foams (μGFs) with pores in the lower micrometer range grown by chemical vapor deposition which can be used as highly conductive current collectors in flexible supercapacitors. To fabricate the μGF, we use porous metallic catalytic substrates consisting of nickel/copper alloy synthesized on nickel foil by electrodeposition in an electrolytic solution. Changing the duration of the electrodeposition allows the control of the thickness of the metal foam, and thus of the μGF, ranging from a few micrometers to the millimeter scale. The resulting μGF with a thickness and pores in the micrometer regime exhibits high structural quality which leads to a very low intrinsic resistance of the devices. Transferred onto flexible substrates, we demonstrate a uniform coating of the μGFs with manganese oxide, a pseudocapacitively active material. Considering the porous structure and the thickness of the μGFs, square wave potential pulses are used to ensure uniform coverage by the oxide material boosting the volumetric and areal capacitance to 14 F cm and 0.16 F cm. The μGF with a thickness and pores in the micrometer regime in combination with a coating technique tuned to the porosity of the μGF is of great relevance for the development of supercapacitors based on state-of-the-art graphene foams

Mapping brain activity with flexible graphene micro-transistors

Establishing a reliable communication interface between the brain and electronic devices is of paramount importance for exploiting the full potential of neural prostheses. Current microelectrode technologies for recording electrical activity, however, evidence important shortcomings, e.g. challenging high density integration. Solution-gated field-effect transistors (SGFETs), on the other hand, could overcome these shortcomings if a suitable transistor material were available. Graphene is particularly attractive due to its biocompatibility, chemical stability, flexibility, low intrinsic electronic noise and high charge carrier mobilities. Here, we report on the use of an array of flexible graphene SGFETs for recording spontaneous slow waves, as well as visually evoked and also pre-epileptic activity in vivo in rats. The flexible array of graphene SGFETs allows mapping brain electrical activity with excellent signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), suggesting that this technology could lay the foundation for a future generation of in vivo recording implants

Mapping brain activity with flexible graphene micro-transistors

Establishing a reliable communication interface between the brain and electronic devices is of paramount importance for exploiting the full potential of neural prostheses. Current microelectrode technologies for recording electrical activity, however, evidence important shortcomings, e.g. challenging high density integration. Solution-gated field-effect transistors (SGFETs), on the other hand, could overcome these shortcomings if a suitable transistor material were available. Graphene is particularly attractive due to its biocompatibility, chemical stability, flexibility, low intrinsic electronic noise and high charge carrier mobilities. Here, we report on the use of an array of flexible graphene SGFETs for recording spontaneous slow waves, as well as visually evoked and also pre-epileptic activity in vivo in rats. The flexible array of graphene SGFETs allows mapping brain electrical activity with excellent signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), suggesting that this technology could lay the foundation for a future generation of in vivo recording implants

Consciousness of God as God is: The phenomenology of Christian centering prayer

In this study I aim to give an alternative approach to the way we theorise in the philosophy and comparative study of mysticism. Specifically, I aim to shift debate on the phenomenal nature of contemplative states of consciousness away from textual sources and towards reliable and descriptively rich first-person data originating in contemporary practices of lived traditions. The heart of this dissertation lies in rich qualitative interview data obtained through recently developed second-person approaches in the science of consciousness. I conducted in-depth phenomenological interviews with 20 Centering Prayer teachers and practitioners. The interviews covered the larger trajectory of their contemplative paths and granular detail of the dynamics of recent seated prayer sessions. I aided my second-person method with a “radical participation” approach to fieldwork at St Benedict’s Monastery in Snowmass. In this study I present nuanced phenomenological analyses of the first-person data regarding the beginning to intermediate stages of the Christian contemplative path, as outlined by the Centering Prayer tradition and described by Centering Prayer contemplatives. My presentation of the phenomenology of Centering Prayer is guided by a synthetic map of Centering Prayer’s (Keating School) contemplative path and model of human consciousness, which is grounded in the first-person data obtained in this study and takes into account the tradition’s primary sources. This includes: (1) an outline of the stages of the contemplative path; (2) the levels of consciousness (ordinary, spiritual and divine) and the type of experiential content (coarse, subtle and very subtle/divine presence) proper to each stage of the path; and (3) corresponding types of self (false, true and separate-self sense). My study addresses three meta-issues in the field pertaining to method, description and theory. First, I offer a new framework for the comparative study of contemplative practices and experiences, alongside a sound second-person method for collecting first-person data from contemplative practitioners. Second, I provide an effective framework for developing phenomenological accounts that are descriptively faithful, analytically transparent and theoretically useful. Third, I draw on the phenomenological accounts developed in this study to reconsider important theses advanced in the contemporary philosophy and comparative study of mysticism. On this basis, I argue that practitioners phenomenally apprehend union states, specifically prayer of full union, through experiential primitives, such as a “sense of presence”, and without a “God-identification element”. Consequently, union states are phenomenologically of an unidentified reality and therefore not theistic, in Katz’s and Pike’s senses. However, there might be some sense in which they are phenomenologically of God, because they could be practitioners’ consciousness of God as God is; but this would empirically disconfirm received views of how God should be experienced. This finding challenges arguments for a unique theistic experience, designed to uphold a fundamental distinction between theistic and nontheistic experiences. Since Christian practitioners do not necessarily have unique theistic experiences in union, in the way that Katz and Pike require, there is at least some sense in which contemplatives from different traditions and cultures could have experiences similar in content and structure

