Audit report criteria: An empirical examination; Technical Research Report 3;

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_guides/1017/thumbnail.jp

An Analysis of Overhead-Expense Measures and Relative Bank Profitability*

John A. Haslem is Professor of Finance and James P. Bedingfield is an Associate Professor of Accounting at the University of Maryland. A. J. Stagliano is an Associate Professor of Accounting at George Mason University

An Analysis of Capital Measures and Relative Bank Profitability

John A. Haslem is Professor of Finance in the College of Business and Management at the University of Maryland . James P. Bedingfield is an Associate Professor of Accounting in the College of Business and Management at the University of Maryland. A.J. Stagliano is the Edward G. Sutula Professor of Accounting at Saint Joseph\u27s University in Philadelphia

Bank Funds Management: Interest-Margin Measures and Relative Profitability*

John A. Haslem is Professor of Finance in the College of Business and Management at the University of Maryland. James P. Bedingfield is an Associate Professor of Accounting in the College of Business and Management at the University of Maryland. A.J. Stagliano is Sutula Professor of Accounting at St. Joseph\u27s University

Equity Returns to Small Bank Investors

Unlike most other small firms, there is an excellent record of the initial equity capitalization details of banking organizations when they are formed, as well as subsequent changes, because of the chartering application and reporting requirements of the banking regulatory authorities. By combining these records with the actual approved acquisition price of small banks, the return received by small bank investors from the time of organization through acquisition is determined. For small banks organized after 1972 and acquired from 1980 and through 1988, yearly mean rates of return ranged from 23.07 percent to 10.49 percent. Generally, these returns exceed S&P 500 returns for similar holding periods, but on a Sharpe Performance Index risk adjusted basis were inferior to S&P portfolios in six of nine holding periods and consistently weaker by the same measure to small company investment on the NYSE for this entire period. This inferior risk adjusted performance was unexpected

An analysis of the impact of international activity on the domestic balance sheet of US banks

The primary purpose of a recent study is to compare the domestic office balance sheet profiles of international US banks with those of domestic banks in the 1984, 1987, and 1989 pooled sample period that included the LDC loan crisis period. The profiles and performance of both foreign focused and domestic focused international banks were analyzed and compared

An analysis of the foreign and domestic balance sheet strategies of the US banks and their association to profitability performance

This study analyzed the 1987 data of 176 relatively large U.S. banks that have both foreign and domestic offices. Canonical analysis and the interpretive framework of asset/liability management were used to identify and interpret their foreign and domestic balance sheet strategies in the context of the crisis in lending to LDCs. The analysis found a consistent dichotomy in foreign and domestic asset/liability matching strategies, the former being more generally conservative with respect to interest-rate and liquidity risks. Among the 44 very large banks, those that were found to follow a predominant or consistent foreign strategy are more profitable than those that follow a mixed or, especially, domestic strategy. Further, these banks that follow a consistent foreign (domestic) matching strategy have the smallest (largest) mean proportions of all foreign asset and liability variables

DEA efficiency profiles of US banks operating internationally

Data envelopment analysis (DEA) was used to analyze the 1987 and 1992 input/output efficiency of U.S. banks operating internationally. In 1987, banks belatedly began to acknowledge with huge writeoffs the crisis in lending to less-developed countries (LDCs). Some 20% of the banks were identified as inefficient in each year, and approximately 50-60% of the total inputs/outputs of inefficient banks were excessive/deficient, with inputs proportionately more so than outputs. In 1987, the herd instinct that had led to the LDC loan crisis caused DEA\u27s empirical “best practice” production frontier to identify as efficient banks that were financial “bad practice” banks. However, by 1992, normalcy had returned and DEA best practice banks were also financial good practice banks. Overall, it was found that management should focus on overall efficiency, but with particular attention to inputs, especially cash and real capital, and to foreign loans among the outputs