The McCain-Feingold Coordination Rules: The Ongoing Program to Keep Politics Under Control

The article begins with a brief introduction to McCain-Feingold which restricts coordination and intends to enforce limits on contributions to candidates and parties. It then goes through a history of coordination. It then goes through some aspects of McCain-Feingold and concludes by stating the aftermath of McCain-Feingold and how its rules are meant to provide order to politics

The Right to “Do Politics” and Not Just to Speak: Thinking About the Constitutional Protections for Political Action

Syfte: Det övergripande syftet med avhandlingen är att utveckla en intressentbaseradutvärderingsmetod för att utvärdera informationssystem. Jag har valt attkalla utvärderingsmetoden för VISU (Verksamhetsutvecklande InformationssystemUtvärdering). I VISU uppfattas utvärderingsprocessen som en socialprocess där människor arbetar tillsammans för att bestämma sig för egenskaperoch värden hos det informationssystem som utvärderas. Utgångspunkten förutvärderingsprocessen enligt VISU är att utvärdering ska användas praktiskt avmänniskor för att skapa utveckling och förbättring i verksamheter. Frågor: Tvåövergripande forskningsfrågor har drivit avhandlingsarbetet: 1. Hur bör en metodför utvärdering av informationssystem vara utformad för att bidra till enverksamhets utveckling? 2. Vad innebär en pragmatiskt grundad modell för ISUtvärdering? Forskningsmetod: I avhandlingsarbetet utvecklar jag VISU ochundersöker hur metoden fungerar samt vilka konsekvenser som användandet avVISU ger i praktiska utvärderingssammanhang. Forskningsarbetet har bedrivitsenligt Canonical Action Research. Aktionsforskningsstrategin har valts för attmotsvara undersökningsbehovet vid metodutveckling - behovet av att prövametoden i praktiska utvärderingsprocesser där metoden är avsedd att användas.Vidare grundas och förankras VISU i pragmatiska kunskapsteorier och teorier omutvärdering (särskilt intressentmodellen). VISU är också grundad i forskning omIS-utvärdering och förankrad i skolan om interpretativ IS-utvärdering. Kunskapsbidrag: Det praktiska bidraget från avhandlingen är en metod, VISU,för att utvärdera informationssystem. De teoretiska kunskapsbidragen är:rationalitet för en pragmatisk utvärderingsprocess, en multiparadigmmodell förIS-utvärdering samt en modell för utvärderingsbruk.Purpose: The purpose of the study is to develop an evaluation method forevaluating information systems based on the stakeholder model for evaluation.The method is called VISU (Swedish acronym for IS evaluation for workpracticedevelopment). In VISU, the evaluation process is recognised as a social processwhere people are working together in order to determine the qualities and valuesof the IS under evaluation. The point of departure is that evaluation is to be usedby people in order to make change and betterment. Questions: Two questionshave guided the study: 1) How should a method for evaluation of informationsystems be designed in order to contribute to the development of an organisation? and 2) What is the significance of a pragmatic grounded evaluation model? and 2) What is the significance of a pragmatic grounded evaluation model? Method: The research process has been conducted according to Canonical ActionResearch. The Action Research strategy has been chosen in order to satisfy theresearch needs when doing method development – the need to try the method outin non trivial situations. Further, VISU is grounded in pragmatic knowledgetheories, evaluation theories (stakeholder model) and IS evaluation theories andanchored in the school of interpretive IS evaluation. Contribution: The practicalcontribution from the study is VISU, a method for evaluation informationsystems. The theoretical contributions are rationality for pragmatic IS evaluation,a multiparadigm model for IS evaluation and a model for evaluation use

An Input-Output Analysis of the Soviet Fleet In ICNAF Areas 5 and 6, 1961-1973

One of the goals of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 was the rebuilding of the American fishing industry. However, the Act does not give the U.S.fisherman exclusive rights to the fishery resource. The American fisherman will still be competing with the foreign fleets. Section 204 (b) (1) of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. states: Each foreign nation with which the United States has entered into a governing international agreement shall submit an application to the Secretary of State each year for a permit for each of its fishing vessels to engage in fishing described in subsection (A). It appears, therefore, that there will be a few gates in this wall. Who comes through these gates will be determined by the State Department, the Regional Councils, and the Secretary of Commerce. However, the size of the gates will be determined by the Regional Councils as provided under the provisions of Section 303 subsection 4(B). Any fishery management plan which is prepared by any council, or by the Secretary, with respect to any fishery shall assess and specify the capacity and the extent to which fishing vessels of the United States, on an annual basis, will harvest the optimum yield specified under paragraph 3 and the portion of such optimum yield which, on an annual basis, will not be harvested by fishing vessels of the United States and can be made available for foreign fishing. For the first year of this Act, the Department of Commerce, with the help of its National Marine Fisheries Branch, will establish the optimum yield and whether or not there will be surpluses available to the foreign fleets.Therefore, for the first year the government will decide the size of the gate and to whom to sell tickets. We, therefore, come to the process of establishing a ticket price at the gate

Transparency, expectations, and forecasts

In 1994, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) began to release statements after each meeting. This paper investigates whether the public’s views about the current path of the economy and of future policy have been affected by changes in the Federal Reserve’s communications policy as reflected in private sector’s forecasts of future economic conditions and policy moves. In particular, has the ability of private agents to predict where the economy is going improved since 1994? If so, on which dimensions has the ability to forecast improved? We find evidence that the individuals’ forecasts have been more synchronized since 1994, implying the possible effects of the FOMC’s transparency. On the other hand, we find little evidence that the common forecast errors, which are the driving force of overall forecast errors, have become smaller since 1994.