Consciousness of God as God is: The phenomenology of Christian centering prayer

In this study I aim to give an alternative approach to the way we theorise in the philosophy and comparative study of mysticism. Specifically, I aim to shift debate on the phenomenal nature of contemplative states of consciousness away from textual sources and towards reliable and descriptively rich first-person data originating in contemporary practices of lived traditions. The heart of this dissertation lies in rich qualitative interview data obtained through recently developed second-person approaches in the science of consciousness. I conducted in-depth phenomenological interviews with 20 Centering Prayer teachers and practitioners. The interviews covered the larger trajectory of their contemplative paths and granular detail of the dynamics of recent seated prayer sessions. I aided my second-person method with a “radical participation” approach to fieldwork at St Benedict’s Monastery in Snowmass. In this study I present nuanced phenomenological analyses of the first-person data regarding the beginning to intermediate stages of the Christian contemplative path, as outlined by the Centering Prayer tradition and described by Centering Prayer contemplatives. My presentation of the phenomenology of Centering Prayer is guided by a synthetic map of Centering Prayer’s (Keating School) contemplative path and model of human consciousness, which is grounded in the first-person data obtained in this study and takes into account the tradition’s primary sources. This includes: (1) an outline of the stages of the contemplative path; (2) the levels of consciousness (ordinary, spiritual and divine) and the type of experiential content (coarse, subtle and very subtle/divine presence) proper to each stage of the path; and (3) corresponding types of self (false, true and separate-self sense). My study addresses three meta-issues in the field pertaining to method, description and theory. First, I offer a new framework for the comparative study of contemplative practices and experiences, alongside a sound second-person method for collecting first-person data from contemplative practitioners. Second, I provide an effective framework for developing phenomenological accounts that are descriptively faithful, analytically transparent and theoretically useful. Third, I draw on the phenomenological accounts developed in this study to reconsider important theses advanced in the contemporary philosophy and comparative study of mysticism. On this basis, I argue that practitioners phenomenally apprehend union states, specifically prayer of full union, through experiential primitives, such as a “sense of presence”, and without a “God-identification element”. Consequently, union states are phenomenologically of an unidentified reality and therefore not theistic, in Katz’s and Pike’s senses. However, there might be some sense in which they are phenomenologically of God, because they could be practitioners’ consciousness of God as God is; but this would empirically disconfirm received views of how God should be experienced. This finding challenges arguments for a unique theistic experience, designed to uphold a fundamental distinction between theistic and nontheistic experiences. Since Christian practitioners do not necessarily have unique theistic experiences in union, in the way that Katz and Pike require, there is at least some sense in which contemplatives from different traditions and cultures could have experiences similar in content and structure

The Contemplative Mind and Life: First-Person Methods and the Challenge of Pure Consciousness and Phenomenal Selfhood for the “Neurophenomenological” Research Program

