Thinking Like a Giraffe: Biosemiotics, Ethics, and Soundscape Ecology

Building on the unique intersection of biosemiotics ethical theory and a philosophical exploration of soundscape ecology, this project examines the ethical implications of considering soundscape analysis from a nonhuman perspective. I first outline the problem of the nonhuman listener for soundscape ecology before then tracing the distinction between acoustic ecology and soundscape ecology. I then introduce the biosemiotics as a theoretical model for understanding nonhuman experience, and then use that model to describe a months-long soundscape study in partnership with a local zoological park which examined the potential impact of anthrophonic noise events on a specific set of individuals: a trio of adult giraffes. This soundscape case study of this zoo’s giraffes and their experiential interrelations with their soundscape proposes that if (soundscape) ecology is meant to help us in “thinking like a mountain,” [1] we might then miss out on individual experience through, in this case, listening like a giraffe.&nbsp

Baudrillard's simulated ecology

Jean Baudrillard, the scholar and critic of postmodernity, struggled with questions of postmodern ontology: representation of the real through the semiotic process of signification is threatened with the rise of simulacra, the simulated real. With this rise, seductive semiotic relationships between signs replace any traditional ontological representamen. This struggle has implications for environmentalism since the problems of contemporary environmental philosophy are rooted in problems with ontology. Hence the question of postmodern ecology: can the natural survive postmodern simulation? Baudrillard's communicative analysis of semiotic postmodernity can both support and extend ecosemiotic theses in response to these questions, questions that must be answered in order to explore our paradoxical understandings of the natural and confirm an understanding of environmentalism for postmodernity. In this paper I will argue for the merit of a semiotic understanding of postmodernity, develop the idea of ecology in this context, and then compare Baudrillard's approach to the contemporary development of ecosemiotics

The Porosity of Autonomy: Social and Biological Constitution of the Patient in Biomedicine

The nature and role of the patient in biomedicine comprise issues central to bioethical inquiry. Given its developmental history grounded firmly in a backlash against 20th-century cases of egregious human subjects abuse, contemporary medical bioethics has come to rely on a fundamental assumption: the unit of care is the autonomous self-directing patient. In this article we examine first the structure of the feminist social critique of autonomy. Then we show that a parallel argument can be made against relational autonomy as well, demonstrating how this second concept of autonomy fails to take sufficiently into account an array of biological determinants, particularly those from microbial biology. Finally, in light of this biological critique, we question whether or to what extent any relevant and meaningful view of autonomy can be recovered in the contemporary landscape of bioethic

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: An Ethics Case Study in Environmental Engineering

The April 20, 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion was an engineering and environmental tragedy that led to the loss of 11 human lives and has had far-reaching environmental and economic impacts, the full extent of which is difficult if not impossible to calculate. In 2015 the explosion continues to impact those 11 individual’s families; it continues to have a far-reaching emotional impact on the 115 men and women on board at the time of the catastrophe; scientists are still evaluating the environmental impacts of both the oil dispersion throughout the gulf and the oil dispersant used to curtail the spill at surface depths. Simultaneously, gulf business owners, particularly those who rely on gulf waters for their livelihoods, continue to struggle. This novel and far-reaching real-world disaster is particularly salient for use within engineering curricula due to its inherently complex interplay of ethical issues and the broad scope of stakeholders impacted by the initial disaster and its aftermath. We have developed and refined this real-world case study with students participating in a graduate level course at Purdue University over three separate years and five course offerings. We designed this case study within a unique pedagogical framework that leads students to reflectively adopt varying stakeholders’ perspectives in order to reason through the case within a team setting. As a final goal, students must decide the appropriateness of continuing deepwater drilling throughout the Gulf of Mexico in light of the human, economic, environmental, and social implications of future potential blowouts. As part of the broader ethics course in which this case is embedded, we selected this case as it provides a uniquely broader scope of stakeholders and a more specific focus on the principles of nonmaleficence and justice when compared to the other cases presented to students. Specifically, this case asks students to consider a broad range of stakeholders. Whereas many engineering ethics case studies focus on human stakeholders and corporations, here the focus also includes marine and aquatic life, challenging a narrowly anthropocentric focus by placing environmental issues as a focal point. In this sense, our focus pushes beyond other case studies in ethics by addressing both macro-ethical issues, where students are encouraged to adopt a broadened societal viewpoint to deduce the most ethical courses of action, and micro-ethical issues, where the focus is towards the professional obligations of an individual engineer, through a scaffolded staged pedagogy. In this paper we present the case structure and pedagogy to argue for the relevance of this unique, novel, and effective case for increasing engineering students’ ethical reasoning abilities, particularly broadening their awareness of the scope of stakeholders impacted by engineering decisions and their ability to empathize with those stakeholders

‘Well, It’s Not Illegal!’

