Introducing Implicit Bias: Why this Book Matters

Written by a diverse range of scholars, this accessible introductory volume asks: What is implicit bias? How does implicit bias compromise our knowledge of others and social reality? How does implicit bias affect us, as individuals and participants in larger social and political institutions, and what can we do to combat biases? An interdisciplinary enterprise, the volume brings together the philosophical perspective of the humanities with the perspective of the social sciences to develop rich lines of inquiry. It is written in a non-technical style, using relatable examples that help readers understand what implicit bias is, its significance, and the controversies surrounding it. Each chapter includes discussion questions and additional reading suggestions. A companion webpage contains teaching resources. The volume will be an invaluable resource for students—and researchers—seeking to understand criticisms surrounding implicit bias, as well as how one might answer them by adopting a more nuanced understanding of bias and its role in maintaining social injustice

Explaining Injustice: Structural Analysis, Bias, and Individuals

Why does social injustice exist? What role, if any, do implicit biases play in the perpetuation of social inequalities? Individualistic approaches to these questions explain social injustice as the result of individuals’ preferences, beliefs, and choices. For example, they explain racial injustice as the result of individuals acting on racial stereotypes and prejudices. In contrast, structural approaches explain social injustice in terms of beyond-the-individual features, including laws, institutions, city layouts, and social norms. Often these two approaches are seen as competitors. Framing them as competitors suggests that only one approach can win and that the loser offers worse explanations of injustice. In this essay, we explore each approach and compare them. Using implicit bias as an example, we argue that the relationship between individualistic and structural approaches is more complicated than it may first seem. Moreover, we contend that each approach has its place in analyses of injustice and raise the possibility that they can work together—synergistically—to produce deeper explanations of social injustice. If so, the approaches may be complementary, rather than competing

Rethinking Legislative Consent Law?

This book is designed to be used as a supplemental text in children's literature and reading/language art courses at the pre-service and graduate levels. The text contains seven chapters: three of wich set the stage for teaching effectively with childern's literature and four of wich provide examples of activities using specific children's books.xv, 164 p.; ill.: 28 c

Effects of Prenatal Drug Exposure on Neurobehavioral Functioning in Young Infants

In the newborn period, infants prenatally exposed to cocaine and other drugs show low scores on the Neonatal Behavioral Assessment Scale. Beyond that period, research is limited on the effects of prenatal drug exposure on neurobehavioral functioning. In this study we compared infants exposed to cocaine and other drugs and control infants from low socioeconomic backgrounds on measures of neurobehavioral functioning during neuromotor assessment at 1, 4 and 7 months of life. None of the measures of neurobehavioral functioning showed any significant group differences. This study did not support the hypothesis of disrupted neurobehavioral functioning beyond the neonatal period in infants exposed to drugs prenatally

Embodiment and Oppression: Reflections on Haslanger, Gender, and Race

This chapter is an extended version (almost 2x in length) of an essay first published in Australasian Philosophical Review. Abstract: In On Female Body Experience, Iris Marion Young argues that a central aim of feminist and queer theory is social criticism. The goal is to understand oppression and how it functions: know thy enemy, so as to better resist. Much of Sally Haslanger’s work shares this goal, and her newest article, “Cognition as a Social Skill,” is no exception. In this essay, I will specify what I believe is special and insightful about Haslanger’s theory of oppression and her most recent addition to it. However, I also explore what it is missing, namely, an account of what Young calls “individual [embodied] experience, subjectivity, and identity.” Echoing a chorus of critical voices, I argue that this omission undermines Haslanger’s ability to effectively theorize group oppression and how to resist it. The core problem is this. Haslanger privileges a third-person methodology that prioritizes social structures over all else. I conclude by amplifying a collective call to action: any adequate theory of oppression must attend to both the lived experiences of individuals and to social structures, that is, to the broad institutional and cultural underpinnings of oppression. A theory that does only one, or the other, will fail. Through this analysis, the chapter contributes to an overall aim of this volume, namely, to advance our understanding of racial and gender-based group oppressions by paying closer attention to facts about embodiment