A new paradigm in cognitive science has emerged called the “enactive approach”, which has given rise to a research program known as “neurophenomenology”. This research program attempts to calibrate third- and first-person methods to investigate consciousness. In his recent and representative work Mind in Life, Evan Thompson has put forward the thesis that there is a “deep continuity between life and mind”. While I remain sympathetic to the neurophenomenological approach as an exemplar par excellence of how the science of consciousness ought to proceed, I argue against this continuity thesis from three perspectives: (1) the nature and potential of first-person approaches to consciousness; (2) the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) the egological or non-egological nature of consciousness and selfhood. My argument begins by laying out the foundations of enactive cognitive science, the continental analysis of time-consciousness and Thompson‟s attempt to close the empirical gap between life and mind with the help of the neurophenomenological bridging strategy (dynamic systems theory). Next, I discuss the phenomenology of different types of (structured) experiences and the fact that continental and contemplative methods share a common logic. I then argue that first-person methods (i) offer prima facie evidence that there are perceptual and non-perceptual types of experience, and (ii) grant us “cognitive access” to both types of experience. Following this, I consider at least one non-perceptual type of experience (pure consciousness) that breaks down the dynamic and relational structure of time-consciousness. I argue that pure consciousness is phenomenally lived-through but without egocentricity (subject-pole). Furthermore, a sophisticated distinction between (i) a minimal, core sense of (ego-) self and (ii) a non-egological but phenomenally lived-through subjectivity, is capable of shedding light on long-lasting debates surrounding the existence and non-existence of self (ātman). This especially holds true with regards to Buddhist philosophy and objectors to the doctrine of not-self (anatta/anātman). Finally, the nature of pure consciousness will lead me to challenge Thompson‟s continuity thesis, on the grounds that phenomenological evidence shows that the contemplative mind (pure consciousness) is decidedly not dynamic and intentional in structure. Thus there is a conceptual discontinuity between the biological domain and the phenomenological domain, being a decisive conceptual disanalogy between the contemplative mind (consciousness proper) and life. I thus conclude that prima facie: (1) first-person methods give us cognitive access to the objective and subjective domain of consciousness; (2) continental phenomenology is mistaken about the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) consciousness qua awareness per se is non-egological. Having completed my argument against the continuity thesis, I will briefly recommend specific avenues for future neurophenomenological research to (a) adjudicate between continental and contemplative phenomenological views of consciousness; (b) judge whether or not Thompson‟s continuity thesis can be upheld; and (c) introduce new ways of studying (phenomenal) selfhood. In this way, I hope not only to argue against Thompon‟s continuity thesis, but to also point towards the potential of the neurophenomenological research program to advance our understanding of consciousness and phenomenal selfhood

The Contemplative Mind and Life: First-Person Methods and the Challenge of Pure Consciousness and Phenomenal Selfhood for the “Neurophenomenological” Research Program

A new paradigm in cognitive science has emerged called the “enactive approach”, which has given rise to a research program known as “neurophenomenology”. This research program attempts to calibrate third- and first-person methods to investigate consciousness. In his recent and representative work Mind in Life, Evan Thompson has put forward the thesis that there is a “deep continuity between life and mind”. While I remain sympathetic to the neurophenomenological approach as an exemplar par excellence of how the science of consciousness ought to proceed, I argue against this continuity thesis from three perspectives: (1) the nature and potential of first-person approaches to consciousness; (2) the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) the egological or non-egological nature of consciousness and selfhood. My argument begins by laying out the foundations of enactive cognitive science, the continental analysis of time-consciousness and Thompson‟s attempt to close the empirical gap between life and mind with the help of the neurophenomenological bridging strategy (dynamic systems theory). Next, I discuss the phenomenology of different types of (structured) experiences and the fact that continental and contemplative methods share a common logic. I then argue that first-person methods (i) offer prima facie evidence that there are perceptual and non-perceptual types of experience, and (ii) grant us “cognitive access” to both types of experience. Following this, I consider at least one non-perceptual type of experience (pure consciousness) that breaks down the dynamic and relational structure of time-consciousness. I argue that pure consciousness is phenomenally lived-through but without egocentricity (subject-pole). Furthermore, a sophisticated distinction between (i) a minimal, core sense of (ego-) self and (ii) a non-egological but phenomenally lived-through subjectivity, is capable of shedding light on long-lasting debates surrounding the existence and non-existence of self (ātman). This especially holds true with regards to Buddhist philosophy and objectors to the doctrine of not-self (anatta/anātman). Finally, the nature of pure consciousness will lead me to challenge Thompson‟s continuity thesis, on the grounds that phenomenological evidence shows that the contemplative mind (pure consciousness) is decidedly not dynamic and intentional in structure. Thus there is a conceptual discontinuity between the biological domain and the phenomenological domain, being a decisive conceptual disanalogy between the contemplative mind (consciousness proper) and life. I thus conclude that prima facie: (1) first-person methods give us cognitive access to the objective and subjective domain of consciousness; (2) continental phenomenology is mistaken about the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) consciousness qua awareness per se is non-egological. Having completed my argument against the continuity thesis, I will briefly recommend specific avenues for future neurophenomenological research to (a) adjudicate between continental and contemplative phenomenological views of consciousness; (b) judge whether or not Thompson‟s continuity thesis can be upheld; and (c) introduce new ways of studying (phenomenal) selfhood. In this way, I hope not only to argue against Thompon‟s continuity thesis, but to also point towards the potential of the neurophenomenological research program to advance our understanding of consciousness and phenomenal selfhood.</p