Improving Practical Reasoning and Argumentation

This thesis justifies the need for and develops a new integrated model of practical reasoning and argumentation. After framing the work in terms of what is reasonable rather than what is rational (chapter 1), I apply the model for practical argumentation analysis and evaluation provided by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) to a paradigm case of unreasonable individual practical argumentation provided by mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik (chapter 2). The application shows that by following the model, Breivik is relatively easily able to conclude that his reasoning to mass murder is reasonable – which is understood to be an unacceptable result. Causes for the model to allow such a conclusion are identified as conceptual confusions ingrained in the model, a tension in how values function within the model, and a lack of creativity from Breivik. Distinguishing between dialectical and dialogical, reasoning and argumentation, for individual and multiple participants, chapter 3 addresses these conceptual confusions and helps lay the foundation for the design of a new integrated model for practical reasoning and argumentation (chapter 4). After laying out the theoretical aspects of the new model, it is then used to re-test Breivik’s reasoning in light of a developed discussion regarding the motivation for the new place and role of moral considerations (chapter 5). The application of the new model shows ways that Breivik could have been able to conclude that his practical argumentation was unreasonable and is thus argued to have improved upon the Fairclough and Fairclough model. It is acknowledged, however, that since the model cannot guarantee a reasonable conclusion, improving the critical creative capacity of the individual using it is also of paramount importance (chapter 6). The thesis concludes by discussing the contemporary importance of improving practical reasoning and by pointing to areas for further research (chapter 7)

The Willingness to be Rationally Persuaded

In this paper I argue that underlying phronêsis is the more foundational virtue of a willingness to be rationally persuaded (WTRBP). A WTBRP is a virtue in the sense that it fulfills the doctrine of the mean by falling between two vices – never sticking to your position and never giving it up. Articulating a WTBRP in this way also helps address problems phronêsis faces in light of implicit bias research

Considering the roles of values in practical reasoning argumentation evaluation

Building upon the role values take in Walton’s theory of practical reasoning, this paper will frame the question of how values should be evaluated into the broader question of what reasonable practical argumentation is. The thesis argued for is that if a positive evaluation of practical reasoning argumentation requires that the argument avoid a morally negative conclusion, then the role of values should be given a central, rather than supportive, position in practical argument evaluation

Others and Imagination in Reasoning and Argumentation: Improving our Critical Creative Capacity

Contemporary argumentation theories highlight the importance of Others for contributing to and critiquing an individual’s reasoning and/or argumentation. Reasoners and arguers are encouraged to interact with imagined constructs such as a community of model interlocutors or universal audience. These model interlocutors are theoretically meant to bring to mind reasons and counter-considerations that may not have been conceived of otherwise so as to improve the overall quality of an instance of reasoning or argumentation. Overlooked, however, is the impact of differing individual’s imaginative abilities. This paper argues that more important than relying on an Other, real or imagined, reasoners and arguers would do just as well to improve their own creative abilities first. Consulting a real or imagined Other may help in some cases help, but such a strong reliance on Others comes with serious limitations

The Basic Components of Agreement

Disagreement has garnered attention in a variety of academic disciplines, but its counterpart agreement is deserving of much more attention than it has received. This paper begins by reviewing some of the existing literature directly discussing agreement. Inspired by these conversations, I then provide a typology of basic types of agreement followed by a more general discussion of its nature. The aim of the paper is to provide conceptual clarifications and a framework for discussing and analyzing agreement wherever it may be found.Le désaccord a attiré l'attention dans une variété de disciplines académiques, mais l’accord mérite beaucoup plus d'attention qu'il n'en a reçu. Cet article commence par passer en revue une partie de la littérature existante qui traite directement de l'accord. Inspiré par ces conversations, je propose ensuite une typologie des types d'accord de base suivie d'une discussion plus générale sur sa nature. L'objectif de cet article est de fournir des clarifications conceptuelles et un cadre pour discuter et analyser l'accord, où qu'il se trouve

Youth Voting, Rational Competency, and Epistemic Injustice

In 1970 the voting age in Canada changed from 21 to 18. Since then, there have been calls to lower it further, most commonly to age 16. Against the motion, however, it has been argued that youth may lack the ability to exercise a mature and informed vote. This paper argues against that worry and shows how restricting youth from voting on the basis of a misbelief about their abilities amounts to an epistemic injustice.En 1970, l'âge de voter au Canada est passé de 21 à 18 ans. Depuis lors, des appels ont été lancés pour l'abaisser davantage, le plus souvent à 16 ans. Toutefois, on a soutenu contre cet appel que les jeunes n’ont peut-être pas l’habileté d’exercer un vote mûr et éclairé. Cet article dénonce cette inquiétude et montre à quel point empêcher les jeunes de voter sur la base d'une croyance erronée quant à leurs habiletés équivaut à une injustice épistémique

Others and Imagination in Reasoning and Argumentation: Improving our Critical Creative Capacity

Contemporary argumentation theories highlight the importance of Others for contributing to and critiquing an individual’s reasoning and/or argumentation. Reasoners and arguers are encouraged to interact with imagined constructs such as a community of model interlocutors or universal audience. These model interlocutors are theoretically meant to bring to mind reasons and counter-considerations that may not have been conceived of otherwise so as to improve the overall quality of an instance of reasoning or argumentation. Overlooked, however, is the impact of differing individual’s imaginative abilities. This paper argues that more important than relying on an Other, real or imagined, reasoners and arguers would do just as well to improve their own creative abilities first. Consulting a real or imagined Other may help in some cases help, but such a strong reliance on Others comes with serious limitations

Introduction to the Special Issue

Special Issu