Stereotyping as Discrimination: Why Thoughts Can Be Discriminatory

.Can we treat people in a discriminatory way in virtue of how we think about them? In this essay, I argue that the answer is yes. According to the constitutive claim, stereotyping constitutes discrimination, either sometimes or always. This essay defends the constitutive claim and explores the deeper justifications for it. I also sketch the constitutive claim’s larger ethical significance. One upshot is that we can wrongfully discriminate against (or in favor of) others in thought, even if we keep our views of others to ourselves. Second, if stereotyping is a form of discrimination, theories of wrongful discrimination bear on the ethical questions associated with stereotyping, including this one: under what conditions is it wrong to stereotype? In closing, I introduce an intriguing possibility, namely, that stereotyping is wrong if and when it constitutes wrongful discrimination

The Constitutive Claim: Payoffs and Perils

In “Stereotyping as Discrimination: Why Thoughts Can Be Discriminatory,” I propose that stereotyping someone—even if you manage to keep your thoughts hidden and don’t act on them—can constitute a form of discrimination (2021b). What, Alex Madva asks, are the practical implications of this claim? Even if I am correct that stereotyping constitutes a form of discriminatory treatment, it’s still possible that people should keep on speaking and acting as if “discrimination” refers exclusively to behaviors and policies. He invites me to explore the “potential payoffs and perils” of referring to thoughts and perceptions as discriminatory, especially as they relate to legal practice and social-scientific inquiry (2021, 46)

Machine Learning and Irresponsible Inference: Morally Assessing the Training Data for Image Recognition Systems

Just as humans can draw conclusions responsibly or irresponsibly, so too can computers. Machine learning systems that have been trained on data sets that include irresponsible judgments are likely to yield irresponsible predictions as outputs. In this paper I focus on a particular kind of inference a computer system might make: identification of the intentions with which a person acted on the basis of photographic evidence. Such inferences are liable to be morally objectionable, because of a way in which they are presumptuous. After elaborating this moral concern, I explore the possibility that carefully procuring the training data for image recognition systems could ensure that the systems avoid the problem. The lesson of this paper extends beyond just the particular case of image recognition systems and the challenge of responsibly identifying a person’s intentions. Reflection on this particular case demonstrates the importance (as well as the difficulty) of evaluating machine learning systems and their training data from the standpoint of moral considerations that are not encompassed by ordinary assessments of predictive accuracy

Predictors of infant positive, negative and self-direct coping during face to face still-face in a Portuguese preterm sample

Past studies found three types of infant coping behaviour during Face-to-Face Still-Face paradigm (FFSF): a Positive Other-Directed Coping; a Negative Other-Directed Coping and a Self-Directed Coping. In the present study, we investigated whether those types of coping styles are predicted by: infants’ physiological responses; maternal representations of their infant’s temperament; maternal interactive behaviour in free play; and infant birth and medical status. The sample consisted of 46, healthy, prematurely born infants and their mothers. At one month, infant heart rate was collected in basal. At three months old (corrected age), infant heart-rate was registered during FFSF episodes. Mothers described their infants’ temperament using a validated Portuguese temperament scale, at infants three months of corrected age. As well, maternal interactive behaviour was evaluated during free play situation using CARE-Index. Our findings indicate that positive coping behaviours were correlated with gestational birth weight, heart rate (HR), gestational age, and maternal sensitivity in free play. Gestational age and maternal sensitivity predicted Positive Other-Direct Coping behaviours. Moreover, Positive Other-Direct coping was negatively correlated with HR during Still-Face Episode. Self-directed behaviours were correlated with HR during Still-Face Episode and Recover Episode and with maternal controlling/intrusive behaviour. However, only maternal behaviour predicted Self-direct coping. Early social responses seem to be affected by infants’ birth status and by maternal interactive behaviour. Therefore, internal and external factors together contribute to infant ability to cope and tore-engage after stressful social events