Whistle blowing

For law enforcement purposes corruption and fraud are hard battles. Because of the highly secretive and premeditated nature of these crimes, prime witnesses are themselves often implicated in the fraudulent transaction. Promises of immunity and whistle blowing rewards are often required to resolve these information asymmetries. These insights have set a trend, both in scholarship and law enforcement practice, towards reward-based approaches (carrots), as an alternative or complement to punishment based deterrence (sticks). Applying the U.S. False Claims Act (FCA) as an analytical framework, we provide a critical review of the efficiency limitations of whistle blowing. More specifically, the formal model developed in this contribution, reveals a gap between social and private incentives in whistle blowing, both with regard to the decision to pursue litigation and the timing of whistle blowing. First, while an insider will blow the whistle whenever his expected recovery exceeds the expected costs of litigation, enforcement agencies seek to optimise enforcement in the long run. The autonomy of whistle blowers to pursue claims without government involvement, weakens the government’s bargaining position and obstructs the government’s ability to weigh in wider factors of enforcement (the effect of an individual case on a multiple claim suit, etc.). Second, whenever rewards are tied to recovery, bounty awards create a perverse incentive whereby fraudulent practices are not terminated at a socially optimal point in time. The potential race among whistle blowers cannot mitigate this effect fully because the stigma and loss of opportunities on the job market act as internal constraints on whistle blowing

Perturbation analysis analyzed—mathematical modeling of intact and perturbed gene regulatory circuits for animal development

Gene regulatory networks for animal development are the underlying mechanisms controlling cell fate specification and differentiation. The architecture of gene regulatory circuits determines their information processing properties and their developmental function. It is a major task to derive realistic network models from exceedingly advanced high throughput experimental data. Here we use mathematical modeling to study the dynamics of gene regulatory circuits to advance the ability to infer regulatory connections and logic function from experimental data. This study is guided by experimental methodologies that are commonly used to study gene regulatory networks that control cell fate specification. We study the effect of a perturbation of an input on the level of its downstream genes and compare between the cis-regulatory execution of OR and AND logics. Circuits that initiate gene activation and circuits that lock on the expression of genes are analyzed. The model improves our ability to analyze experimental data and construct from it the network topology. The model also illuminates information processing properties of gene regulatory circuits for animal development

Less meat initiatives at Ghent University : assessing the support among students and how to increase it

In this study, we conducted a survey among Business Administration students at Ghent University to assess their support for six less meat initiatives (LMIs) to be implemented in student restaurants. We examined associations between the support and variables related to meat curtailment and additionally examined the effect of providing information about the climate impact of meat on the support for the LMIs. We find that the support is rather limited among the students we surveyed. Students have different appraisals of the different LMIs, which may be due to differences in intervention strength and types of meat curtailment. We found that higher environmental concern is associated with a higher support for all LMIs. Female students and students with lower meat consumption levels indicate a higher support for four of six LMIs. Simply providing information about the climate impact of meat had no remarkable effect on the support. More integrated approaches are recommended to inform students

TOO MUCH INVESTMENT : A PROBLEM OF COORDINATION FAILURE

This paper shows that coordination failure and contractual incompleteness can lead to socially excessive investment. Firms and workers choose investment levels, then enter a stochastic matching process. If investment levels are discrete, and match frictions are low, high-investing workers (firms) impose a negative pecuniary externality on any worker (firm) who cuts investment. Specifically, an agent cutting investment subsequently bargains with a partner with a binding outside option due to the fact that it can easily match with another high investor. The deviant thus bears the full loss in revenue from its action. However, given enough complementarity in investments, when one agent cuts investment it is efficient that its partner also does so. So, only part of the cost saving accrues to the deviant, with the implication that the net private gain to cutting investment is less than the social gain. A similar argument establishes that over-investment can occur when agents are heterogenous i.e. differ in their cost of investing, even if investments are continuous. Then, over-investment occurs because low-cost investors have a private incentive to invest to shift rent away from high-cost investors. Our model can also explain some recent trends in graduate/non-graduate wage differentials.hold-up ; coordination failure ; matching ; over-investment

Bisector energy and few distinct distances

We introduce the bisector energy of an $n$-point set $P$ in $\mathbb{R}^2$, defined as the number of quadruples $(a,b,c,d)$ from $P$ such that $a$ and $b$ determine the same perpendicular bisector as $c$ and $d$. If no line or circle contains $M(n)$ points of $P$, then we prove that the bisector energy is $O(M(n)^{\frac{2}{5}}n^{\frac{12}{5}+\epsilon} + M(n)n^2).$. We also prove the lower bound $\Omega(M(n)n^2)$, which matches our upper bound when $M(n)$ is large. We use our upper bound on the bisector energy to obtain two rather different results: (i) If $P$ determines $O(n/\sqrt{\log n})$ distinct distances, then for any $0<\alpha\le 1/4$, either there exists a line or circle that contains $n^\alpha$ points of $P$, or there exist $\Omega(n^{8/5-12\alpha/5-\epsilon})$ distinct lines that contain $\Omega(\sqrt{\log n})$ points of $P$. This result provides new information on a conjecture of Erd\H{o}s regarding the structure of point sets with few distinct distances. (ii) If no line or circle contains $M(n)$ points of $P$, then the number of distinct perpendicular bisectors determined by $P$ is $\Omega(\min\{M(n)^{-2/5}n^{8/5-\epsilon}, M(n)^{-1} n^2\})$. This appears to be the first higher-dimensional example in a framework for studying the expansion properties of polynomials and rational functions over $\mathbb{R}$, initiated by Elekes and R\'onyai.Comment: 18 pages, 2 figure