Some things are immoral, yet perfectly legal. While other things may be illegal, but not necessarily immoral

Internet Has Helped Spread Information, But Not Necessarily Knowledge

How many of us know how to ground an electrical circuit, or what the difference is between a volt, an amp or a watt? Probably very few

The Ecosystem of Bioethics: Building Bridges to Public Health

Understanding bioethical inquiry as ecosystem aligns that thinking about health conceptually close to public health ethics. Despite having roots in decades-long, culturally-diverse, and disciplinarily-broad concerns about the relationships of human beings to environment as manifest in the work of Fritz Jahr and Van Rensselaer Potter, medical “mainstream” bioethics has maintained a relatively narrow focus on individual health. The practical instantiations of bioethics are inconsistent both with the term’s own historical international contexts and the ecosystemic nature of health, a concept of systems that includes both cultural and biological interactions. Following a growing number of international calls for such change in bioethics, this paper argues that a reinvigoration of bioethics demands transdisciplinary intersections of ecology, value, and health – as a bridge connecting across to the identified projects of public health ethics

Who Should Self-Driving Cars Be Programmed to Protect?

Technology advances at breakneck speed. That’s exciting to early adopters, who can’t wait to get their hands on the latest piece of tech. For some, the rapid onslaught of technology is frustrating. But there are bigger issues that need our attention

Can’t We Make Better Decisions to Ensure Ethical Outcomes?

Ethics is not just for deep philosophical discussion. Check out the news on any given day and you are apt to find a report that makes you wish people acted more ethically

Justifying Moral Standing by Biosemiotic Particularism

In diesem Essay untersuchen wir eine fundamentale Frage der Biosemiotik: Warum sollte Semiose eine moralisch relevante Fähigkeit sein, oder eine Fähigkeit, die den moralischen Wert lebender Wesen oder Systeme, die über sie verfügen, steigert? Wir argumentieren, dass biosemiotischer Partikularismus, also die Ansicht, dass normative Bewertung auf der jeweiligen Erfüllung der semiosischen Kapazität eines Organismus oder einer anderen biologischen Entität fußen sollte, eine gerechtfertigte normative Position für den biosemiotischen Ethiker bereithält. Wenn das, was es rechtfertigt, allen lebenden Wesen und Systemen moralischen Stellenwert beizumessen, ihr semiosischer Charakter ist, dann muss Semiose etwas ethisch Motivierendes beinhalten. Wir untersuchen verschiedene Argumente, um diese Frage zu beantworten: Argumente für semiotische Handlungsfähigkeit, also die Behauptung, dass alle lebenden Entitäten als Ergebnis ihrer semiosischen Kapazitäten Handlungsträger sind; Argumente dafür, dass alle lebenden Wesen subjektive oder quasi-subjektive Erfahrungen haben und dass sie moralisch relevant sind; und Argumente dafür, dass die Erzeugung von Bedeutung moralische Relevanz hat und ausreicht, um moralische Bedeutsamkeit zu begründen. Wir gehen auch auf das Negativargument ein, dass Semiose mindestens so vertretbar ist wie das Empfindungsvermögen, das eine alternative Kapazität zur Begründung moralischer Relevanz darstellt, wie auch andere wahrnehmungsverwandte Kapazitäten. Schließlich fragen wir noch weiter: Selbst wenn Semiose eine moralisch relevante Fähigkeit lebender Organismen darstellt, ist sie die moralisch relevante Fähigkeit? Das heißt, ist Semiose der kleinste gemeinsame Nenner für die Zuschreibung moralischen Werts, mit dem Ergebnis, dass empfindungsbasierte Konzepte, unter anderen, auf biosemiotischer Ethik als einer begründenden meta-ethischen Theorie aufbauen könnten?In this essay we examine a fundamental question in biosemiotic ethics: why think that semiosis is a morally relevant property, or a property that supports the moral value of living beings or systems that possess it? We argue that biosemiotic particularism, the view that normative assessment should be based on the particular fulfillment of an organism’s or other biological entity’s specific semiosic capacity, offers a justifiable normative position for the biosemiotic ethicist. If what justifies offering moral standing to all living beings and systems is that these entities are semiosic, then there must be something ethically motivating about semiosis. We examine several arguments in answer to this question. These include arguments for semiotic agency, the claim that all living entities are agential as a result of their semiosic capacities; arguments for subjective or quasi-subjective experience, that all living beings have it and that it matters morally; and arguments for the moral relevance of meaning-making as sufficient for moral considerability. We also address the negative argument that semiosis is at least as defensible as sentience, an alternative candidate capacity for grounding moral relevance, and other cognition-related capacities. Finally, we push further to ask: even if semiosis is a morally relevant capacity of living organisms, is it the morally relevant property? That is, is semiosis the least common denominator for attribution of moral worth, to the effect that sentience-based approaches, among others, could build on biosemiotic ethics as a foundational meta-ethical theory